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This is the second half of a two-part Article focusing on preclusior~s 
against successive enforcement of the environmental statutes. Part One of 
the Article, printed in Volume 28 of this Journal, examined preclusions 
against citizen suits and argued that because of the theme-and-variations 
nature of the preclusion language, that langrtage shortld be read in accor- 
dance with its plain meaning. Part Two, pitblished in this issue, studies the 
restrictions on enforcement actions by the EPA and reaches the same con- 
clusion. 
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In drafting environmental statutes, Congress sought to ensure effec- 
tive environmental protection by authorizing the Environmental Protec- 
tion Agency ("EPA"), states, and citizens to enforce against violations of 
the federal environmental statutes. Foreseeing that successive actions by 
multiple enforcers could cause disruption, Congress devised a three-element 
preclusion device governing when successive actions are authorized or 
barred. Congress developed variations for each of the three elements, giving 
itself a flexible device to fine-tune the degrees to which successive actions 
by different enforcers were allowed under each statute. 
The preclusion devices which Congress placed in the citizen suit provi- 
sions of the statutes were relatively uniform, reflecting Congress's inten- 
tion that government be the primary enforcer. On the other hand, Congress 
placed widely varying versions of the preclusion device in the EPA en- 
forcement provisions of the statutes, reflecting the different balances be- 
tween federal and state implementation it intended under each of the stat- 
utes. This Article examines EPA enforcement preclusions. 
The variations Congress used in each version of the preclusion de- 
vice it placed in the enforcement provisions of the statutes indicate pre- 
cisely when EPA or a citizen may or may not proceed with a successive ac- 
tion. In spite of clear Congressional intent, some courts have ignored the 
wording of the preclusion devices and bypassed the normal canons of statu- 
tory construction. Instead, courts have interpreted the device to protect 
choices made by the first enforcer, usually the state, thereby unaccepta- 
bly substituting a judicial policy choice for a policy choice already made 
by Congress. Worse, from the perspective of environmental law, however, 
they encourage violators of environmental statutes to invite actions by weak 
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enforcers for the purpose of insulating their violations from effective en- 
forcement. This enables polluters to exploit weak enforcers, with the bless- 
ing of the federal courts, and to undermine the integrity of the environ- 
mental statutes. This Article urges courts to interpret the preclusion de- 
vices as enacted by Congress, observing the proper roles of the judicial 
and legislative branches, and preserving the integrity of the environmental 
statutes. 
America's environmental statutes, and specifically their enforcement 
provisions, were enacted against a backdrop of failures to effectively ad- 
dress environmental harm. Rampant industrial growth during the begin- 
ning of the twentieth century set the stage for several decades of environ- 
mental trauma at its end. The federal government augmented the develop- 
ing trauma by largely abstaining from pollution control regulation for 
much of the century. Once the federal government did act, i t  addressed 
pollution control only on a fragmented, state-led basis, with little federal 
intervention or enforcement. When the public finally demanded action 
with massive demonstrations on the first Earth Day,' Congress reacted by 
enacting comprehensive environmental protection legislation during the 
1 9 7 0 ~ . ~  The legislation replaced earlier state-dominated pollution control 
programs with federal programs, and replaced earlier weak and cumber- 
some federal enforcement authorities with strong and streamlined ones.' 
For the most part, Congress did not oust states from the pollution control 
field, but created programs with roles for both federal and state regula- 
tors, typically allowing for both state and federal enforcement. Not trust- 
ing even two sets of government regulators to comprehensively enforce 
these programs, Congress also authorized private citizens to enforce the 
same requirements, incorporating the "citizen suit" provisions in these 
 statute^.^ 
. When Congress created federal and citizen enforcement authorities 
in addition to existing state enforcement authorities, it recognized the 
potential for duplicative and conflicting successive enforcement against 
the same violations. It was willing to tolerate that possibility in order to 
assure more comprehensive compliance with pollution control laws through 
more frequent enforcement, but sought to lessen and manage successive 
enforcement by creating a flexible, notice, delay, and bar preclusion de- 
vice, and by placing variations of that device in the federal and citizen 
enforcement provisions of the statutes. This two-part Article examines 
the legal issues raised in applying and interpreting that preclusion device. 
' Jeffrey G.  Miller, Theme and Variations in Statuton Precl~rsions Against Strccessive 
Environn~er~tal Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, Part One: Srat~rtory Bars in 
Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 H A R V .  ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 408 (2004). 
For a list of the statutes covered, see infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
Miller, supra note I ,  at 407-08. 
V d .  at 408-09. 
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Part One examined the issues under the citizen suit  provision^,^ and Part 
Two examines them under the federal enforcement provisions. 
Part One concluded that the plain meaning of the preclusion device 
addresses and answers the issues defendants have raised under it, often 
favoring successive enforcement actions. It found, however, that some courts 
disregard the plain meaning, interpreting the device to implement their 
policy choice to preserve the enforcement discretion of the first govern- 
ment enforcer, rather than interpreting it to implement the congressional 
policy choice to gain greater compliance through the actions of multiple 
enforcers. The legislative history of the provisions contains no hint that 
Congress was concerned with preserving the discretion of the first gov- 
ernment enforcer. Indeed, that aberrant interpretation deprives the citizen 
suit provisions of much of their force. The interpretation also derogates 
congressional intent expressed in the plain meaning of the device and 
elsewhere. Part One developed the thesis that the theme and variation 
nature of the device underscored its plain meaning by emphasizing that 
Congress made deliberate word choices when drafting the device, with 
its variations throughout the statutes. Congress used the words it chose in 
each variation to specifically enunciate the extent to which i t  intended to 
preclude successive enforcement under the enforcement provision at is- 
sue. Significantly, the device limits successive enforcement, but does not 
preclude i t  altogether. Indeed, the very presence of the citizen suit provi- 
sions indicates that at the very least Congress did not intend to preserve 
the policy choice of governmental enforcers not to enforce. Finally, Part 
One noted that the many reported citizen suit decisions evidenced little 
real disruption of government actions by the citizen suits. 
Part Two examines the preclusion device and its variations used in 
the EPA enforcement provisions of the same statutes. The plain meaning 
of these devices addresses and answers the issues defendants have raised 
under them, often favoring successive enforcement actions. Nevertheless, 
as with the citizen suit provisions, some courts interpret the device to im- 
plement their policy choice to preserve the discretion of earlier state enforc- 
ers. The legislative history of the provisions contains no indication that Con- 
gress was concerned with preserving the discretion of state enforcers. These 
interpretations to the contrary undermine the integrity of the federal stat- 
utes and the environmental requirements they establish, thereby encour- 
aging violators to invite lax state enforcement not requiring compliance 
with the federal requirements in order to foreclose any enforcer thereafter 
from seeking such compliance. Moreover, these interpretations are possi- 
ble only by ignoring the variations in the provisions and the additional 
emphasis they place on the plain meaning of the provisions. 
Recognizing the existence and implications of the theme and varia- 
tion nature of the preclusion device avoids the evisceration of the federal 
Miller, sccprcr note 1 .  
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statutes by emphasizing the primacy of the plain meaning interpretation. 
Congress used the device in one variation or another at least sixteen times in 
the citizen and EPA enforcement provisions of the nine environmental stat- 
utes considered here. Congress's pervasive use of the preclusion device 
strongly implies that when Congress intended to preclude or limit subse- 
quent enforcement by EPA, Congress did so by placing the preclusion de- 
vice or one of its variations in the EPA enforcement provision. While the 
preclusion devices in the citizen suit provisions are quite similar, the pre- 
clusion devices in the EPA enforcement provisions are varied. Congress 
used at least five variations of the preclusion device in two or more of the 
statutes' EPA enforcement pr~vis ions .~  The significant variations in the 
device that Congress used in the EPA enforcement provisions is further 
evidence that Congress chose the wording of the devices carefully, intending 
that courts interpret them to effectuate the words Congress employed. 
The relative strengths of the restrictions Congress placed on succes- 
sive EPA enforcement in different statutes mirror the degrees to which 
Congress envisioned state implementation of the statutes, progressing from 
no preclusion where Congress provided for exclusive federal implemen- 
tation, to a presumption of preclusion where Congress expected state im- 
plementation. Despite the sometimes virtually identical nature of the pre- 
clusion devices in the EPA and citizen suit provisions, they serve some- 
what different purposes. The device in the citizen suit provisions man- 
ages conflict and disruption from successive enforcement. The device in 
the EPA enforcement provisions reflects the balances between federal and 
state implementation in different statutes. Despite the somewhat different 
purposes of the devices in the two sets of enforcement provisions, they 
are all variations of the same device. This is underscored by subsection 
309(g) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), in which Congress used the de- 
vice in the statute's EPA enforcement provision to bar both EPA and citi- 
zen subsequent enforcement under specific circumstances.' 
Statutes providing for both federal and state implementation usually 
require EPA to approve a state program meeting statutory minimum crite- 
ria and substitute the state program for the federal program once EPA ap- 
proves the state program. Defendants sometimes argue that these state 
approval provisions infer that EPA cannot enforce in states with approved 
programs, or at least cannot do so if the state already has taken an enforce- 
ment a c t i ~ n . ~  The role of the preclusion device as the regulator of EPA 
See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
' 33 U.S.C. $8  1251-1387 (2000). 
See infra Parts 1II.B.-C. Relying on this theory, one court of appeals has held that 
when a state with an approved Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") haz- 
ardous waste management program has taken an enforcement action, EPA is precluded 
from "overfiling." Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999). The 
court also held that EPA was precluded from doing so by res judicata. Id. The opinion is 
flawed in many ways. See discussion infra Part 1II.C. The flaws follow i ~ i  part from the 
court's failure to recognize the pattern of preclusions established by Congress in the envi- 
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enforcement under statutes authorizing state implementation .is empha- 
sized by the fact that Congress knew how not to grant EPA enforcement 
authority in states with approved programs. In view of this explicit, com- 
prehensive, and nuanced cross-statutory pattern, it is unlikely that Con- 
gress intended to infer a preclusion on EPA or citizen enforcement from 
other provisions containing no notice, delay, and bar device. The statutes 
should not be interpreted to depart from this well-established pattern, absent 
clear and unambiguous l a n g ~ a g e . ~  
While there are many reported decisions on the preclusion device in 
the citizen suit provisions, there are few reported decisions on preclusions in 
the EPA enforcement provisions. This disparity arises from a variety of 
factors. First, the preclusions on EPA enforcement are, for the most part, 
less restrictive than preclusions on citizen suits, providing fewer possi- 
bilities for credible efforts by defendants to raise them. Second, EPA ex- 
ercises self-restraint in filing successive actions, providing few opportu- 
nities to litigate the issues.I0 Third, defendants may accord greater legiti- 
macy to EPA actions than to citizen actions and may be more willing to 
settle enforcement actions with EPA than with citizens without litigating 
legal issues." Even though there are a small number of judicial interpre- 
tations of the device in the EPA enforcement provisions, this case law 
may be augmented by the many judicial interpretations of the device in 
the citizen suit provisions. Because Congress used the same device in both 
sets of provisions, precedents under one set are valid under the other set, 
unless variations in the devices are sufficiently different.12 
Part One examined the virtually identical preclusion devices in the 
citizen suit provisions of the statutes as if they were the same device, 
ronmental statutes, including RCRA. See Miller, supra note 1, at 412; infra notes 45-48. 
9Congress did place one preclusion on CWA section 505 citizen suits outside of sec- 
tion 505, in subsection 309(g). 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g) (2000). It is noteworthy, however, that 
subsection 309(g) is in the EPA enforcement provision, subsection 505(a) contains a cross- 
reference to subsection 309(g), and subsection 309(g) contains an explicit preclusion that 
follows the theme and variations pattern examined here. 
' O  ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECT~ON AGENCY, REVISED POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA 
ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, 18-20, 24-25 (Aug. 1986), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
Compliance/resources/policies/planning/state/enforce-agree-mem.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 
2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
" Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or  Deliver: Citizerz Suits, Standing, arzd Environmental 
Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39 (2001); Ross Macfarlane & Lori Terry, 
Citizen Suits: Impacts on Permitting and Agency Enforcement, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, 
Spring 1997, at 20. Although the environmental defense bar does not articulate this explic- 
itly, it can be inferred from both its generally negative attitude toward citizen suits and 
from its far greater propensity to contest citizen enforcement than EPA enforcement. For 
example, there are far more reported citizen suit decisions cited in Part One than reported 
EPA enforcement decisions cited here. The disparity is remarkable because the numbers of 
civil enforcement actions brought by EPA and citizens are roughly comparable and the 
total number of enforcement actions brought by EPA far exceeds those brought by citizens. 
See Miller, supra note I ,  at 415 11.68, 419-20. 
l 2  A precedent interpreting one variation of an element in the device, however, might 
not be useful in interpreting another variation of that element. 
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analyzing their common legal issues with little or no distinction between 
how they should be decided under different statutes. Because the preclu- 
sions on EPA enforcement are more varied than preclusions on the citi- 
zen suits, the format of Part Two differs. Part 1.A examines the preclusion 
devices in the EPA enforcement provisions of all the statutes and identifies 
their common variations. Part I1 examines the legal issues raised in each 
of the common variations. Part I11 examines asserted limitations on EPA 
and citizen enforcement not articulated in the enforcement provisions, 
but inferred by some courts from the state program approval provisions. 
Part IV revisits the doctrinal split identified in Part One between courts 
interpreting the preclusion device in accordance with its plain meaning, 
usually favoring successive enforcement, and those interpreting it to fa- 
vor prosecutorial discretion, usually disfavoring successive enforcement. 
The final Part suggests integrated interpretation of the preclusion devices 
in EPA and citizen enforcement provisions. 
Parts One and Two as a whole emphasize the importance of recog- 
nizing the theme and variations in the preclusion devices Congress devel- 
oped to manage successive enforcement by both EPA and citizens. Two 
principles emerge from that recognition. First, when Congress intended 
to limit successive enforcement by EPA or citizens, i t  used the preclusion 
device to do so. This counsels that preclusions should not be inferred from 
other provisions. Second, Congress employed considerable variations in 
the device, particularly in limiting successive enforcement by EPA. This 
counsels that the wording Congress used in a particular version of the device 
precisely articulates congressional intent for how far that device limits 
successive enforcement. 
Courts ignoring these principles not only disregard plain wording 
and congressional intent, they undermine the integrity of the federal envi- 
ronmental statutes. The facts underlying the reported decisions in Parts 
One and Two indicate that EPA and citizens almost never initiate succes- 
sive enforcement when an earlier enforcement action resulted in compli- 
ance or a penalty large enough to deter violations. They also indicate that 
earlier, ineffective enforcement actions prompting such "overfiling" are 
usually state enforcement actions. Interpretations that restrict successive 
enforcement in favor of state prosecutorial discretion can insulate sources 
from compliance with federal law. The proliferation of such decisions offers 
violators the opportunity to shield themselves from compliance with fed- 
eral law by soliciting actions from less than zealous state enforcers and 
agreeing to state consent orders that require less than full compliance. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this could lead to systematic, judicially 
sanctioned evisceration of federal environmental statutory standards and 
protections. Congress did not intend this result when it enacted strong 
federal enforcement provisions with limited preclusions on successive en- 
forcement. 
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Courts should interpret these preclusion devices as Congress wrote 
them, through the lens of mainline canons of statutory construction, rather 
than to protect the choices of the first enforcers. Congress has already de- 
termined with precision, by the variation of the device that it used in each 
enforcement provision, when a subsequent enforcer may bring an action or 
is barred from bringing one. This is a legitimate legislative policy choice: 
balancing (1) environmental protection through effective enforcement by 
multiple enforcers against (2) the possibility that successive enforcement 
action may cause disruption and disturb choices made by the initial 
prosecutors. Where congressional intent is clear, as it is in the preclusion 
devices, courts should honor it. 
I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES' ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS AND 
THEIR PRECLUSIONS 
The Article examines federal environmental statutes administered by 
EPA.I3 The wording of the preclusions in each of these statutes is informed 
by concerns about allocating the proper authority to various potential en- 
forcers. This Part will examine the general intent and wording of the 
statutes to prepare for the in-depth analysis of specific provisions that 
follows. 
A. Impacts of Federalism 
Each of the environmental statutes follows one of two general feder- 
alist strategies. The first gives EPA authority to implement and enforce 
statutory programs, with little or no role for states.13 The second provides 
roles for both EPA and states in implementing and enforcing statutory 
 program^.'^ Statutes establishing multiple regulatory programs may em- 
ploy both strategies for different purposes.I6 While statutes adopting the 
'"he Article examines the Clean Air Act ("CAA), 42 U.S.C. 55 7401-7671q (2000); 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. $5  1251-1387 (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 5 5  6901-6992k (2000); the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"), 40 U.S.C. $5  1201-1328 
(2000); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. $ 5  9601-9675 (2000); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. $ 5  136-136y (2000); the Toxic Substances Control 
Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. $ 5  2601-2691 (2000); the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"), 
42 U.S.C. $ 5  300f-300j-25 (2000); the Marine Protection, Resources and Sanctuaries Act 
("MPRSA"), 33 U.S.C. $5 1401-1445 (2000); and the Emergency Planning and Commu- 
nity Right to Know Act ("EPCRKA"), 42 U.S.C. 5 5  11001-1 1050 (2000). 
IJ TSCA, CERCLA, MPRSA, FIFRA (registration of pesticides, FIFRA 5 3, 7 U.S.C. 
5 136a), and CAA (regulation of emissions from motor vehicles, CAA 95 202-208, 42 
U.S.C. $ 5  7521-7542 (2000)). 
' T A A  (except for regulation of emissions from motor vehicles, CAA $5  202-208, 42 
U.S.C. $ 5  7521-7542), CWA, RCRA, FIFRA (pesticide use regulation, FIFRA 5 26, 7 
U.S.C. 5 136a), and SDWA. 
l6 The CAA, for instance, adopts the first strategy for its program regulating emissions 
from motor vehicles and the second strategy for regulating emissions from other sources. 
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first strategy authorize exclusive EPA implementation and enforcement, 
they provide different accommodations with states. Some preempt state 
regulation," while some explicitly allow parallel state programs and au- 
thorize EPA to accomplish its mission by contracting with states.'' 
Congress adopted the second strategy for most of the major environ- 
mental programs. Beginning with the CAA, Congress modeled compli- 
cated "cooperative federalism" constructs as the bedrock of its environ- 
mental programs. It envisioned that state laws, approved by EPA and 
meeting federal requirements, would be the cores of the statutes. At the 
core of the CAA, for instance, are EPA-approved state implementation 
plans designed to achieve federal air quality standards for each regulated 
p ~ l l u t a n t . ' ~  As long as a state submits a plan meeting the statutory re- 
quirements, EPA must approve it and has no authority to develop its own 
plan, and the core of the CAA requirements becomes state law. On the 
other hand, if the state fails to submit an approvable plan, EPA must it- 
self promulgate an implementation plan for the state. At the core of the 
CWA20 and RCRA2' are EPA-approved state permit programs. The CWA 
and RCRA require EPA to promulgate and implement a permit program 
in federal regulations, but also require EPA to approve state permit pro- 
grams meeting the federal criteria. Once EPA approves a state permit 
program, EPA ceases to issue permits in the state and thereafter states 
issue permits under state law.22 Congress subsequently amended the CAA 
l7 CAA $ 209, 42 U.S.C. $ 7543 (2000) (preempting standards for emissions from 
automobiles with some exceptions). 
FIFRA $9 23(a), 24(a), 7 U.S.C. $ 9  136u(a), 136v(a) (2000). 
l 9  CAA $ 110, 42 U.S.C. $ 7410 (2000). Under the CAA, Congress intended states to 
develop implementation plans to achieve federally promulgated ambient air quality stan- 
dards, and authorized EPA to develop such plans only if a state failed to submit an approv- 
able plan to EPA. State implementation plans consist of state statutes and regulations im- 
posing emissions limitations on air pollution sources and mechanisms to administer and 
enforce the limitations. Assuming that a state develops an approvable implementation plan, 
there will never be a federally developed plan to be violated. 
2o CWA $8 301(a), 402, 33 U.S.C. $8 13 1 ](a), 1342 (2000). Under the CWA, Congress 
intended states to submit permit programs to EPA for approval. Permits, whether issued by 
EPA or a state with an approved permit program, at a minimum must apply federally 
promulgated technology-based standards relevant to the particular pollution source, and 
federally approved state water quality standards designed to provide for the types of uses 
the state designated as appropriate to the particular water body. Congress authorized EPA 
to issue permits in the absence of an approved state program but commanded EPA to cease 
issuing permits in a state once it had approved the state's program. Assuming that a state 
submits an approvable program before EPA issues a permit to a source, there will never be 
a federally issued permit to be violated. 
21 RCRA $5  3005-3006.42 U.S.C. $ 8  6925-6926 (2000). RCRA establishes a permit 
program for entities that treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste. It also establishes regu- 
latory programs for generators and transporters of hazardous waste that are not imple- 
mented through permits. All of these programs may be administered and enforced by EPA 
or by states with approved programs. Whether EPA or states with approved programs issue 
the permits, they must contain the minimum standards promulgated by EPA. 
"Under both statutes, however, EPA may approve partial state programs, covering 
some but not all permits or some but not all federal requirements. In such cases, EPA re- 
mains the permit issuer for the unapproved portion of the program. CWA § 402(n), 33 
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to add a permit program modeled in large part on the CWA and RCRA 
permit programs.'-' All three statutes authorize EPA to exercise oversight 
authority on the implementation and enforcement of plans and programs 
approved by states.24 At the same time, these core cooperative federal pro- 
grams do not stand alone. The CAA, CWA and RCRA establish other major 
regulatory programs and provisions unrelated to the core programs. Some 
of these other programs and provisions contemplate pure federal imple- 
menta t i~n , '~  while others contemplate state i m p l e m e n t a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Analyzing 
the preclusions on EPA enforcement requires examining them in the con- 
text of the federallstate relationships in the programs that they enforce. 
Differences in the federalist balance between EPA and states in im- 
plementing the statutes are not reflected in the types of enforcement sanc- 
tions and remedies that Congress provided to EPA and citizen enforcers. 
They are reflected, however, in the statutory preclusions Congress placed 
on EPA's exercise of those authorities. Congress developed a three-element 
notice, delay and bar preclusion device that it could change by varying 
one or more of the three elements to reflect the particular balance be- 
tween the potential enforcers it intended in each statute. It generally placed 
no preclusion on EPA enforcement in programs where it gave EPA au- 
thority to implement and enforce, with little or no role for states. But it 
placed a wide variety of preclusions on EPA enforcement in programs where 
it gave EPA shared implementation authority with states. The variety in 
the preclusions reflects the different balances Congress struck between its 
goal of protecting the environment through strong federal authorities and 
its desire for state implementation of environmental programs. The care 
that Congress took to place a version of the preclusion device appropriate 
for a particular statute in its enforcement provisions underscores the im- 
portance of interpreting the device as Congress wrote it. 
The preclusions may vary in any or all of their elements: (1) who 
they require the potential enforcer to notify of its intention to enforce; 
U.S.C. 5 1342(n) (2000); RCRA 5 3006(g), 42 U.S.C. 9 6926(g) (2000); see also CAA 
9 502(i), 42 U.S.C. 9 7661a(i) (2000). 
23 CAA $9 501-505,42 U.S.C. 99 7661-7661d (2000). 
2 T o r  instance, the CWA requires states to send copies of proposed permits to EPA for 
review and authorizes EPA to both veto state permits not conforming to federal require- 
ments and issue permits in their place. EPA also may assume primary enforcement respon- 
sibility in the state if it demonstrates the state's systemic failure to enforce, may enforce 
against violations in a state with an approved program, and may revoke its approval of the 
state's program if it fails to conform to federal requirements. CWA $5 309(a), 402(c)-(d), 
33 U.S.C. 55 1319(a), 1342(c)-(d) (2000). 
25 For instance, the CAA establishes a program for regulating motor vehicle emissions 
at the manufacturing stage, implemented almost exclusively by EPA, and the CWA estab- 
lishes an oil spill program implemented almost exclusively by EPA and the Coast Guard. 
CAA $9 202-219,42 U.S.C. 59  7521-7554 (2000); CWA 9 31 1, 33 U.S.C. 5 1321 (2000). 
'6 For instance, RCRA establishes a program for regulating disposal of non-hazardous 
solid waste for which EPA establishes the standards, but for which states are almost exclu- 
sively responsible for implementing. RCRA $9 40014009(a), 42 U.S.C. 09 6941-6949(a) 
(2000). 
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(2) how long after notice they delay the potential enforcer from com- 
mencing its enforcement action; and (3) the extent to which they bar the po- 
tential successive enforcer from commencing its action. They may re- 
quire the potential enforcer to notify all, some, or none of the violator, EPA, 
and the state in which the violation occurs. They may require the poten- 
tial enforcer to delay commencement of its enforcement action for peri- 
ods up to ninety days or not at all. They may or may not bar the potential 
enforcer from commencing particular actions if another enforcer has al- 
ready commenced an action and is diligently prosecuting it. Congress 
intended the many possible combinations of these variables to provide a 
nuanced device, with a wide spectrum of effects on successive enforcement. 
B. EPA Enforcement Provisions 
The statutes provide EPA an arsenal of enforcement remedies and sanc- 
tions, ranging from notices of violation2' to criminal incarceration and 
fines.28 Some provide augmented incarceration and fines for violations that 
the defendant knew placed persons in peril of life or limb.'9 The number 
and variety of these remedies allow EPA considerable latitude to deter- 
mine the appropriate enforcement remedy for a particular violation. 
States have similar arsenals of enforcement remedies in their statutes. 
In practice, however, EPA and states conduct most enforcement by issu- 
ing administrative orders. Approximately ninety percent of EPA enforce- 
ment actions and ninety-five percent of state actions are admin i~ t r a t i ve .~~  
The citizen suit provisions are very similar and share a common ori- 
gin in the CAA. Courts often interpret the citizen suit provisions in a par- 
ticular statute by reference to the wording, legislative history and prece- 
dent under the provisions of other statutes. On the other hand, the EPA 
enforcement provisions sometimes appear less similar. Courts seldom inter- 
pret them by reference to wording, legislative history and precedent un- 
der EPA enforcement provisions in other statutes. However, the similari- 
ties and dissimilarities in the preclusion devices are critical to their proper 
interpretation. Some of the differences between the EPA enforcement provi- 
27 E.g. ,  CAA 9: 113(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. 9: 7413(a)(I) (2000). 
28 E.g. ,  CAA 9: 113(c), 42 U.S.C. 9: 7413(c). In between these ends of the spectrum are 
administrative orders to assess penalties, e.g. ,  CWA 9: 309(g), 33 U.S.C. $ 1319(g) (2000), 
require compliance, e .g . ,  CWA 9: 309(a)(l), (a)(3), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(a)(l), (a)(3), revoke 
permits, e .g . ,  RCRA § 3008(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (2000), stop sales, e .g . ,  FIFRA 
9: 13(a), 7 U.S.C. 9: 136k(a) (2000). recall products, e.g.,  CAA 9: 207(c), 42 U.S.C. 9: 7541(c) 
(2000), seize goods, e .g . ,  FIFRA 9: 13(b), 7 U.S.C. g 136k(b), and prohibit federal grants 
or contracts to violating facilities, e .g . ,  CWA 9: 508, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1368 (2000); and civil 
judicial actions to assess penalties, e .g . ,  CWA 5 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(d) (2000), enjoin 
compliance, e.g. ,  CWA 9: 309(b), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(b), ban new connections to sewers, 
CWA 9: 402(h), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1342(h) (2000). and abate imminent and substantial endan- 
germents, e .g . ,  CWA 9: 504, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1364 (2000). 
29 See infra note 34. 
'O See Miller, supra note I, at 415 n.68. 
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sions in different statutes reflect the different strategies adopted by Con- 
gress for those statutes. Statutes regulating environmental dangers from 
the use of products, for instance, provide for product recall and forfeiture 
provisions3' not found or needed in statutes regulating dangers from pol- 
lution and waste disposal. Other differences reflect peculiar circumstances 
in the evolutions of the statutes and their EPA enforcement provisions.'? 
However, close examination of the provisions reveals their common reme- 
dies are very similar and share the same origins. This is true both of basic 
provisions initially included in the statutes beginning with the CAA," 
including administrative orders, injunctions, and criminal provisions, and 
of more sophisticated provisions added later.'4 These similar EPA en- 
forcement provisions can be interpreted by reference to the wording, leg- 
islative history and precedents under comparable provisions in other stat- 
utes, just as citizen suit provisions are interpreted by cross-statutory ref- 
erence. This is particularly true of the preclusion devices in the EPA en- 
forcement provisions, for they are manifestations of the theme and varia- 
tions sounding in the EPA and citizen enforcement provisions of all of 
the statutes. 
1 .  Statutory Bars on EPA Enforcement 
While Congress intended the preclusions in the citizen suit provi- 
sions to prevent unwarranted disruption in government enforcement, it 
intended the preclusions in EPA enforcement provisions to reflect the 
relative strength of EPA authority in the balance Congress struck between 
federal and state implementation of the program being enforced. None- 
theless, when Congress placed preclusions against EPA enforcement, it 
used variations of the same three-part notice, delay, and bar preclusion it 
" FIFRA, regulating pesticides and similar products, authorizes EPA to stop the sale 
and use, seize and regulate the manufacture, use, importation and exportation of products 
violating the statute. FIFRA $5 13, 17, 7 U.S.C. $5 136k, 1360 (2000). TSCA, regulating 
the manufacture and sale of chemicals, authorizes EPA to seize offending chemicals, to 
require their manufacturer to warn its customers and the general public of, and to replace, 
defective chemicals, and to regulate the importation and exportation of chemicals. TSCA 
I $  11-12, 17, 15 U.S.C. 05 2610-261 1, 2616 (2000). Subchapter I1 of the CAA, regulating 
automobile emissions, authorizes EPA to order the recall and repair of vehicles not con- 
forming to air pollution requirements and requires manufacturers to warrant to their cus- 
tomers that their vehicles conform to those requirements. CAA s 207, 42 U.S.C. s 7541 
(2000). 
"CAA section 119, for instance, authorized protracted phase-out orders for copper 
smelters in accommodation to an economically hard-pressed industry, typically the sole 
significant employer in towns where they operated. 42 U.S.C. 7419 (2000). 
" See CAA 5  1 13(a)-(d), 42 U.S.C. 3  7413(a)-(d) (2000). 
'? For example, the knowing endangerment criminal provision was added successively 
to RCRA, the CWA and the CAA, using virtually the same language. See Pub. L. No. 98- 
616, $ 232(b), 98 Stat. 3221, 3257 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5  6928) (RCRA); Pub. L. 
No. 100-4, 5  3 12, 101 Stat. 7, 43-44 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 1319(c)(3)) (CWA); 
Pub. L. No. 101-549, $ 701, 104 Stat. 2399, 2676 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 3  7413(c)(5)) 
(CAA). 
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used in the citizen suit provisions. It created at least five categories in the 
device precluding EPA enforcement. These preclusions range from more 
restrictive than preclusions in the citizen suits provisions to much weaker 
than citizen enforcement preclusions. A few EPA enforcement provisions, in 
fact, contain no preclusion device. From the strongest to the weakest, 
they: (1) bar EPA from taking some enforcement actions against a viola- 
tion if EPA or the state has taken specific enforcement actions against the 
v i o l a t i ~ n ; ~ ~  (2) require EPA to give the state thirty days prior notice be- 
fore EPA takes an enforcement action against a violation in the state, and 
bar EPA enforcement if the state takes "appropriate enforcement action" 
against the violation;36 (3) require EPA to give the state notice before EPA 
takes an enforcement action against a violation in the state;" (4) require 
EPA to notify the state after EPA takes enforcement action against a viola- 
tion in the state;38 and ( 5 )  impose no preclusion on EPA enf~rcement. '~ 
2.  Legislative History 
The EPA enforcement provisions have proven to be quite dynamic, 
as Congress has strengthened them from time to time. Though these amend- 
ments have introduced idiosyncrasies into the provisions, the structures, 
basic authorities (administrative compliance orders, civil penalties, injunc- 
tions, and criminal sanctions), and basic preclusions can still be traced to the 
first of these statutes, the CAA.40 For these common elements, the legislative 
history of the CAA provisions is useful and precedents from one statute 
can be useful in interpreting others. This is often true beyond the basic 
common elements as well, for the newer embellishments found in many 
of the statutes were developed for one statute and copied into  other^.^' 
With some exceptions, however, there is little legislative history regard- 
3s CWA §§  309(g)(6)(A), 3 1 1(b)(6)(E), 33 U.S.C. §§ 13 19(g)(6)(A), 1321(b)(6)(E) 
(2000); SDWA 1423(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. 300h-2(c)(5) (2000). 
36 FIFRA 27(a), 7 U.S.C. Q 136w-2(a) (2000); CWA § 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(l) 
(2000); SDWA 14 14(a)(l )(B), 1423(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. $ 5  300g-3(a)( l)(B), 300h-2(a)(l) 
(2000). 
37RCRA 3008(a)(l)-(2), 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(a)(l)-(2) (2000); CAA 113(a)(l), 42 
U.S.C. 6 7413(a)(l) (2000). 
. . .  . . 
'SC%A 08 309(a)(4)-(5), 404(s)(3), 33 U.S.C. $3 1319(a)(4)-(5), 1344(s)(3) (2000); 
CAA 113(a)(3)-(4), 42 U.S.C. 7413(a)(4) (2000). 
39 FIFRA 14, 7 U.S.C. 1361 (2000); TSCA $ 9  16, 207, 15 U.S.C. 2615, 2647 
(2000); MPRSA 105,33 U.S.C. 1415 (2000); EPCRKA 5 325,42 U.S.C. § 11045 (2000). 
''"The Committee report accompanying the Senate CWA bill acknowledged that its en- 
forcement provisions were based on those of the CAA and the Refuse Act (an 1899 statute 
prohibiting the deposit of refuse into navigable rivers). S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1972), 
reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND- 
MENTS OF 1972, at 1482 (1973) [hereinafter "CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY"]. The Commit- 
tee report accompanying the Senate RCRA bill acknowledged that its enforcement provi- 
sions were based on those of the CAA and CWA. S. REP. NO. 94-988, at 17 (1976). 
" See supra note 34. 
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ing the preclusions, although some legislative history regarding the bal- 
ance between EPA and states in enforcement bears on their interpretation. 
The Committee report accompanying the Senate CAA bill in 1970 
explained that, by providing new federal enforcement authorities, Con- 
gress did "not intend to diminish either the authority or the responsibility 
of State and local governments" in the enforcement arena. Although the 
new enforcement authorities provided "the necessary tools to act swiftly 
to abate violations," the federal government "should not interfere with 
effective State action." The federal enforcer "would be authorized to is- 
sue . . . an order when [it] determined that a State had not satisfactorily 
administered its enforcement author it^."^^ These expectations are consis- 
tent with the congressional findings that "air pollution prevention . . . and 
air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States 
and local  government^."^^ The implied primacy of state administration and 
enforcement, however, is hyperbole. Congress authorized only EPA to estab- 
lish emission standards for new motor vehicles and contemplated that it 
would have sole responsibility to enforce them. It authorized only EPA to 
establish emission standards from new sources and for hazardous pollut- 
ants, and contemplated that it would have primary responsibility for en- 
forcing them. And even the above-quoted report language asserts that 
EPA should not interfere with effective state enforcement and acknowl- 
edges EPA is free to interfere with unsatisfactory state enforcement. But 
this report is not reflected in the EPA enforcement provisions that Con- 
gress enacted. It does not limit EPA's enforcement authority to cases in 
which the state has not taken satisfactory actions. Indeed, it authorizes EPA 
to bring an enforcement action without regard to whether the state has 
enforced, satisfactorily or not.44 
Two years later, congressional trumpeting of state enforcement re- 
sponsibility grew even stronger in the legislative history of the CWA. The 
Committee report accompanying the House CWA bill stated that the 
Committee expects that the Administrator will rely to the maxi- 
mum extent possible upon the enforcement actions of the indi- 
vidual States. The Committee in providing for Federal enforce- 
ment'does not intend to replace enforcement by the States. The 
provisions of section 309 are supplemental to those of the States 
and are available to the Administrator in those cases where . . . 
State . . . enforcement agencies will not or cannot act expedi- 
tiously and vigorously to enforce the requirement of this Act. The 
42 S .  REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 21-22 (1970). reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 421-22 (1974) [hereinafter "CAA LEGIS- 
LATIVE HISTORY"]. 
43 CAA 8 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 5 7401(a)(3) (2000). 
CAA 5 113(a), 42 U.S.C. Q 7413(a) (2000). 
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Committee clearly intends that the greater proportion of enforce- 
ment actions be brought by the States.45 
The Committee report accompanying the Senate CWA bill stated similar 
expectations: 
In any regulatory program involving Federal and State participa- 
tion is (sic) the allocation or division of enforcement responsi- 
bilities is difficult . . . . 
Against the background of the Clean Air Act and the Refuse Act 
the Committee concluded that the enforcement presence of the 
Federal government shall be concurrent with the enforcement 
powers of the States. The Committee does not intend this juris- 
diction of the Federal government to supplant state enforcement. 
Rather the Committee intends that the enforcement power of the 
Federal government is available in cases where States . . . are 
not acting expeditiously and vigorously to enforce control re- 
quirements. 
Under the Refuse Act the Federal government is not constrained 
in any way from acting against violators. The Committee continues 
that authority in this Act. 
The Committee . . . notes that the authority of the Federal Gov- 
ernment should be used judiciously by the Administrator in those 
cases deserve (sic) Federal action because of their national charac- 
ter, scope, or seriousness. The Committee intends the great vol- 
ume of enforcement actions be brought by the State. It is clear 
that the Administrator is not to establish an enforcement bureauc- 
racy but rather to reserve his authority for the cases of paramount 
interest.46 
Again, deference to state enforcement in these statements is exag- 
gerated. The enacted enforcement provision did not contain the suggested 
limitations. Indeed, the statute envisions EPA as a permit issuer in states 
with no approved programs and it makes little sense to view non-partici- 
pating states as the primary enforcers of federally issued permits. To the 
extent that Congress modeled the CWA enforcement provisions on the 
Refuse it modeled them on a statute contemplating no state role in 
45 H. REP. NO. 92-91 1 ,  at 115 (1972), reprirtted in CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 40, at 802 (1973). 
46S.  REP. NO. 92-414, at 73-74 (1971), reprir~ted in 2 CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 40, at 1481-82. The Committee repeated much of the same language in its re- 
port accompanying its RCRA bill. S. REP. NO. 94-988, at 17 (1976). 
47 33 U.S.C. 88 407, 41 1 (2000). 
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enforcement. Indeed, the Committee report acknowledged the CWA en- 
forcement authorities, like those in the Refuse Act, were "not constrained 
in any And its statement that EPA is not to establish an enforce- 
ment bureaucracy is puzzling, since EPA had a preexisting enforcement 
bureaucracy that operated EPA's part of the Refuse Act permitting pro- 
gram. Congress was well aware of this for it provided a budget for those 
operations and heard testimony from EPA enforcement officials support- 
ing the enactment of the CWA.49 
Despite its overblown championing of the state role in enforcement, 
the legislative history suggests that Congress intended the preclusion de- 
vices to ease friction between federal and state enforcers. It does not, 
however, illuminate how the provisions should be interpreted. 
3. An Anomaly: Limited Federal Enforcement Authority 
RCRA's program for regulating non-hazardous solid waste is a stark 
contrast to the dominant statutory pattern of strong federal enforcement 
authority tempered by a sliding scale of preclusions on EPA enforcement 
when the state has already taken an enforcement action. It reflects Con- 
gress's intent not to displace state responsibility for solid waste manage- 
ment. It also demonstrates that Congress knows how to deny EPA en- 
forcement authority or to drastically curtail it when that is its intent, which 
undercuts arguments that Congress obliquely implied restrictions on EPA 
enforcement authority in non-enforcement provisions. 
In RCRA section 3008, Congress granted EPA broad authority to en- 
force against violations of "this subchapter," i.e., subchapter 111, regulat- 
ing hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal.50 Subchapter 111 
does not regulate the disposal of non-hazardous solid waste. That is ac- 
complished in Subchapter IV, which adopts a model from an earlier era. 
It contemplates that states will develop and implement plans for non- 
hazardous solid waste [hereinafter "solid waste"] disposal to protect the 
environment and encourage resource conservation by recycling." Sub- 
chapter IV confines the federal role largely to providing financial and 
technical assistance and promulgating standards for safe d i spo~a l .~ '  As 
enacted in 1976, RCRA required EPA to promulgate criteria for "sanitary 
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprirzted irz 2 CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 40, at 1482. 
J9 See, e.g., Hearirzgs orz H.R.  11896 Before the House Cornnz. 0 1 1  Public Works, 92d 
Cong. 336, 338 (1972) (testimony of John Quarles, EPA General Counsel and Assistant 
Administrator for Enforcement, discussing the enforcement and permitting programs under 
the Refuse Act and projected under the to-be-enacted CWA), reprirzted in 2 CWA LEGISLA- 
T I V E  HISTORY, supra note 40, at 1234, 1236. 
50 42 U.S.C. 9: 6928 (2000). 
s' RCRA 5 4001,42 U.S.C. 5 6941 (2000). 
5' RCRA $ 5  4002-4004,4007-4008,42 U.S.C. $8  6942-6944,6947-6948 (2000). 
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 landfill^."^' It declared that solid waste disposal facilities not meeting the 
sanitary landfill criteria were "open dumps," and made the further opera- 
tion of open dumps It also used grant money to encourage states 
to submit to EPA control programs, closing open dumps and regulating 
sanitary landfills, for approval as meeting federal  standard^.^' Unlike in 
other statutes, Congress did not authorize EPA to develop a regulatory pro- 
gram in states failing to submit approvable programs, nor did it authorize 
EPA to enforce against open dumps to require them to meet sanitary 
landfill standards. Curiously, however, it did authorize citizens to enforce 
against open 
Congress soon prompted amendment of RCRA because several de- 
velopments demonstrated that municipal landfills were not benign, but 
were the ultimate disposal sites for considerable amounts of hazardous 
waste. First, approximately twenty percent of the sites listed for remedia- 
tion on CERCLA's National Priority List were operating or defunct mu- 
nicipal  landfill^.^' Second, generators of small quantities of hazardous 
waste were allowed to avoid the RCRA Subchapter I11 regulatory net if 
they disposed of that waste in state-licensed municipal landfills.s8 Third, 
municipal waste itself had a hazardous waste component from households 
and commercial  establishment^.^^ Finally, leachate from municipal landfills, 
even those without a significant industrial waste component, can be very 
like leachate from hazardous waste landfills6" These factors prompted 
Congress to amend Subchapter IV in 1984, upgrading controls on solid 
waste disposal facilities receiving wastes from small quantity genera- 
t o r ~ . ~ '  As part of the upgrade, Congress authorized EPA to enforce against 
disposal facilities not meeting the federal standards, but only in states 
without approved programs.62 RCRA does grant EPA authority to abate 
imminent and substantial endangerments, including endangerment from 
solid waste, and does not limit that authority to endangerment caused by 
violations of the statute or EPA's  regulation^.^^ The RCRA amendments 
continued to favor citizens, however, giving them authority to enforce 
5'RCRA 5 4004,42 U.S.C. 8 6944. 
54 RCRA 5 4005,42 U.S.C. 5 6945 (2000). 
55 RCRA 5 4006,42 U.S.C. 5 6946 (2000). 
56 RCRA subsection 7002(a)(l) authorizes citizens to enforce against any violation of 
a requirement or standard that "has become effective pursuant to this chapter." 42 U.S.C. 
5 6972(a)(1) (2000). The "chapter" referred to is all of RCRA, including both Subchapters 
I11 and IV. If there was any doubt, Congress specifically provided in section 4005(a) that 
the prohibition against operating an open dump was enforceable under section 7002. 42 
U.S.C. 5 6945(a) (2000). 
57 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. B (2004). 
ss RCRA 5 3001(d)(5), 42 U.S.C. 5 692l(d)(5) (2000). 
59 See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50978, 50982-83 (Oct. 9, 
1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257-258). 
Id. 
61  RCRA 5 4010(c), 42 U.S.C. 5 6949a(c) (2000). 
RCRA 5 4005(~)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. 3 6945(~)(2)(A) (2000). 
63 RCRA 5 7003,42 U.S.C. 5 6973 (2000). 
Heinonline - -  29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 18 2005 
20051 Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions 19 
against solid waste disposal facilities not meeting the federal standards, 
regardless of whether they were located in states with approved programs 
or whether they posed an endangerment.&l 
The author is aware of no reported decisions on EPA enforcement 
under these provisions. On the other hand, there are numerous reported 
decisions on citizen enforcement of them.6s The juxtaposition of limited EPA 
enforcement authority and unlimited citizen enforcement authority is cu- 
rious and unique. It is illustrative of the lengths to which Congress will 
go to adjust the balance between federal and state enforcers. 
C. Citizen Enforcement Provisions and Their Preclusions 
An understanding of the preclusion mechanism in citizen suits is im- 
portant for understanding preclusions against EPA enforcement, since 
both share the three element notice, delay and bar structure. Indeed, they 
both resonate the theme and variation nature of this preclusion structure. 
The citizen suit provisions of the various environmental statutes are modeled 
on CAA section 304.66 Indeed, the citizen suit provisions in the different 
statutes are so nearly alike that courts commonly interpret one of them by 
comparing and contrasting its wording with the wording of others and by 
using legislative history and precedent from the others.67 CAA section 
304 contains a three-element statutory preclusion in a form followed closely 
by the citizen suit provisions in the other statutes. It provides generally that 
See supra note 56. 
65 See, e.g. ,  Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other 
grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). 
6642 U.S.C. 5 7604 (2000). Both the House and Senate CWA Reports acknowledge 
this. CWA section 505 is "modeled on the provision enacted in the Clean Air Act Amend- 
ments of 1970." S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79 (1971). reprinted in 2 CWA LEGISLATIVE HIS- 
TORY, supra note 40, at 1497. The section "closely follows the concepts utilized in section 
304 of the Clean Air Act." H. REP. NO. 92-91 1, at 133 (1972), reprinted in 1 CWA LEGIS- 
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40, at 820. Indeed, they are so alike that the Senate Report on 
the citizen suit provision in the CWA follows the Senate Report on the citizen suit provi- 
sion in the CAA almost paragraph by paragraph and word for word. See S. REP. NO. 9 l -  
1196, at 36-39 (1972), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 436- 
39; S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79-82 (1972), reprinted in 2 CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 40, at 1497-1500. This is particularly significant because the provision in the CAA 
originated in the Senate bill, with no counterpart in the House bill. CONF. REP. NO. 91- 
1783, at 55, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374, 5388. 
67 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 
(1987) (comparing wording of CWA section 505 to citizen suit provisions of several other 
statutes); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 
493 U.S. 20 (1989); Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 
1985) (using the CAA citizen suit provision legislative history to interpret CWA citizen 
suit provision); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 702 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (using the CAA citizen suit provision legislative history used to interpret CWA citi- 
zen suit provision); Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier, 755 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Conn. 1990) 
(interpreting SDWA citizen suit provision); Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788, 791-92 (W.D. 
Okla. 1989); Student Pub. Interest Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc. 
579 F. Supp. 1528, 1533-34 n.8 (D.N.J. 1984). aff'd, 759 F.2d 1 131 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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No action may be commenced . . . 
. . . prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the 
violation [to EPA, the state and the violator] . . . or 
if [EPA or the state] has commenced and is diligently prosecut- 
ing a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to re- 
quire compliance with the standard, limitation, or order [that the 
citizen seeks to enforce]. . . .68 
Under the notice and delay elements, citizens must give the government 
the first opportunity to sue in court.69 Under the bar element, citizens may 
not sue if the government has taken and is diligently prosecuting that op- 
portunity. If the preclusive government action is filed in federal court, 
however, a citizen may intervene as a matter of right.70 The citizen suit pro- 
visions in the other statutes share these features; indeed, the "has com- 
menced and is diligently prosecuting" language in the bar element is identi- 
cal in most of them.7' There are only three differences among the bar 
elements. First, the citizen suit provisions of the statutes that do not envi- 
sion a state role in implementation do not bar a citizen suit because of a 
state action.72 Second, several of the citizen suit provisions bar citizen 
suits when EPA has commenced, and is diligently prosecuting, a civil or 
criminal a ~ t i o n . ~ '  Finally, other citizen suit provisions bar citizen suits 
when EPA has commenced assessing an administrative penalty,74 or has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting the assessment of an adminis- 
68 CAA 9: 304(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. Q: 7604(b)(l). 
69 A few variants on the notice and delay provision should be noted. All of the statutes 
require that citizens give notice to EPA before suing it for failure to perform a mandatory 
duty. Most of the statutes require a sixty-day delay after notice before a citizen may file 
suit against a violating polluter. On the other hand, many of the statutes do not require a 
delay period before citizens may sue for particular violations, often associated with haz- 
ardous substances, although prior notice must still be given. RCRA section 7002(b)(2)(A), 
for instance, normally requires citizens to give EPA a ninety-day delay before they may file 
a suit to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment, but requires only prior notice 
with no delay period for citizens filing complaints alleging violations of Subchapter 111 (regu- 
lating the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste). 42 U.S.C. Q: 6972(b)(2)(A) 
(2000). See also CWA Q: 505(b), 33 U.S.C. Q: 1365(b); CAA Q: 304(b), 42 U.S.C. 9: 7604(b) 
(2000) (providing for differential notice requirements). 
70CAA Q: 304(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. Q:7604(b)(l)(B). 
7 1  Except as noted in the text below, it  is identical in CWA section 505(b)(l)(B), RCRA 
section 7002(b)(l)(B), SDWA section 1449(b)(l)(B), TSCA section 20(b)(l)(B), and 
EPCRKA section 326(b)(l)(B). 33 U.S.C. 9; 1365(b)(l)(B) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. 9; 6972(b)(l)(B) 
(RCRA); 42 U.S.C. Q: 300j-8(b)(l)(B) (2000) (SDWA); 15 U.S.C. Q: 2619(b)(l)(B) (2000) 
(TSCA); 42 U.S.C. Q: 11046(e) (2000) (EPCRKA). 
7Z TSCA 9: 20(b), 15 U.S.C. Q: 2619(b); MPRSA Q: 105(g)(2), 33 U.S.C. 3 1115(g)(2) 
(2000); EPCRKA 5 326(e), 42 U.S.C. Q: 11046(e). 
73 CWA Q: 505(b)(I)(B) , 33 U.S.C. Q: 1365(b)(l)(B); MPRSA 9; 105(g)(l)(D) , 33 U.S.C. 
9; 141 5(g)(l)(D); RCRA 5 7002(b)(l)(B) , 4 2  U.S.C. Q: 6972(b)(l)(B). 
74 MPRSA 9: 105(g)(2)(C) , 33 U.S.C. Q: 14 15(g)(2)(C). 
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trative penalty.75 Some of the provisions contain other limitations on citi- 
zen suits not germane to this inquiry. 
Some related aspects of the citizen suit provisions are also relevant 
to this analysis. First, while the provisions bar citizen suits if the federal 
or state government has commenced, and is diligently prosecuting, an ac- 
tion, most allow citizens to intervene as of right in government actions 
filed in federal courts.76 Second, they allow the federal government (but 
not the state) to intervene as a matter of right in any citizen Finally, 
the CAA and CWA require citizens to give the federal government (but 
not the state) notice of a proposed settlement of the citizen suit and allow 
the federal government to comment on it.78 
Although there are variations in the three-element preclusion device 
in the citizen suit provisions, there are fewer and they are far less varied 
than the preclusion device in EPA enforcement provisions. This reflects 
the somewhat different purposes the devices serve in the two sets of pro- 
visions. In the citizen suit provisions the devices serve to manage duplicative 
litigation by successive enforcers, a purpose that does not vary much from 
one statute to another. In EPA enforcement provisions the devices serve 
to modulate the federalist balance between EPA and states, a balance that 
varies considerably from one statute to another. 
11. INTERPRETING THE PRECLUSIONS IN EPA ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS 
To IMPLEMENT THEIR PLAIN MEANINGS 
Analysis of Congress's intent in promulgating the enforcement pre- 
clusions demonstrates that, except where such interpretation renders the 
preclusions absurd or contradictory, those preclusions should be interpreted 
according to their plain meaning. This Part will examine the specific pre- 
clusions against EPA enforcement in light of this conclusion. This Part 
75TSCA Q: 20(b)(l)(B), 16 U.S.C. 5 2619(b)(l)(B); EPCRKA Q 326(e), 42 U.S.C. 
5 11046(e). The CWA includes a bar on EPA and citizen suits for penalties when EPA or a 
state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting the assessment of an administrative 
penalty or has assessed and collected such a penalty. CWA Q: 309(g), 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(g) 
(2000). Although i t  differs from the more common bars in several respects, it raises many 
of the same or similar issues. Because it bars EPA as well as citizen enforcement, however, 
Part Two addresses it, although Part One frequently referenced it  where appropriate. 
76 Most allow "any citizen" or "any person" to intervene. See CWA 5 505(b)(l)(B), 33 
U.S.C. Q 1365(b)(l)(B); SDWA 5 1449(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. Q 300j-8(b)(l)(B); RCRA 
Q:7002(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. Q 6972(b)(l); CAA Q: 304(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. Q 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
EPCRKA section 326(h)(2) qualifies those who may intervene, and TSCA subsection 
20(b)(l)(B) allows only those parties to intervene who gave notice of citizen suit before 
the government filed suit. 16 U.S.C. 9: 2619(b)(l)(B); 42 U.S.C. Q: 11046(h)(2). 
77 TSCA Q 20(~)(1), 16 U.S.C. 9: 2619(c)(I); SMCRA 9: 520(c)(2), 30 U.S.C. Q 1270(c)(2) 
(2000); CWA Q 505(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. Q: 1365(c)(2); MPRSA Q 105(g)(3)(B), 33 U.S.C. 
5 1415(g)(3)(B); SDWA Q 1449(c), 42 U.S.C. 5 300j-8(c); RCRA Q: 7002(d), 42 U.S.C. 
5 6972(d); CAA Q: 304(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. Q 7604(c)(2); EPCRKA Q 326(h)(l), 42 U.S.C. 
5 1 1046(h)(l). 
7X CAA Q 304(~)(2), 42 U.S.C. Q: 7604(c)(2); CWA Q 505(~)(3), 33 U.S.C. Q: 1365(~)(3).  
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discusses the legal issues that arise under each type of preclusion, begin- 
ning with the most stringent and proceeding in order of decreasing power. 
A. CWA Subsection 309(g) and Its Kin 
The strongest preclusion against EPA enforcement is found in the 
CWA and the SDWA. In each case, the preclusion applies to enforcement 
subsequent to an administrative penalty assessment by either EPA or a 
state with an approved program under a cooperative federalism arrange- 
ment. Both the SDWA, in the enforcement provision for its underground 
injection p r~gram, '~  and the CWA, in its general enforcement and oil spill 
 provision^,^^ authorize EPA to assess administrative penal tie^.^' The pro- 
visions preclude subsequent EPA and citizen actions against violations 
for which: ( I )  EPA has commenced and is diligently pursuing an admin- 
istrative penalty action or (2) has finally assessed an administrative pen- 
alty. The CWA's enforcement provision precludes both EPA and citizens 
from taking other penalty actions against violations for which the state 
has taken similar action under comparable state law.82 The CWA provi- 
sion precludes only successive penalty actions and its second prong ap- 
plies only if the violator has paid the penalty." The SDWA provision 
omits this preclusion against EPA action, probably because the SDWA 
already precludes EPA enforcement if the state has taken "appropriate 
enforcement action."84 CWA subsection 309(g) is unique in that its pre- 
clusion device contains a bar on both EPA and citizen enforcement. De- 
fendants have invoked the subsection 309(g) bar in many citizen suits, 
but in few EPA enforcement actions. Because of a dearth of opinions un- 
der the comparable provisions in CWA section 31 1 and SDWA, this Arti- 
cle focuses on the preclusion device as it is used in CWA subsection 309(g), 
but its conclusions are applicable to the use of the device in the SDWA. 
I .  Introduction: The Provision and Its Preclusions 
In 1987, Congress amended the CWA enforcement section to add ad- 
ministrative assessment of civil penalties to EPA's enforcement arsenal.85 
It intended this authority to address relatively minor violations in a sort 
of traffic ticket fashion. Whereas subsection 309(d) authorizes courts to 
assess penalties up to $25,000 a day for each violation, with no limit on 
79 SDWA 5  1423(~)(5),  42  U.S.C. 5  300h-2(~)(5) (2000). 
so CWA $ 5  309(g), 31 l(b)(6)(E), 33 U.S.C. $ 5  1319(g), 131 l(b)(6)(E) (2000). 
Other statutes authorize EPA to assess penalties, but they do not incorporate the pre- 
clusion device in those authorities. E.g., CAA 5  113(d), 42 U.S.C. 5  7413(d) (2000). 
82 CWA 5  309(g)(6), 33 U.S.C. 5  1319(g)(6). 
CWA 5  309(g)(6)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 13 19(g)(6)(B). 
84 See infra Part 1II.B. 
85 Pub. L. No. 100-4, $ 3 14, I01 Stat. 7 , 4 6 4 9  (1 987). 
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total penalties assessed, subsection 309(g) authorizes EPA to assess pen- 
alties only to a total of $25,000, using informal administrative procedures, 
or $125,000, using formal administrative  procedure^.^^ Both administra- 
tive penalty processes, however, require EPA first to consult with the state 
in which the violation occurs, give the violator notice allowing it thirty days 
to request a hearing, and give public notice and opportunity for participa- 
tion in the assessment procedures.*' The provision also allows interested 
parties the opportunity to appeal EPA's ultimate assessments and to re- 
quest that the court assess greater penalties than EPA if EPA abused its 
discretion in assessing too low a penalty.88 To prevent the assessment of 
duplicative penalties for the same violation, Congress included the pre- 
clusion device in subsection 309(g)(6)(A). It provides that "any violation 
. . . shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action" by EPA or a citizen 
suit if 
(i) . . . [EPA] has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an 
action under this subsection, 
(ii) . . . a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an 
action under a State law comparable to this subsection, or 
(iii) . . . [EPA or a State] has issued a final order . . . and the 
violator has paid a penalty assessed under this subsection, or such 
comparable State law . . . .89 
But subsection 309(g)(6)(B) provides that the bar does not apply in the 
event that: 
(i) a civil action under section 1365(a)(1) . . . has been filed prior 
to commencement of an action under this subsection, or 
(ii) notice . . . has been given in accordance with section 1365(b) 
(l)(A) . . . prior to commencement of an action under this sub- 
section and an action under section 1365(a)(l) . . . with respect 
to such alleged violation is filed before the 120th day after the 
date on which such notice is given.90 
Although an EPA action under subsection 309(g) may bar a citizen suit, EPA 
must provide public notice of such an action, and citizens may intervene 
or, if a penalty has been agreed between EPA and the violator, demand a 
hearing on the adequacy of the penalty. Citizens may also appeal final EPA 
action on penalty  assessment^.^' This is the only instance of which the 
86 CWA Q 309(d), (g)(2), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(d), (g)(2). 
87 CWA Q 309(g)(1), (4), 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(g)(l), (4). 
88 CWA Q 309(g)(8), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(8). 
89 CWA §309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(6)(A). 
90CWA Q 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(6)(B). 
91 CWA Q 309(g)(8), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(8). 
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author is aware that Congress provided citizens with judicial review of 
consented-to administrative penalties between EPA and violators. Of in- 
terest in interpreting the preclusions is subsection 309(g)(7), which pro- 
vides that EPA penalty assessments do not "affect any person's obliga- 
tions to comply with" the CWA, without mentioning the effect of state 
penalty  assessment^.^^ 
The CWA subsection 309(g) preclusion device is a variant of the fa- 
miliar three-element device against subsequent enforcement. It contains 
the notice and delay elements requiring EPA to issue a notice to the vio- 
lator and to consult with the state before commencing a penalty action. It 
then gives the respondent thirty days to request a hearing. Uniquely, how- 
ever, 309(g) contains the bar element for the device's limitation on suc- 
cessive actions by both EPA and citizens. Normally, preclusions on EPA 
enforcement are located in the EPA enforcement provisions, and preclu- 
sions on citizen enforcement are located in the citizen suit provisions. 
The CWA subsection 309(g)'s wedding of the two bar elements into one 
provision is a graphic illustration that the statutes' preclusions on EPA 
and citizen actions are variants of the same device. Despite its uniqueness 
in this regard, the CWA subsection 309(g) preclusion device is structured as 
the other preclusion devices and raises many of the same interpretive is- 
sues, albeit in a somewhat different context: (1)  What levels of govern- 
ment may act to bar an EPA or citizen action? (2) What government ac- 
tions will bar an EPA or citizen action? (3) When must the government 
action be commenced to bar an EPA or citizen action? (4) How diligently 
must the government prosecute the action to bar an EPA or citizen ac- 
tion? ( 5 )  What EPA or citizen actions will the government action bar? 
Before addressing these issues, however, it is useful to examine the legis- 
lative history of subsection 309(g), for Congress recognized that if not 
properly implemented, subsection 309(g) could interfere with the com- 
pliance goals of CWA sections 309 (EPA enforcement) and 505 (citizen 
enforcement), and structured subsection 309(g) to prevent that interfer- 
ence. 
The subsection 309(g) preclusion device has generated considerable 
litigation and reported decisions, almost all of them in citizen suits.93 Courts 
swayed by deference to prosecutorial discretion or otherwise hostile to citi- 
zen suits have disregarded the plain wording of subsection 309(g) to in- 
terpret the preclusion device broadly. They have done so without consid- 
ering the implications of their interpretations on EPA enforcement under 
CWA subsection 309(g) and the other statutes. Moreover, they utterly fail 
92 CWA 5 309(g)(7), 33 U.S.C. 9 13 19(g)(7). 
93This discussion of the subsection 309(g) preclusion device cites nearly fifty deci- 
sions considering its application in citizen suits. But the author is aware of only one re- 
ported subsection 309(g) decision in  an EPA enforcement action. See United States v. 
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 791-95 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part oil other grolrtzds, 191 F.3d 5 16, 524-26 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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to grasp that the CWA subsection 309(g) preclusion device is part of a 
nuanced spectrum of preclusions on EPA and citizen actions in the stat- 
utes, rendering the congressional wording of each preclusion to be of par- 
ticular significance in determining the legislative intent. Finally, they 
have ignored the legislative history of subsection 309(g), which demon- 
strates congressional intent to strengthen, not weaken, EPA enforcement 
authority and to limit the bar against subsequent enforcement when the 
initial penalty was inappropriately lenient. 
2.  Background and Legislative History 
Congress's 1987 CWA amendments94 strengthened the deterrent value 
of EPA's enforcement authorities in three ways.95 First, Congress pro- 
vided greater deterrence through civil penalties by raising the amount of 
penalties that courts could assess from $10,000 per day to $25,000 per 
day for each violation and by establishing factors for courts to consider 
in setting the amounts of penalty assessments, including the economic 
benefit of non-compliance to the violator.96 Second, it provided to EPA 
the option of assessing administrative penalties in subsection 309(g). Fi- 
nally, it increased the criminal sanctions that courts could impose and 
added a new criminal offense with particularly harsh sanctions for know- 
ing violations which the violator knew put others in danger of death or 
serious bodily injury.97 It based the administrative penalty and the know- 
ing endangerment provisions on EPA proposals made as early as 1982.98 
Both the House and Senate bills contained provisions for all three en- 
forcement enhancements, although they varied in their details.99 
The legislative history emphasizes three aspects of congressional in- 
tent behind the new administrative penalty authority. First, Congress in- 
tended to strengthen EPA's enforcement program by giving it a new en- 
forcement option. Second, and most important in terms of coverage, Con- 
gress intended the new administrative penalty authority to be used against 
9-' Pub. L. No. 100-4, $5  3 12-3 14, 101 Stat. 7 (1987). Both chambers initially passed 
the amendments in 1985. A Conference Committee reconciled the two versions in 1986 
and President Reagan vetoed the legislation that year. Congress enacted it over his veto in 
1987. See Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. City of West Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792, 
803 n.1 1 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (recounting the history of the statute). 
95 Pub. L. No. 100-4, $ 8  3 12-3 14, 101 Stat. 42-49 (1987). 
96Pub. L. NO. 100-4, 8 313, 101 Stat. 45 ,45  (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d)). 
9 7 P ~ b .  L. NO. 100-4, 5 312, 101 Stat. 42, 42-44 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
!j 1319(c)). 
98 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Envirorlmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on 
Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong. 34, 78-85 (1982) [hereinafter "Senate Hear- 
i ~ ~ g s " ]  (written testimony of John Hernandez, Deputy Administrator, EPA); Hearings Be- 
fore the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Trans- 
portation, 97th Cong. 341, 384-91 (1982) [hereinafter "House Hearings"] (written testi- 
mony of John Hernandez, Deputy Administrator, EPA). 
99 Id. 
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lesser violations, not against serious violations for which substantial pen- 
alties or injunctive relief are more appropriate. Third, almost as an after- 
thought, Congress was concerned that violators not be forced to pay two 
penalties for the same violation. The last-minute revision of the provision 
to accomplish the third goal created a cumbersome preclusion device en- 
couraging some courts to misinterpret it to undercut the first two goals, 
potentially doing great damage to the entire statute. 
The legislative history on the first point is straightforward; by all ac- 
counts congressional intent was to strengthen EPA enf~rcement. '~" Most of 
the legislative history focuses on the second point: that the new adminis- 
trative penalty was for lesser violations. Indeed, the testimony of EPA's 
Deputy Administrator in hearings before both the Senate and House au- 
thorizing committees stressed that: 
[tlhe efficiency afforded by this administrative assessment plan 
would be negated if EPA used this procedure to assess penalties 
for major violations of the Act or complex cases. For this reason, it 
is EPA's intent to use administrative penalties to address clear and 
well documented violations of the Act which may not be serious 
enough to require judicial enf~rcement . '~ '  
The Senate Committee was quite concerned that the provision only be used 
for such lesser violations. The Senate Report reiterated: 
This authority . . . is . . . not to replace a vigorous civil judicial 
enforcement program. Civil judicial enforcement is a keystone 
of successful enforcement of the Act and necessary for . . . cases 
requiring injunctive relief, serious violations of the Act, or large 
penalty actions, and cases where remedies are sought requiring 
significant construction or capital i n v e ~ t m e n t . ' ~ ~  
loo The original enforcement provision provided EPA "with two civil enforcement op- 
tions," administrative compliance orders and judicial actions for penalties and injunctions. 
S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 26 (1985). "These amendments give the Administrator a third op- 
tion." Id. Administrative penalty assessments "could provide greater deterrent value than 
an administrative [compliance] order for a violation that does not warrant the more re- 
source intensive aspects of judicial enforcement." Id. When introducing both the House bill 
and the Conference Committee bill for floor debate and vote, Rep. Roe, chief sponsor of 
the House Bill and Chairman of the House Authorizing Committee, stated that the adminis- 
trative penalty provision was "designed to substantially increase EPA's enforcement capa- 
bility to ensure compliance with the act." 131 CONG. REC. 19847 (1985); 132 CONG. REC. 
31961 (1986). Sen. Chaffee Mitchell said substantially the same thing in support of the 
conference committee bill for the ultimate vote. "The amendments provide for new author- 
ity for the EPA to use administrative penalties . . . ." 133 CONG. REC. 1270 (1987). 
'01 See House Hearings, supra note 98, at 387; Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 8 1. 
lo's. REP. NO. 99-50, at 26 (1985). 
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Indeed, two thirds of the Senate Report's discussion of subsection 309(g) 
is devoted to this concern, which explains many of the distinctive features of 
the Senate bill. 
The initial version of the Senate billlo' and the final House bi11IM pro- 
vided EPA authority to commence a penalty proceeding against a person 
who "is in violation" of the statute. However, the final version of the Senate 
bill changed the tense of the phrase, providing EPA authority to com- 
mence a penalty action only against a person who "has violated" the stat- 
ute.'05 Both chambers adopted the Senate past tense version in the en- 
acted provision, subsection 309(g)(l)(A).Io6 The Senate's use of the past 
tense was thus intentional and meaningful. The Senate report stated that 
the bill contained several measures to assure that EPA did not use the 
new authority against violations more appropriately addressed by judicial 
action, the first measure was use of the past tense: 
First, this new authority is designed to address past, rather than 
continuing, violations . . . . Continuing violations are more ap- 
propriately addressed by abatement orders or injunctive actions, 
and, if EPA seeks both civil penalties and injunctive relief, one 
judicial action should be filed . . . . These limitations are intended 
to assure that violations of greater magnitude are handled judi- 
cially and pursued in a judicial forum.'07 
The Senate Report also identified public participation as another of 
the "several safeguards . . . to prevent abuse of the administrative penalty 
authority, such as significant violators escaping with nominal penalties."lo8 
Both the House and Senate bills contained detailed requirements for giv- 
ing public notice of penalty assessments, allowing citizens to intervene in 
assessment proceedings, allowing citizens to request hearings if penalty 
assessments were concluded by agreement without a hearing, and author- 
izing citizens to appeal assessments to the courts.lW But only the Senate 
bill allowed courts in such appeals to assess higher penalties than the EPA 
penalty being appealed.Il0 This too was one of the safeguards the Senate 
bill contained against lenient penalty assessments for serious violations,"' 
I0-'S. 2652,97th Cong. Q 8 (1982), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 15-17. 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-189, at 89 (1985). 
Io5 S .  REP. NO. 99-50, at 100 (1985). 
IM33 U.S.C. Q 1319(g)(l)(A) (2000). 
Io7S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 26 (1985). 
Io8 Id. at 27. 
Im S.  REP. NO. 99-50, at 26-29, 102 (1985); H.R. REP. NO. 99-189, at 9 0  (1985). 
] I 0  S .  REP. NO. 99-50, at 102 (1985). 
The report accompanying the bill stated: 
Providing citizens with a right to appeal will serve as an added safeguard to as- 
sure that the Agency assesses appropriate penalties . . . that take into account the 
seriousness of the violation . . . and serve to deter noncompliance . . . . Where it is 
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and was adopted in the enacted version."* Senator Chaffee, chief sponsor of 
the Senate bill, noted that state action could bar an EPA or citizen action 
"only where a State is proceeding under a State law that is comparable to 
section 309(g). For example, in order to be comparable, a State law must 
provide for a right to a hearing and for public notice and participation 
procedures similar to those set forth in section 309(g).""' 
The Senate report identified a final measure to prevent use of the ad- 
ministrative penalty authority for violations more appropriately addressed 
by judicial enforcement: the bar on subsequent EPA or citizen penalty action 
was limited only to the specific violations against which a penalty had been 
a s ~ e s s e d . " ~  
The third legislative concern was that the new administrative penalty 
authority not result in duplicative penalty assessments for the same viola- 
tion.Il5 The Senate bill anticipated the possibility that EPA could seek civil 
penalties under sections 309(b), 309(d), and 31 1, and that citizens could 
seek civil penalties under section 505 after EPA had assessed a subsec- 
tion 309(g) penalty for the same violations. The Senate bill provided pre- 
clusions against such successive penalty actions, and ultimately these 
preclusions in the enacted provision. The Senate bill made no accommo- 
dations for state administrative penalty assessments. The House bill con- 
tained no preclusions on citizen suits in subsection 309(g), but did pro- 
pose a preclusion in section 505(a) if EPA or a state had assessed an ad- 
ministrative penalty.'I6 The House bill was more deferential to states in 
other ways, requiring EPA to confer with them before assessing a penalty 
clear that the Agency has assessed such an unreasonably low penalty as to consti- 
tute and abuse of discretion, the court may choose to impose its own higher pen- 
alty rather than exercise its authority to remand. 
S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28-29 (1985). 
llz CWA 3 309(g)(8), 33 U.S.C. 3 13 19(g)(8) (2000); Joinzr Explanzatory Staremerzt of 
the Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-1004, at 139 (1985) ("From the 
Senate bill, . . . court authority to impose additional penalties is included in the conference 
substitute . . . ."). 
' I 3  133 CONG. REC. 1264 (1 987). 
' I 4  The Senate Committee underlined this in its report: 
This limitation applies only to an action for civil penalties for the same violations 
which are the subject of the administrative civil penalties proceeding. It would not 
apply to an action for civil penalties for a violation of the same requirement of the 
Act that is not being addressed administratively or for a past violation of another 
pollutant parameter . . . . In addition, this limitation would not apply to: I )  an ac- 
tion seeking relief other than civil penalties . . . . 
S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28 (1985). Moreover, the Committee noted that "[tlhis amendment 
does not preclude administrative or judicial enforcement actions by the Administrator for 
any violations not specifically penalized by the initial enforcement action." Id. 
' I 5  "[Nlo one may bring an action to recover civil penalties under sections 309(b) and 
(d), 3 1 I(b), or 505 of this Act for any violation with respect to which the Administrator has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an administrative civil penalty action . . . ."Id. 
'I6 H.R. REP. NO. 99-189, at 103 (1985). 
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and precluding EPA from assessing an administrative penalty for a viola- 
tion for which the state could demonstrate it already had assessed an ap- 
propriate penalty.'" The consultation provision was adopted in subsection 
309(g)(l) as enacted. The broad preclusion from the House bill was not 
adopted, but the Conference Committee incorporated much of its substance 
into the provision ultimately adopted by adding penalty assessments un- 
der comparable state statutes to those that would preclude EPA or citizen 
penalty actions under subsection 309(g)(6). 
Congress was aware of how the features of the provision knit together 
and intended the intricate result. For instance, Representative Edgar, a rank- 
ing member of the authorizing committee in the House, commented that, 
under the original House bill, "citizens would be precluded from seeking 
redress in cases of violation of the Clean Water Act. I understand that the 
Roe amendment will allow citizens to go to court in the case of continu- 
ing violations, which I believe is a fair c~mpromise . " '~~  
The House Conference Committee Report reiterated the limitations the 
Senate included in the legislation to prevent EPA from abusing the new 
authority to protect violators from compliance by assessing small penal- 
ties against them. 
This limitation applies only to an action for civil penalties for 
the same violations which are the subject of the administrative 
civil penalty proceeding. It would not . . . apply to 1 )  an action 
seeking relief other than civil penalties (e.g., an injunction or 
declaratory judgment); 2) an action under section 505(a)(l) of 
this Act filed prior to commencement of an administrative civil 
penalty proceeding for the same violation; or 3) a violation which 
has been the subject of a notice of violation under section 
505(b)(l) of this Act prior to initiation of the administrative pen- 
alty process, provided that, in the latter case, the action under 
section 505(a)(l) of this Act is filed within 120 days of the no- 
tice of v i~ l a t i on . "~  
The Senate Committee was rightly concerned with the potential for 
abuse of the new provision. Perversely implemented and interpreted, the 
preclusions could shield continuing violators from appropriate penalties, 
and even from compliance, by paying a pittance in administrative penal- 
ties to the State. Such an interpretation would eviscerate any deterrent 
value from civil penalties when the economic benefit of non-compliance 
H.R. REP. NO. 99- 189, at 89, 91 (1985). 
13 1 CONG. REC. 19852 (1985). There was no amendment offered by Rep. Roe to 
the House bill or to what was to become subsection 309(g). The speaker evidently was 
referring to the entire bill amending the CWA, including its provision for subsection 
309(g), for Rep. Roe was one of its chief sponsors. 
' I q  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-1004, at 133 (1986). 
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exceeds $25,000, which is usually the case. Such an interpretation could 
effectively eliminate citizen enforcement and could limit EPA enforce- 
ment to criminal prosecution. Indeed, such an interpretation could evis- 
cerate not only the enforcement provisions of the statutes, but also the 
substantive requirements of the statutes by allowing paltry penalty assess- 
ments to shield violators from actions to force compliance. There is not a 
hint in the legislative history that Congress intended either of these results; 
indeed, the history indicates Congress anticipated these dangers and care- 
fully drafted the preclusion device to avoid them. 
3. Interpreting the Preclusion Device in CWA Subsection 309(g). 
Several legal questions arise in the interpretation of subsection 309(g). 
This Section discusses each of these questions in turn based on the fore- 
going analysis. 
a .  What Levels of Government May Act To Bar a Successive EPA or 
Citizen Penalty Action? 
Actions by the "Administrator" or a "State" may bar subsequent EPA 
and citizen penalty actions under subsection 309(g). The scope of the mean- 
ing of these terms, however, is a relevant question. The statute defines the 
"Administrator" to mean the Administrator of EPA,IZ0 and defines "State" 
to mean "a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico" and various territories.12' There are two issues regarding the mean- 
ing of "State." First, does the term include political subdivisions of a state, 
such as cities or sewer districts? Second, does the term include all states 
or only those with approved CWA permit programs? The statutory definition 
of "State" does not address either issue explicitly. 
Because municipalities and other state subdivisions, such as sewer 
districts, may implement environmental programs responsive to the CWA 
and may have authority to assess penalties against violators of related local 
environmental requirements, defendants may claim cities are states for 
purposes of the subsection 309(g) bar."? But the CWA defines "State" 
with no reference to municipalities and, indeed, separately defines munici- 
palities.'?' All courts considering the issue have held that municipalities 
120CWA Q: IOl(d), 33 U.S.C. 8 1251(d) (2000). 
I 2 l  CWA Q: 502(3), 33 U.S.C. Q: 1362(3) (2000). There is a question about the Adminis- 
trator's ability to take enforcement actions in court. See Miller, supra note 1 ,  at 429-30. 
12' The CWA, for instance, requires municipal sewage treatment plants to secure per- 
mits to regulate the treatment of their wastewater and the purity of their discharges. The 
CWA requires most of them to develop and enforce programs to regulate discharges into 
the sewer system from industrial water pollution sources. Thus, the CWA creates roles for 
them as both regulators and members of the regulated public. The CAA authorizes states to 
designate local agencies to implement and enforce state implementation plans. 
CWA 5 502(4), 33 U.S.C. 5 1362(4). The definition includes cities, towns, and spe- 
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are not states for purposes of preclusion in  the citizen suit  provision^.'^^ 
There is no reason for a different answer under the subsection 309(g) pre- 
clusion provision. 
A more serious question is whether "State," for the purposes of the pro- 
vision, means any state or only a state with an approved permit program. 
The plain meaning is any state, and this meaning is correct because the 
CWA defines "State" to include all states, not just states with approved 
programs,'25 and does not define "State" differently for purposes of sub- 
section 309(g). When Congress intended to use a generally defined term 
in section 309 in a manner departing from the general definition, it pro- 
vided a different special definition in section 309."6 Its failure to provide 
a special definition for "State" in section 309 suggests that Congress did 
not intend a special meaning for the term in the section. Its special treat- 
ment of violations in states with approved programs in subsection 309(a) 
indicates it knew how to designate authorities in such states when it in- 
tended to do so. The structure of the section thus supports the plain meaning 
of "State" to be any state, regardless of the status of its permit program. 
The issue has been noted in one decision,12' but never decided in a re- 
ported decision of which the author is aware. 
This is the one issue examined in the Article for which the plain mean- 
ing leads to such absurd results that it should be disregarded. Penalties 
assessed under subsection 309(g) are capped at $125,000. A $125,000 pen- 
alty is blatantly insufficient to deter violation of a requirement to install 
pollution control equipment costing several million dollars and is, therefore, 
an inappropriate sanction for a polluter who violates a requirement, for ex- 
ample, to install such equipment. The legislative history is rife with con- 
gressional recognition of the lack of deterrent value of subsection 309(g) 
penalties for serious violations and of the consequent congressional in- 
tent to limit the use of subsection 309(g) to less serious violations. In- 
deed, in both section 309 generally and subsection 309(g) in particular, Con- 
gress admonished that the amount of penalties assessed take into account 
"the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation."lZ8 Courts rec- 
ognize that a penalty must be greater than the economic benefit or saving 
of the violation to the polluter to have either general or specific deterrent 
effect.l19 If a state assesses a five dollar penalty against a serious viola- 
cia1 sewer districts. 
I z J  See Miller, supra note I ,  at 43 1-33; see also supra Part II.A.2. 
I z 5  CWA 5 502(3), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1362(3). 
126See CWA 9: 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(c)(6) (2000) (adding, for the purposes of 
subsection (c), "responsible corporate officer" to the general definition of "person" in 
CWA section 502, 33 U.S.C. 5 1362(5) (2000)). 
12' N. & S .  Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 554 n.3 (1st Cir. 
1991). 
l z s  CWA 9: 309(d), 309(g)(3), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(d), 1319 (g)(3) (2000). Subsection 
309(g)(3) adds "or savings" after benefit. 
I z 9  Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 492 
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tion, the penalty will have no deterrent or punitive value; but worse, be- 
cause of the bar against subsequent penalties, it will prevent the assess- 
ment of any penalties in the future that will have deterrent or punitive 
value. This eviscerates the federal penalty provisions and their deterrent val- 
ues. Worse, some courts interpret the bar to prevent any subsequent en- 
forcement action, whether for penalties or compliance. While they are 
plainly wrong,I3O under their interpretation, a state can assess a five dollar 
penalty against a violation and insulate the polluter from compliance with 
the federal requirements. This amounts to the federal judiciary empower- 
ing state agencies to amend federal statutes. This is an absurd result that 
Congress cannot have intended. 
Interpreting "State" to mean a state with an approved program would 
limit the potential for states to eviscerate the federal program by assess- 
ing paltry penalties. To achieve EPA approval, a state must be committed 
enough to the federal program to enact comparable legislation and prom- 
ulgate comparable regulations. When it does so, the state has a stake in the 
success of the federal program, thereby making it far less likely to under- 
cut the federal program than a state with no commitment to it. Thus, in- 
terpreting "State" in this fashion avoids the absurd results of interpreting 
it to mean any state. 
There is good reason to believe that Congress used "State" rather than 
"State with an approved permit program" in subsection 309(g) inadver- 
tently. It added the bar from state penalties assessed under state authority 
comparable to subsection 309(g) at the last minute, in Conference Com- 
mittee."' Making a last minute addition to a provision as long and com- 
plex as subsection 309(g) risks an inadvertent mistake. Senator Chaffee, 
the chief Senate sponsor of the amendments, appears to have recognized 
that the Conference Committee had made just such a mistake when it wrote 
that the bar was activated by a penalty assessed by a state rather than by a 
state with an approved program. He noted on the Senate floor in the de- 
bate on the Conference Committee bill, that "State" in subsection 309(g) 
means "State with an approved permit program.""? 
(D.S.C. 1995) ("[Tlo serve as an effective deterrent, a civil penalty must recover an amount 
beyond the economic benefit of noncompliance."); see also Atl. States Legal Found. v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1141 (I lth Cir. 1990); PlRG v. Powell Duffryn Termi- 
nals, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1 158, 1166 (D.N.J. 1989), aff'd it1 pclrt, rev'ct in part, 91 3 F.2d 64 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
"O See inzfrct Part II.A.3.e. 
13' See slrpru Part 1.B.2. 
Is' Sen. Chaffee explained that: 
A single discharge may be a violation of both State and Federal law and a State is 
entitled to enforce its own law. However, only if a State has received authoriza- 
tion under section 402 to implement a particular permitting program can it prose- 
cute a violation of Federal law. Thus, even if a non-authorized State takes action 
under State law against a person who is responsible for a discharge which also 
constitutes a violation of the Federal permit, the State action cannot be addressed 
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The absurd plain meaning of "State" in subsection 309(g) thus ap- 
pears to be drafting error, recognized soon after by the chief sponsor of 
the amendment that added subsection 309(g). As written, the provision 
encourages violators to seek states that assess paltry penalties in hopes of 
shielding themselves from meaningful penalties or even from compliance. At 
the very least, this renders the federal penalty provisions super-fluous and, 
at the very worst, renders the violated federal requirements meaningless. 
These absurd results can and should be avoided by interpreting "State" to 
mean a "State with an approved permit program," as suggested by the chief 
Senate sponsor of the amendment prior to the Senate vote on the Confer- 
ence Committee bill. That interpretation is consistent with the structure 
and policy of the statute. 
Part One came to the opposite result when it considered the issue in 
the context of a "State" whose action could bar a citizen suit."' Although 
the interpretive choice there was also between "State" and "State with an 
approved program," the analytical context was sufficiently different not 
to warrant departure from the plain meaning of "State." For example, the 
interpretive issue with regard to citizen suits recurs in many statutes, em- 
phasizing congressional intent. With regard to subsection 309(g), however, it 
occurs only once. Moreover, generally only state actions for compliance 
can bar a citizen suit; but, under 309(g), state-assessed penalties of five dol- 
lars can bar subsequent EPA and citizen enforcement. Under the citizen 
suit provisions, state actions can bar only citizen suits, but under 309(g), 
state actions can bar both citizen suits and EPA actions. In the citizen suit 
provisions, no legislative history supports interpreting "State" to mean 
"State with an approved program," but under 309(g), the legislative his- 
tory suggests just that. Thus, the contexts of the issues are sufficiently dif- 
ferent to warrant different interpretive results. 
b. When Congress Provides that Particular Adrninistrative Penalty 
Actions May Bar Successive EPA and Citizen Penalt?, Actions, May 
Other Enforcement Actions Bar Them? 
Subsection 309(g) specifically states that administrative penalty pro- 
visions bar subsequent enforcement, but does not refer to any preclusion 
under this subsection produced by other forms of enforcement activity. 
Under a plain-meaning reading of subsection 309(g), other forms of en- 
to the Federal violation. for the State has no authority over the Federal permit 
limitation or condition in question. In such case. the authority to seek civil penal- 
ties for a violation of the Federal law under subsections 309(d) or 3 1 I(b) or sec- 
tion 505 would be unaffected by the State action, notwithstanding paragraph 
309(g)(6). 
133 CONG. REC. 1264 (1987). 
13' Miller, sirprn note I, at 433-35. 
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forcement would not preclude subsequent enforcement, but many courts 
wrongly interpret the preclusion device in subsection 309(g) to provide 
that non-penalty state actions may bar successive EPA and citizen suits. 
This Section discusses which of these interpretations should be favored. 
The plain meaning and expressio unius ("expression of one thing sug- 
gests the exclusion of others") canons of statutory interpretation both sup- 
port a plain reading meaning.'34 Similarly, Part One concluded that courts 
overwhelmingly interpret the preclusion devices in the citizen suit provi- 
sions to bar citizen suits only when the government takes an action specified 
in the preclusion as barring suit.'" Many courts are true to the plain read- 
ing and strong congressional intent that the listed penalty actions and no 
other actions bar citizen suits and EPA actions. Other courts, however, 
interpret the preclusion to allow all sorts of administrative actions, pen- 
alty and non-penalty actions, and formal and informal actions to bar citi- 
zen suits. Because the same preclusion device bars successive EPA ac- 
tions as well as successive citizen actions, their holdings effectively bar any 
federal enforcement action under those  circumstance^.'^^ That holding 
enables a violator to avoid compliance with federal law by the simple expe- 
dient of soliciting a paltry penalty assessment or other weak and ineffec- 
tive action by the state. This is not a chimera; as demonstrated in this Sec- 
tion of the Article, violators do solicit ineffective state action as a sanctu- 
ary from compliance actions, and some courts have allowed this practice."' 
The statute provides that action taken by EPA under subsection 309(g) 
does not affect EPA or citizen authority to enforce the CWA, "except that 
any violation" shall not be subject to a "civil penalty action" under sec- 
tions 309(d), 31 1(b) or 505 if ( I )  EPA "under this subsection" or a state 
"under a State law comparable to this subsection" "has commenced and 
is diligently prosecuting" an action, or (2) EPA or a state has "issued a final 
order" and the violator has paid a penalty assessed "under this subsec- 
tion, or such comparable State law."'38 The statutory language could not 
1 3 ~  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 323 (1994). 
Miller, supra note 1 ,  at 436-45. 
In United Stares v. Smithfield Foods, I I I ~ . ,  the defendant argued that an earlier state 
action barred EPA's action under subsection 309(g), citing as precedent subsection 309(g) 
decisions in citizen suits. The Smirhjield court analyzed the issue in the same manner in the 
EPA enforcement action as other courts had analyzed it in citizen enforcement actions. 965 
F. Supp. 769, 782-83 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 191 
F.3d 5 16, 526 (4th Cir. 1999). 
"'See Miller, supra note I ,  at 465-73 (recounting various weak and ineffective state 
"enforcement" actions that defendants contended barred subsequent citizen suits). As one 
court commented, "[c]omplete deference to agency enforcement strategy, adopted and imple- 
mented internally and beyond public control, requires a degree of faith in bureaucratic 
energy and effectiveness that would be alien to common experience." Gardeski v. Colonial 
S a n d &  StoneCo., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
CWA 5 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. 8 13 19(g)(6)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). In ongo- 
ing penalty actions, the bar is activated only by EPA or a state commencing and prosecut- 
ing an action "under this subsection," i.e., subsection 309(g), or "under a State law compa- 
rable to this subsection," i.e., a state law comparable to subsection 309(g). Meanwhile, in 
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be more clear: only an EPA penalty assessment under the authority of sub- 
section 309(g) or a state penalty assessment under a comparable penalty 
authority activates the bar. The legislative history supports the plain Eng- 
lish reading of the preclusion language, which originated in the Senate bill. 
The Senate report stated specifically that the bar operated "only for the 
same violations which are the subject of the administrative civil penalties 
pr~ceeding.""~ 
The questions that arise during a consideration of what enforcement 
actions may bar subsequent enforcement differ depending on whether EPA 
or state action is alleged to be preclusive. If EPA action is at issue, the 
question is whether an EPA compliance or other non-penalty order will bar 
EPA or a citizen from commencing a subsequent penalty action. If state 
action is alleged to be preclusive, there are more numerous and complex 
 question^.'^^ 
i. May EPA Administrative Compliance Orders and Other 
Non-penalty Assessment Actions Preclude Successive EPA and 
Citizen Actions? 
The structure of the CWA provides evidence in regard to the preclu- 
sive effect of non-penalty assessment procedures. EPA has two adminis- 
trative order authorities under different subsections of CWA section 309. 
Subsection 309(a) authorizes EPA to issue administrative compliance orders, 
not to issue penalty assessment orders. Subsection 309(g) authorizes EPA to 
issue penalty assessment orders, not to issue compliance orders. Not only 
does each of these two subsections authorize EPA to take very different 
types of enforcement actions, each subjects EPA's actions to very differ- 
ent procedural and judicial review regimes.I4' Other sections of the CWA 
concluded penalty actions the bar is activated only by EPA or a state issuing "a final order" 
and the violator paying a "penalty assessed under this subsection, or such comparable State 
law." Again, "this subsection" is subsection 309(g) and a "comparable State law" is one 
comparable to subsection 309(g). 
S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28 (1985) (emphasis added). 
lWSee irlfrn Part II.A.3.b.(ii). 
IJ1  Subsection 309(g) specifies administrative procedures for EPA to follow in issuing 
penalty orders and authorizes judicial review of its penalty orders. 33 U.S.C. $ 1319(g) 
(2000). Section 309(a) specifies no administrative procedures for EPA to follow in issuing 
compliance orders and it does not authorize judicial review of its compliance orders, nor 
does section 509, the CWA's general judicial review section. 33 U.S.C. $5 1319(a), 1369 
(2000). Indeed, circuit court opinions uniformly hold that no pre-enforcement review is 
available for EPA section 309(a) compliance orders. Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 
F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995); Reuth v. E.P.A., 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993); S. Pines Assocs. by 
Goldmeier v. United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990); Hoffman Group, Inc. v. E.P.A., 
902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990); City of Baton Rouge v. U.S. EPA, 620 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 
1980). For other examples, see LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Chap. 9:22 and 
cases cited therein, at 9-99-9-108 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1987). 
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provide EPA with authorities to issue orders addressing violations, al- 
though they are neither compliance nor penalty assessment orders.I4? 
Because subsection 309(g) explicitly states that only EPA actions under 
"this subsection," (i.e., subsection 309(g)), bar suit, i t  is not surprising 
that courts universally have held section 309(a) compliance orders have 
no preclusive effect on citizen suits, relying on the plain meaning of the 
statute.IJ3 That interpretation also is in accord with the expressio unius 
canon of statutory interpretation.I4-l It also follows from the legislative 
history, which specifies that only EPA penalty assessments can be preclu- 
sive under subsection 309(g).'45 It is supported by the fact that, if Con- 
gress intended compliance orders to bar successive enforcement, i t  could 
easily have included such a bar, as it did in other statutes.'46 Finally, i t  is 
supported by judicial decisions holding that citizen suits are barred only 
by the government actions specified in the citizen suit preclusion device.IJ7 
No courts have considered whether the subsection 309(g) bar to EPA ac- 
tion or citizen suits can be activated by EPA administrative orders under 
other sections of the statute. If a section 309(a) compliance order does not 
constitute a bar under subsection 309(g), however, it follows that EPA orders 
under other authorities cannot constitute a subsection 309(g) bar either. 
I.'? For instance. EPA may order facilities violating the CWA to be barred from federal 
contracts or grants. CWA 3 508, 33 U.S.C. (i 1368 (2000); 40 C.F.R. $5  32.1 100-32.1105 
(2004). I t  also may order abatement of emergencies, regardless of whether they arise from 
violations of the statute. CWA (i 504, 33 U.S.C. 9 1364 (2000). 
I A 3  In Washington Public Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, the Ninth 
Circuit considered an appeal from the dismissal pursuant to CWA subsection 309(g) of a 
citizen suit because EPA had issued a section 309(a) compliance order. l l F.3d 883, 885- 
86 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit reversed. relying on the plain language of the statute. 
Id.  at 886-87. Other courts considering the question have reached the same result. Old 
Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist.. 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109. 1 1  14 (D. 
Colo. 1999) (quoting as dicta legislative history asserting that "[tlhis limitation applies 
only to an action for civil penalties for the same violations which are the subject of the 
administrative civil penalty proceeding," H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-1004, at 133 (1986)); 
Save Our Bays and Beaches v. City and County of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Haw. 
1994) (holding that a section 309(a) compliance order did not bar citizen suit even though 
order reserved the right to assess penalties under 3 309(g)); Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
Fina Oil & Che~n. Co., 806 F. Supp. 145, 146 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (noting that "comparable to 
this subsection" in  CWA subsection 309(g)(6)(a)(ii) requires interpretation, while "under 
this subsection" in subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(i) does not); Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. Bekaert 
Corp., 791 F. Supp. 769. 775 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (concluding that the statute's language and 
structure "only precludes a citizen's suit if the Administrator is diligently prosecuting an 
action for administrative penalties"). 
IUSee ESKRIDGE, slrprn note 134, at 323. E.~pre.s.sio ~rrli~rs means that expression of 
one thing suggests the exclusion of others. 
I A S  See slrprn note 1 14 (reviewing the legislative history). 
l a b  Wash. Pub. Interest Research Group, F.3d at 886-87. 
'"The vast majority of decisions interpreting the preclusions in  the citizen suit sec- 
tions hold that, when Congress specified one or more government action that could bar a 
citizen suit, i t  intended that other government actions could not bar a citizen suit. See 
Miller, supra note 1 at 436-45. 
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ii. May State Adrninisrrative Cornl~licrrzce Orders and Otlzer 
Non-penalty Actions Preclude Successive EPA and Citizerl Actions? 
The question of what state actions may bar successive EPA and citi- 
zen actions is more complex than the question of what EPA actions will bar 
them, because of the necessity to determine the meaning of "an action 
under a State law comparable to this subsection." The plain meaning of 
this phrase is that only a state administrative penalty action taken under a 
state authority comparable to subsection 309(g) may bar a successive action. 
However, the first court of appeals to consider the matter entirely ignored 
the wording of the provision, holding in North and South Rivers Water- 
shed Assn. v. Town of Scituate that the statute should be interpreted in dero- 
gation of its wording to protect enforcement choices made by the state.'48 
The state order before the court in Sciruare, was an administrative com- 
pliance order, not a penalty assessment order. The citizen enforcer argued 
that the state authority to issue a compliance order was not comparable to 
EPA's authority under subsection 309(g) to issue a penalty assessment 
order. Explicitly disregarding the wording of subsection 309(g) and with- 
out examining its legislative history, the Court held that the state's ad- 
ministrative compliance order was sufficient to bar the citizen suit under 
subsection 309(g) if the state had comparable administrative penalty au- 
thority somewhere in its statute. Faced with this, the citizen enforcer ar- 
gued that the state's unused administrative penalty assessment authority 
was not comparable to subsection 309(g) because the state statute did not 
require public notice and opportunity to comment on proposed penalty 
assessment orders, public participation in the proceedings, and public 
rights to appeal similar to those in subsection 309(g). The court dealt cava- 
lierly with this argument in a footnote, apparently finding that the status 
of penalty assessment orders as public documents satisfied the public notice 
requirement and state regulations allowing intervention in penalty as- 
sessment actions "adequately safeguard the substantive interest of citizens in 
enforcement actions."'49 Finally, compounding these errors, the court held 
that the state action barred all successive actions, not just penalty actions, 
again ignoring the wording of the ~ t a t u t e . " ~  
The court's excursion from the statute has misled many courts in sub- 
sequent decisions and unduly has clouded the proper interpretation of 
this element of subsection 309(g)'s preclusion d e ~ i c e . ' ~ '  There are three 
IJ949  F.2d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 1991). 
M. at 556 n.7. 
Id. at 557-58. 
Is' Virtually every post-Scirlrote decision cited in this Article for not following the 
plain meaning of subsection 309(g) pays homage to Scitirnte. See, e.g., Lockett v. EPA. 319 
F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v. City of Lakeland, 175 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'rl ell 
bmlc or1 other grounds, 224 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2000); Sierra Club v. Colo. Refining Co.. 
852 F. Supp. 1476, 1482-1483 (D. Colo. 1994). 
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issues in addressing the interpretation of the "comparable state statute" 
phrase. What does "comparable" mean? What federal and state laws must 
be compared? And must the state use its comparable penalty authority and 
assess a penalty to bar a successive action? These questions are the only 
issues unique to the preclusion device in CWA subsection 309(g).IS2 Be- 
fore addressing these questions, it is instructive to understand why the Sci- 
tuate court and those following it  stray so far from the plain meaning of 
the statute. 
The court's errors result from its general approach to citizen suits. The 
court assumed it was more important to protect the enforcement choices 
made by the state than to examine the wording of the statute. It made this 
error by a combined consideration of: (1) the general policy of the CWA 
that states have the primary responsibility to combat water pollution;'53 
(2) legislative history of the 1972 CWA, cited in Gwalrney, to the effect 
that Congress intended states to bring most enforcement actions;'54 and 
(3) the Supreme Court's observation in Gwalrney that citizen suits are to 
supplement rather than supplant government enforcement.ls5 This led the 
Scituate court to conclude that, when government enforcement action "be- 
gins and is diligently prosecuted, the need for citizen's suits van is he^."'^^ 
To interpret subsection 309(g) consistently with this conclusion required 
the court to ignore its plain wording that only EPA and state administra- 
tive penalty actions will bar successive citizen actions and that such gov- 
ernment actions will bar only successive actions for penalties. The court 
rationalized this omission by commenting that the wording of the subsec- 
tion was merely the "happenstance of statutory drafting,"'57 which the court 
could disregard to accomplish the court's higher goal of preventing citi- 
zens from interfering with the state's enforcement choices. The court ap- 
peared oblivious that its logic bars successive EPA actions, enables viola- 
tors to insulate themselves from compliance with federal law, and is con- 
trary to legislative intent. 
Aside from the court's obvious disregard of the plain meaning and 
other controlling canons of statutory construction, each of the three sup- 
ports i t  offers as a rationale for its approach is significantly in error. First, 
the general statement of congressional policy i t  recites favoring state re- 
sponsibility for controlling water pollution is only a general preference, 
one that Congress explicitly and repeatedly overrode throughout the statute. 
For instance, i t  authorized EPA to establish national technology-based 
Is' Other issues are addressed generally in Miller, supra note I at 456-73. See in par- 
ticular the discussion of what constitutes "diligent prosecution." 
Is' CWA 5 IOl(b), 33  U.S.C. 5 1251(b) (2000). 
INN. and S. Rivers Watershed Ass'rz, 949 F.2d at 557 (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield, 
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49,  6 0  (1987) (citing S .  REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 
(1971), reprirtred i r~  2 CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40,  at 1482)). 
15s 484  U.S. at 60. 
949 F.2d at 555. 
Id. at 556. 
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standards applicable to sources of water pollution in all states;158 establish 
criteria for state water quality standards and approve state water quality 
standard programs as meeting the federal criteria;Is9 establish national 
criteria for state permit programs and approve state permit programs as 
meeting the federal criteria;I6O inspect water pollution sources in any 
state;I6' and enforce against water pollution sources violating state-issued 
permits, in states with EPA approved permit programs, even when the 
states have already taken enforcement actions.I6* Indeed, in the citizen 
suit provision, Congress also authorized citizens to enforce against viola- 
tions of state-issued permits in states with approved permit programs, 
even when the states have already taken enforcement actions.I6' Thus, 
Congress's preference for state implementation of water pollution control 
programs is qualified throughout the statute. Its preference for state im- 
plementation is also qualified by the wording of the preclusion device in 
subsection 309(g). 
Second, the Scituare court's use of legislative history quoted in Gwalt- 
ney is curious, for the Sciruate court earlier cautioned against uncritical 
reliance on legislative hist01y.I~~ In any event, the Supreme Court in Gwalt- 
ney cited Senate Report language from 1972 to interpret section 505, en- 
acted in 1972, not to interpret subsection 309(g), enacted in 1987. Legis- 
lative history from 1972 is of no value in determining what a later Con- 
gress meant when it enacted subsection 309(g), fifteen years later.165 More- 
over, the Supreme Court edited the quoted language to change its mean- 
ing.166 In reality, the report passage addresses EPA enforcement rather than 
citizen suits; it never suggests that citizen suits are subordinate to gov- 
ernment enforcement. Indeed, it neither states nor implies that citizen suits 
are "proper only" under the circumstances the Court states.I6' 
Finally, the Supreme Court's conclusion in Gwaltney that citizen suits 
supplement rather than supplant government enforcement is flawed be- 
cause it is based entirely on the same legislative history, as well as for many 
other reasons examined in Part One.168 Even so, the Scituare court's reli- 
Is8 CWA Q Q  301, 304,33 U.S.C. $5 131 I, 1314 (2000). 
ls9 CWA QQ 303-304, 33 U.S.C. QQ 1313-1314 (2000). 
IMI CWA Q 402(b), 33 U.S.C. Q 1342(b) (2000). 
1 6 '  CWA Q 308, 33 U.S.C. Q 1318 (2000). 
CWA Q 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(3) (2000); see also infra Part I1.C. 
16' CWA Q 505, 33 U.S.C. Q 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000) (authorizing citizens to proceed with 
suits in the face of state actions, if the state actions were commenced after the citizen suit, 
are not diligently prosecuted, are not judicial actions, or are not calculated to or capable of 
securing compliance); see Miller, supra note I, at 435-73. 
IN 949 F.2d 552, 556 n.6 (1st Cir. 1991). 
16' Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Ib6 The Court found congressional history supported its conclusion only if i t  took Sen- 
ate report language out of context and changed "if' to "only if." Miller, supra note 1,  at 
487. 
I6'See Miller, supra note I, at 487 nn.424-27. 
Id. at 488-90 nn.428-38. 
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ance on G,valtney is misplaced. However questionable Gwnltney's "sup- 
plement, not supplant" mantra may be, the Supreme Court only used it in  
dicta as a tertiary argument to follobv the plain rneaning of the CWA, while 
the Scituate court used it as a primary argument to ignore the plain rneaning 
of the CWA, in blatant disregard of Gwaltney's admonition to interpret 
the CWA's citizen suit provision in  accordance with its plain meaning.'69 
The Scituate court concluded from these flawed or misunderstood 
points that when a state commences and diligently prosecutes any action 
against a violation, the need for a citizen suit disappears. In doing so, the 
court disregarded the congressional determination of the circumstances 
under which state action makes the need for EPA or citizen suit disappear. 
Congress explicitly stated in the plain words of subsection 309(g) when 
government action barred successive enforcement action, as i t  had in the 
preclusion devices in the citizen and EPA enforcement provisions of all 
of the statutes. 
The Scituate court and its followers improperly rewrite the statute, 
seeking to preserve the states' enforcement choices, in deference to the 
states' enforcement discretion. Those courts perceive that the primary reason 
Congress included the preclusion device in subsection 309(g) was to pre- 
serve the state governments' enforcement authority. That may be the pri- 
mary reason Congress included the preclusion devices in the citizen suit 
 provision^.'^^ Subsection 309(g), however, is not in  the citizen suit provi- 
sion of the CWA and the legislative history of subsection 309(g) indi- 
cates the reason Congress included the preclusion device in subsection 
309(g) was to prevent the assessment of duplicative penalties for the 
same violations.17' Indeed, the legislative history of subsection 309(g) 
contains no hint that preservation of the enforcement authority of the gov- 
ernment was even a subsidiary purpose of the preclusion device.I7' 
In the seminal opinion on the presumption of judicial deference to 
the government's enforcement discretion, the Supreme Court cautioned 
in Heckler v. Chaney that courts should not defer to such discretion when 
Congress circumscribes it.l7' When Congress enacted section 505, it  cir- 
cumscribed the ability of EPA and states to exercise their enforcement 
discretion free from the possibility of citizen suits. Under section 505 they 
could exercise enforcement discretion unfettered from citizen suits only 
Ibq Id. at 485 nn.409-12. 
17" For an account of the legislative history of the citizen suit provisions, see id. at 
420-25. 
See strprrr Part II.A.2. 
17' Id. Again, while the intent of the earlier Congress that drafted the preclusion device 
in section 505 was to preserve the government's enforcement authority, the intent of the 
earlier Congress in drafting section 505 is of no value in determining the intent of the later 
Congress that drafted the preclusion device i n  subsection 309(g). See s~tpra note 165. 
17'470 U.S. 821. 832-33 (1985) ("The preSumption may be rebutted where the sub- 
stantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforce- 
ment powers."). 
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by commencing a civil action in court prior to the initiation of a citizen 
suit and by diligently prosecuting the action. And even then EPA could 
not exercise its discretion free from citizen intervention in its judicial 
a ~ t i 0 n s . l ~ ~  When Congress amended section 309 to include subsection 
309(g), neither the text nor the legislative history of the new subsection 
suggests that it altered the bounds on EPA's or states' discretion to use 
other enforcement authorities free from the possibility of citizen suits. In 
adding subsection 309(g), Congress carefully bound EPA's and the states' 
discretion to assess administrative penalties by prescribing penalty as- 
sessment procedures, citizen participation procedures, and judicial review 
procedures. Scituate's refusal to give plain meaning to the words of the 
statute ignores the bounds that Congress placed on EPA or the state to 
exercise its enforcement discretion free from the possibility of citizen 
suits or of the state to exercise its enforcement discretion free from the 
possibility of EPA or citizen enforcement. It also ignores the legislative 
history of subsection 309(g), reiterating the plain language of subsection 
309(g) that only penalty actions activate the preclusion, preventing the 
government from assessing paltry penalties against continuing and seri- 
ous violations and thereby insulating violators from actions seelung compli- 
a n ~ e . ' ~ ~  Focus on preserving the states' enforcement discretion to act free 
from successive enforcement actions by others can be preserved only by 
limiting EPA's discretion to commence successive enforcement, for inter- 
preting the preclusion device to bar citizen enforcement also bars EPA en- 
forcement. 
Finally, the Scituare court saw no reason to subject the state to du- 
plicative and costly citizen enforcement that could not add to the envi- 
ronmental protection already afforded by the state's enforcement action 
and might detract from it. The court recited that the goal of the CWA was 
to combat water pollution and concluded that "[d]uplicative enforcement 
actions add little or nothing to compliance actions already under way, but 
do divert State resources away from remedying violations in order to fo- 
cus on the duplicative effort."'76 The court found that "[d]uplicative ac- 
tions aimed at exacting financial penalties in the name of environmental 
protection at a time when remedial measures are well under way do not fur- 
ther this goal. They are, in fact, impediments to environmental remedial 
efforts."'77 The court here seems to promote the congressional purpose of 
preventing duplicative penalties for the same v i o l a t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  But in Scituate, 
the penalty sought by citizens was not duplicative; the state had not as- 
sessed a penalty and did not desire to. The court imposed a preclusion dif- 
ferent than Congress imposed in subsection 309(g), one that prevented 
171CWA Q: 505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
175 See Miller, srrprn note I ,  at 430-35. 
949 F.2d 552, 556 ( l st Cir. 199 1). 
177 I d .  
17* See strprn Part II.A.2. 
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any penalty from being assessed once the state ordered compliance, rather 
than one that prevented a duplicative penalty from being assessed once 
the state had assessed a penalty. Congress could have established such a 
preclusion, but chose not to. 
The court was also unaware of the implications of its decision. While it 
rightly recognized that requiring compliance is more important than col- 
lecting penalties, it was unaware that its holding could shield violators 
from compliance as well as penalties in other contexts and that assessing 
significant penalties deters non-compliance, a point recognized twice by 
the Supreme Court under the CWA.'79 Moreover, the court failed to un- 
derstand that an EPA or citizen action for penalties is not in conflict with, 
does not interfere with, and does not duplicate a state compliance order 
that does not assess penalties. A successive EPA or citizen action for com- 
pliance could conflict or interfere with an earlier state compliance order 
by seeking a different means or schedule of compliance than the state had 
imposed. An EPA or citizen action for compliance incorporating the same 
terms as an earlier state compliance order would duplicate the states' ac- 
tion. However, an EPA or citizen action for penalties does not involve the 
state, does not depart from its compliance order and does not duplicate it. 
Although the court commented that the state would be forced to squander 
scarce resources by involving itself in a citizen suit, it did not explain why 
the state had to involve itself in the citizen suit. The plaintiff was not su- 
ing the state, and the citizen suit decisions cited in Part One do not reveal 
one instance in which a state intervened in a citizen suit. Indeed, the au- 
thor is unaware of any such case. 
The court also suggested that the assessment of penalties would hin- 
der pollution control. Of course, payment of penalties may divert funds the 
violator might otherwise use to attain compliance. But Congress decided 
the deterrence benefits of assessing penalties against violators outweigh 
detriments imposed on the violators. Moreover, Congress provided for 
the eventuality that the violator might not be able to comply if it had to 
pay a judicially assessed penalty, by instructing courts to take into ac- 
count "the economic impact on the violator, and such other matters as 
justice may require" when determining the amount to assess.'s0 In the end, 
the Scituate court's hostility toward successive actions by citizen enforc- 
ers is supported neither by its reasoning nor by wording of the statutes. 
Worse, it wrongly substituted its policy choice for the congressional pol- 
icy choice, manifested in the wording of the subsection 309(g) preclusion 
device. 
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Tull 
v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987). 
Ia0CWA 9: 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(d) (2000). For an instance in which a court con- 
sidered a penalty previously assessed by the state in establishing the amount of penalty the 
court would assess in a citizen suit, see Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. 
Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525 (D.N.J. 1993). 
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iii. What Actions Under "Comparable" State Law May Bar 
Successive EPA and Citizen Penalty Actions? 
Thus far, this Section has delved into the preclusive effect of non- 
penalty actions by EPA and states and has concluded that non-penalty 
actions do not preclude subsequent enforcement under subsection 309(g). 
The remaining issue focuses on which actions do have preclusive effect, 
and raises three separate but related inquiries. What does "comparable" 
mean? What federal law is to be used as a benchmark for comparison? What 
state law is to be compared? 
( a )  What Does "Comparable" Mean? 
The statute does not define "comparable." The dictionary defines it 
as "equivalent, similar."ls' Courts rightly point out that it does not mean 
" iden t i~a l . " '~~  This means the states have some latitude to enact penalty 
provisions that vary from the subsection 309(g) model but are still com- 
parable to it. How far they may vary and still be comparable is a knotty 
question. The structure of subsection 309(g), however, does provide guid- 
ance. Subsection 309(g) establishes three sets of procedures: penalty as- 
sessment procedures; citizen participation procedures; and judicial re- 
view procedures, all to prevent misuse of the preclusive authority. That 
suggests a comparable state provision is one that has all three sets of pro- 
cedures and that each set of state procedures is approximately the same 
as its corresponding set of federal  procedure^.'^^ 
The legislative history does not directly elaborate on the meaning of 
"comparable" because the phrase was added to the legislation at the last 
minute in the Conference Committee. The tenor of the Senate report, how- 
ever, does provide some insight into the intended meaning of the term. 
The Senate Committee was deeply concerned that EPA not abuse subsec- 
tion 309(g) authority by assessing lenient penalties for continuing or se- 
rious violations warranting injunctions and large penal tie^."^ The Com- 
mittee crafted several limitations to prevent this. With regard to penalty 
assessment procedures, it limited administrative penalty assessments to 
I n '  WEBSTER'S EVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 267 (9th Ed. 1983). 
IR2McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1252 (I lth Cir. 2003); Ark. Wildlife 
Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1994). 
18' McAbee, 3 18 F.3d at 1254. 
Unlike many of the other paragraphs in section 1319(g), paragraph (6) makes no 
references to particular paragraphs within the subsection. Instead, paragraph (6) 
refers to the subsection as a whole, which includes not only penalty-assessment 
provisions but also public-participation and judicial-review provisions. This is 
strong textual evidence that Congress intended courts to consider all three classes 
of provisions when deciding whether state law is "comparable. . . ." 
I8.'See supra notes 107-1 14 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 43 2005 
44 Harvard Environnzental LNW Review [Vol. 29 
past violations and required that EPA take into account the violator's 
economic benefits of non-compliance in determining the penalty to as- 
sess.Is5 With regard to public participation procedures, it required public 
notice of and opportunity to comment on proposed penalty assessments 
and authorized citizen intervention in penalty assessments. With regard to 
judicial review, it authorized citizens to appeal as insufficient EPA pen- 
alty assessments, even penalties made in the context of judicial settle- 
ments between EPA and violators, as long as the citizens meet specified 
standards of review.Is6 These public rights, of course, continue to reflect 
the strong emphasis on citizen participation that gave rise to the citizen 
suit p r o v i ~ i o n s . ' ~ ~  But the legislative history of the requirements indicates 
they were crafted to prevent EPA from addressing serious and continuing 
violations with paltry penalties instead of injunctions and significant ju- 
dicially assessed penalties. State penalty assessments, of course, are sub- 
ject to the same lenient enforcement abuses as EPA penalty assessments. 
In view of the Senate Committee's strong intent to prevent such abuse, 
the most logical meaning of "comparable" state law is that state law must 
have comparable protections against excessively lenient enforcement be- 
fore it can bar successive EPA and citizens actions. Indeed, Senator Chaf- 
fee, chief sponsor of the bill, stated in the Senate debates that a state ac- 
tion could bar an EPA or citizen action "only when a State is proceeding 
under a State law that is comparable to subsection 309(g)."'S8 This legis- 
lative history supports the same conclusion as suggested by the structure 
of the provision. 
The limitations the Senate Committee crafted to protect the provi- 
sion from abuse are easily discernible and fairly objective factors with which 
to make a comparability analysis. Not surprisingly, as discussed below, 
most courts have focused their comparability analyses on some of these 
factors, particularly on the notice and comment and citizen participation 
intervention rights. Surprisingly, however, none of their decisions recog- 
nize that the legislative history establishes that Congress placed limita- 
- - - 
18s Id 
I S b  If subsection 309(g) penalties are limited to past violations. it may be asked 
whether citizens have standing to appeal them under Steel Co. Citizer~s for n Better Erlvi- 
ronmer~t, which considered the standing of citizens to enforce against a violator for wholly 
past violations. 523 U.S.  83 (1998). Because the violation had ceased, the Court concluded 
that whatever injury the citizen plaintiffs had suffered from it had also ceased, depriving 
plaintiffs of standing. Id. at 106-10. Of course, in appeals under subsection 309(g)(8). 
citizens are not suing violators for past violations. but are seeking judicial review of a 
present EPA administrative action. They could plead a present and future injury caused by 
EPA's failure to assess a sufficient penalty to provide both general and specific deterrence, 
which would suffice under Frier~cls of the Er~rth. See 528 U.S. at 185-86. 
IS7See Miller, slrprrr note I ,  at 420-25 (discussing the legislative history of the citizen 
suit provisions). Citizen participation in the CWA is emphasized in CWA subsection 
lOl(e), 33 U.S.C. 9 1251(e) (2000); see Citizens for a Better Env't v. EPA. 596 F.2d 720 
(7th Cir. 1979). 
'" I33 CONG. REC. 1264 ( 1987); see also ir~frn note 206. 
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tions on the 309(g) preclusion to prevent abuse subsection 309(g) penalty 
authority by imposing paltry penalties against serious violations. 
The Scituate court did not attempt to define what "comparable" means, 
except to reject in a footnote the argument that the public notice and par- 
ticipations requirements in the state statute must be identical to the notice 
and participation requirements in subsection 309(g).Im It apparently con- 
ceded that the state statute must contain such requirement, but applied a 
very relaxed test. For instance, it concluded in the footnote that the nature of 
penalty assessment orders as public documents provided sufficient public 
notice to meet the comparability test. It summarily stated that, as long as 
the state statute's provisions "adequately safeguard the substantive inter- 
ests of citizens in enforcement actions," the comparability test is met.Ig0 
That is an enigmatic statement, for the limiting factors in subsection 
309(g) are procedural rights, not substantive rights. While in theory gov- 
ernment enforcement always protects the substantive rights of its citi- 
zens, theory does not approach reality.I9' Recognizing that, Congress lim- 
ited the preclusion devices to allow some successive enforcement. Never- 
theless, some courts have followed Scituate, including the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits.I9' 
The most thorough analysis of the issue is in the recent appellate de- 
cision, McAbee v. Fort Payne.I9' First, the court determined that subsection 
309(g) contained three sets of requirements for comparability: (1) penalty 
assessment procedures; (2) public notice and participation provisions; and 
(3) judicial review  provision^.'^^ Then it examined whether the standard for 
comparability should be either (1) "rough comparability" for each set of re- 
quirements or (2) a balance of "overall effect[s]," a weaker test. It equated 
I X y  949 F.2d 552, 556 n.7 (1st Cir. 1991). 
Isn Id. 
1 9 '  See suprrr note 137. 
1y2Arkorlsns Wildlife Federntior1 r? ICIAnrericns, Ilrc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994), fol- 
lowed Scirlrate, holding that state procedures did not have to be precisely the same as sub- 
section 309(g) procedures, "as long as the state law contains comparable penalty provi- 
sions which the state is authorized to enforce, has the same overall enforcement goals as 
the federal CWA, provides interested citizens a meaningful opportunity to participate at 
significant stages of the decision-making process, and adequately safeguards their legiti- 
mate substantive interests." Id. at 381-82. While this reference to citizen participation may 
appear to be somewhat more true to congressional intent than Scitlmte, it enabled the Ar- 
Porrscrs Wildlife court to find a state procedure requiring no pre-order public notice and 
comment to be comparable to the federal procedure requiring them. The citizens unsuc- 
cessfully contended that Arkansas administrative penalty procedures were not "compara- 
ble" to subsection 309(g) because they did not require public notice of or opportunity to 
comment on proposed orders and provided citizens only an after the fact opportunity to 
intervene. Id. at 381-82; see also Lockett v. EPA, 319 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v. 
City of Lakeland, 175 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd err bnr~c or7 other grolrrlrls, 224 F.3d 
518 (6th Cir. 2000); Sierra Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476, 1482-1483 (D. 
Colo. 1994) (holding that subsection 309(g) bars CWA citizen suit when state enforces 
under its hazardous waste statute); Saboe v. Oregon, 8 19 F. Supp. 9 14 (D. Or. 1993). 
l Y s  3 I8 F.3d 1248 (I I th Cir. 2003). 
Icl. at 1254. 
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the balance of "overall effects" test with that adopted by Scituate and its 
progeny.195 However, it rejected the balance of overall effects test in favor of 
rough comparability of each set of requirements for three reasons. First, 
the overall effects standard balances "incommensurable values."'96 That 
makes it arbitrary, inviting courts to reach different conclusions on simi- 
lar state provisions. Indeed, such an arbitrary suggestion is no standard at 
all. Second, the rough comparability for each requirement standard is 
easy to apply and reduces uncertainty for everyone involved.19' Third, the 
legislative history explicitly adopts a standard comparing each of the 
three  requirement^.'^^ Under this standard, the court ruled a state proce- 
dure not requiring pre-order public notice and comment was not compara- 
ble to subsection 309(g).'99 The sixth and Ninth Circuits are roughly in 
accord with the decision in Fort P~yne .~"  
Most courts have dealt seriously with whether state law was compa- 
rable to subsection 309(g), placing the burden of proof of comparability 
on the defendant pleading the bar.*O1 They have split fairly evenly on 
whether particular state penalty assessment provisions are comparable to 
subsection 309(g), usually focusing on the public notice and citizen par- 
ticipation aspects of the state statutes. One court, for instance, held a state 
statute was not comparable to subsection 309(g) because it authorized the 
state agency to assess a penalty only with the consent of the violator and 
had no provision for citizen participation in the administrative order issu- 
ance or for citizen appeal of an assessment order.202 Another held that a 
state's procedure was not comparable to subsection 309(g) because it did 
not require public notice or participation, although it  allowed appeal by 
persons receiving notice,203 quite similar to the Massachusetts procedure 
the First Circuit found comparable in Scituare. 
Other courts have held that similar state statutes are not comparable 
to subsection 309(g).204 A number of district courts have found state pen- 
'95 Id. at 1255. The court concluded that Arkansas Wildlife Federatiorl followed Scitrr- 
ate in this regard. 
196 Id. 
19' Id. 
19" 18 F.3d at 1255-56. 
I w  Id. at 1257. The court did, however, find comparable to subsection 309(g) the state's 
authority to assess administrative penalties from $100 to $25,000 per violation, capped at 
$250,000, with penalty factors similar to the federal factors. 
'M Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2000); Citizens for a Better Env't 
v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1 I 1  l(9th Cir. 1996). 
'O' Jones, 224 F.3d at 529; Citizens for a Better Env't, 83 F.3d 1 I 11; Cmty. Ass'n for 
Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, No. CY-98-3011, 2001 WL 1704240, at 
*6-*7 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2001); United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 
769 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 19 1 F.3d 5 16, 525-26 
(4th Cir. 1999). See also infra notes 203-205. 
'02 Smithjeld Foods, 965 F. Supp. at 792-93. 
'03 Waste Action Project v. Atlas Foundry & Mach. Co., No. C975082R, 1998 WL 
210846, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 1998). 
'04 Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1182 (D. Idaho 2001); Cmty. 
Heinonline - -  2 9  Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 46 2005 
20051 Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions 47 
alty assessment authorities comparable to subsection 309(g), after exam- 
ining the state authorities and determining they had none of the deficiencies 
found in the above decisions.205 The decisions turn, in whole or in part, 
on the lack of state requirements that the state give public notice of and 
opportunity to comment on proposed penalty orders or that states allow 
public intervention in administrative penalty assessment proceedings.206 
Some courts, however, relying on the Scituate line of reasoning, have 
found state authorities comparable to subsection 309(g) despite the state 
statute's lack of requirements for public notice, opportunity for comment, 
and inter~ention.~~' The most dramatic split in this regard is between de- 
cisions of the circuits holding that "ex-post facto" notice and comment 
are and are not comparable to the pre-order notice and comment of sub- 
section 309(g).?08 As the Eleventh Circuit rightly points out, 
Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't, 2001 WL 1704240, at *6-*7 (E.D. Wa. Feb. 27, 2001); 
Lead. Envtl. Awareness Dev. v. Exide Corp., No. CIV. 96-3030, 1999 WL 124473 at *31 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Montgomery County N. Reduc- 
tion Plant, No. C-3-95-156, 1996 WL 1670982, at '5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 1996) (determin- 
ing that citizen participation was neither required nor permissive); Molokai Chamber of 
Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389, 1405 (D. Haw. 1995); Save Our 
Bays and Beaches v. City and County of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098, 1133 (D. Haw. 
1994); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. 97, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1992); 
Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp. 943, 950 (D.N.J. 
1991); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404, 
1416 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Tobyhanna Conservation Ass'n v. Country Place Waste Treatment 
Co., 734 F. Supp. 667, 670 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Waste Action Project v. Atlas Foundry & 
Mach. Co., No. C975082R, 1998 WL 210846, at * 6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 1998). 
205 Lockett v. EPA, 176 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (E.D. La. 2001), aff'd, 319 F.3d 678 (5th 
Cir. 2003); Pape v. Menominee Paper Co., 91 1 F. Supp. 273, 277 (W.D. Mich. 1994); Cal. 
Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. City of West Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Cal. 1995); 
Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 777 F. Supp. 173, 183 (D. Conn. 
1991). 
206 For instance, the court in Atlnntic Stcites Legal Folrndatior1 v. Urziversnl Tool & 
Stampirlg Co., Ir~c., 735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990), began its analysis with the state- 
ment of Sen. Chaffee, one of the authors of subsection 309(g): 
[Tlhe limitation of 309(g) applies only where a State is proceeding under a State 
law that is comparable to section 309(g). For example, in  order to be comparable, 
a State law must provide for a right to a hearing and for public notice and partici- 
pation procedures similar to those set forth in section 309(g) . . . . 
Id. at 1415 (quoting 133 CONG. REC. S. 737 (1987)). The court found that state procedures 
were not comparable to subsection 309(g) if they required public notice of hearings on 
nonconsensual penalty orders, but not of penalty assessments concluded by consent. 
'07 Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (D. Or. 1995) 
(requiring that state procedures be comparable, not identical; discretionary public notice 
enough), rev'd or1 other grourlds, 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996); Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F. 
Supp. 914, 918 (D. Or. 1993) (stating that mandatory public notice is "not necessarily the 
sirle qua rlorl of comparability"). 
'OR McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1256-57 (I lth Cir. 2003) (holding 
"ex-post facto" notice and comment not comparable to the pre-order notice and comment 
of subsection 309(g)): Lockett, 319 F.3d 678, 686-87 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding "ex-post 
facto" notice and comment comparable to the pre-order notice and comment of subsection 
-309(g)); Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 5 18, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding "ex-post 
facto" notice and comment not comparable); Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 
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a right to pre-order participation is markedly different from the 
right to post-decision participation. In pre-order proceedings, an 
agency has not hardened its position and interested persons are 
not subject to the same technical pleading requirements or burdens 
of proof that are imposed once the state has issued an order.2w 
Such differences in notice and comment requirements "strike at the heart 
of whether the statute 'provides interested citizens a meaningful opportu- 
nity to participate at significant stages of the decision-making p roce~s . " '~ '~  
Without public notice, of course, other public participation rights may be 
moot. Several courts have held that lack of the right to or denial of citi- 
zen intervention denotes a lack of diligent prose~ut ion.~"  But this goes 
more toward the comparability of state and federal procedures than it 
does to diligent prosecution. 
Congress placed procedural requirements on EPA's penalty assess- 
ment procedures under subsection 309(g), not just to protect the due process 
rights of violators, but also to prevent EPA from assessing insignificant 
penalties against serious offenses, thereby insulating the offenders from 
significant penalties. The length to which Congress went in this regard is 
highlighted by its uniquely providing citizens with the right to seek judi- 
cial review of penalties consented to by EPA and violators and to petition 
reviewing courts to assess higher penalties. Courts have not recognized 
this, which may explain why they focus on the familiar public notice and 
intervention requirements as if they were merely normal procedures to 
assure government transparency. When it is recognized that these and 
other requirements were placed on EPA's procedures not just to promote 
transparency of government,"' but to prevent abuse by under-enforcement, 
and that such abuse is just as likely from states as from EPA, it is ines- 
capable that state penalty assessment procedures cannot be comparable to 
subsection 309(g) without similar requirements to prevent such abuse. 
(6) Wl~at  Federal Law Must Be Compared? 
The question of which federal law should be the basis of comparison 
is answered once again by reference to the plain meaning and structure of 
the CWA. The plain meaning of "an action under a State law comparable 
F.3d 376, 381-82 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding "ex-post facto" notice and comment compara- 
ble). 
""McAhee, 318 F.3d at 1257. 
"O Id. (quoting Ark. Wildlife Fed'n, 29 F.3d at 38 I). 
'I1 See Frilling v. Vill. of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Friends of the 
Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995); Love v. N.Y. State 
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation. 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
"' Section I.B.2 of Part One describes the legislative history of the citizen suit provi- 
sions, including their role as part of citizen participation in government, in  turn a part of 
the quest for transparency in government. See Miller, supra note 1. at 420-25. 
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to this subsection" in subsection 309(g) is a state administrative penalty 
assessment authority having the same characteristics as CWA subsection 
309(g). Although the statute does not define "subsection," the nomencla- 
ture of federal statutory structure is familiar. A subsection in the United 
States Code is a principal subpart of a section and is delineated by a lower- 
case letter in parentheses. "This subsection," then, defines itself as sub- 
section 309(g). 
When Congress drafted section 309 and, later, subsection 309(g), it 
was conscious of the differences between the title (Title 33 of the United 
States Code), a chapter of the title (the CWA), a section of the chapter (309), 
a subsection of the section (309(g)), a paragraph of the subsection (309(g) 
(6)), and a subparagraph of the paragraph (309(g)(6)(A)). Indeed, it  care- 
fully observed those distinctions and correctly used the different terms 
throughout section 309 and subsection 309(g)."3 It is unlikely in this one 
instance that Congress intended "this chapter" or "this section" when it 
wrote "this subsection." Every court considering whether EPA may bar a 
citizen suit by issuing a compliance order under subsection 309(a) has as- 
sumed that the bar under subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(i) for an action under 
"this subsection" meant subsection 309(g), not the entire Chapter of the 
CWA or even the entire section 309.?'' It is extremely unlikely that Con- 
gress intended "this subsection" in CWA subsections 309(g)(6)(A)(ii)- 
L. 
(iii) to mean anything other than subsection 309(g). 
(c . )  WIzat State Lcrtt- M L I S ~  Be Conzl?ared? 
Once the meaning of "comparable" is understood and a reference 
point in federal law established, the question of which state law is to be 
compared may be answered by applying the lessons of the foregoing analy- 
sis. The "comparable" state law phrases in subsections 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) 
and (iii) differ somewhat. In (ii) the phrase is "an action under a State 
law comparable" to "this subsection," i.e., subsection 309(g). Because 
the only action that EPA can take under subsection 309(g) is to assess an 
administrative penalty, the only action that a state could take under a compa- 
rable state law would be to assess an administrative penalty. That means, 
to be comparable, a state law must provide administrative penalty author- 
? "  For instance. i n  sectlon 309(a)(l) i t  correctly distinguished between "section." and 
"subsection." 33 U.S.C. (i 1319(a)(l) (2000). In section 309(a)(2) it correctly distinguished 
between "section." "subsection." and "paragraph." 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(a)(2) (2000). In sec- 
tion 309(c)(3). it correctly distinguished between "title," "chapter." "section." "subsection." 
"paragraph." and "subparagraph." 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(c)(3) (2000). Apart from subsection 
309(g). i t  correctly referenced subsections no less than seven times: subsections 309(a)(l)- 
(3). (c)(S)-(6). and (d)-(0. 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(a)(I)-(3), (c)(5)-(6). (d)-(0 (2000). In sub- 
section 309(g) itself. Congress correctly distinguished between "title." "chapter." "section," 
"paragraph." and "subparagraph." 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(g) (2000). See McAhee. 318 F.3d at 
1255: s~rprrr note 182. 
"4 Srr Miller. .slrprn note I .  at 433-35. 
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ity. In (iii), the phrase is "a penalty assessed under . . . such comparable 
State law." The reference here to a state assessed penalty reinforces the 
conclusion that "comparable State law" is administrative penalty author- 
ity. Moreover, because (iii) refers to "such" comparable state law, and the 
only antecedent reference to a "comparable state law" is in (ii), both phrases 
refer to the same state administrative penalty authority. The remaining 
questions are: (1) whether the state administrative penalty assessment au- 
thority must be embedded in the enforcement provision of its water pol- 
lution statute, as subsection 309(g) is embedded in the enforcement pro- 
vision of the CWA; (2) whether the state must actually use that authority 
to bar subsequent EPA and citizen actions; and (3) what is a penalty? 
The Scituate court suggested the comparable state authority could be 
found outside the state's water pollution enforcement p r o v i s i ~ n . ~ ' ~  Some 
, courts have followed Scituate by looking outside the state's penalty as- 
sessment authority for public participation and judicial review provisions 
applicable to that authority.216 Other courts have rejected Scituate and looked 
only within the relevant state pro~ision.~" It does no violence to the compa- 
rability requirement for public participation, procedural, and judicial re- 
view requirements comparable to those in subsection 309(g) to be located 
in state statutes outside the state's water pollution enforcement provisions, 
as long as those requirements apply to the state's assessment of penalties 
for violations of its water pollution statute. Of course, if a state has com- 
parable public participation, procedural, and judicial review requirements 
outside its water pollution enforcement provisions and those require- 
ments do not apply to the state's assessment of penalties for violations of 
its water pollution statute, the state does not have a water pollution viola- 
tion penalty assessment authority comparable to subsection 309(g). The 
wording and structure of subsection 309(g) indicate that the citizen par- 
ticipation and judicial review procedures must relate to the state's water 
pollution administrative penalty assessment procedures to be comparable 
to subsection 309(g). Moreover, the legislative history makes it clear that 
the purpose of requiring citizen participation and citizen appeal of pen- 
alty amounts is to prevent paltry penalty assessments for water pollution 
n5 949  F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991). The court reasoned that: 
It  is enough that the Massachusetts statutory scheme, under which the State is 
diligently proceeding, contains penalty assessment provisions comparable to the 
Federal Act, that the State is authorized to assess those penalties, and that the 
overall scheme of the two acts is aimed at correcting the same violations, thereby 
achieving the same goals. 
n6 Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2000). In McAbee, the 
court noted and discussed the issue, but concluded i t  need not decide i t .  3 18 F.3d at 1255 
n.8. 
"'Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1 1  1 1 ,  1 1  17-18 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
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violations where more aggressive enforcement is That purpose 
could not be served unless the citizen participation and judicial review 
provisions in the state law applied to the state's water pollution adminis- 
trative penalty assessment procedures. 
( d )  Must the State Use Its "Comparable Authority" To Bar a 
Successive EPA or Citizen Penalty Action? 
If a state must have legal authority comparable to subsection 309(g) 
to preclude an EPA or a citizen enforcement action, it follows that the state 
must use that authority to preclude an EPA or a citizen action. Surprisingly, 
a line of cases has reached contrary conclusions. This Section will eluci- 
date the proper interpretation of this issue. 
The plain meaning of subsection 309(g) limits preclusion to situa- 
tions in which the state "has commenced . . . an action under a State law 
comparable to this sub~ec t ion ."~ '~  If a state has an administrative penalty 
authority that is comparable to subsection 309(g), but uses an administra- 
tive compliance order authority that is not comparable, it simply has not 
"commenced an action under a State law comparable" to subsection 
309(g). The compliance order authority cannot be comparable to subsec- 
tion 309(g), even if it theoretically has comparable citizen participation 
and judicial review provisions, because it has no administrative penalty as- 
sessment procedures. Moreover, compliance order authority could not have 
citizen participation and judicial review provisions comparable to those 
in subsection 309(g), because the latter are tailored to participating in 
and appealing decisions regarding penalty amounts.220 
This is emphasized by the parallel structure of the clauses dealing with 
EPA and state actions. The preclusion of EPA and citizen penalty actions 
applies only for a violation 
(i) with respect to which the Administrator . . . has commenced 
and is diligently prosecuting an action under this subsection, 
(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this sub- 
section, or 
(iii) for which the Administrator . . . or the State has issued a final 
order not subject to further judicial review and the violator has 
paid a penalty assessed under this subsection, or such compara- 
ble State law . . . . 22 1 
"8 See supra Part II.A.2. 
39 CWA Q 309(g)(6)(A)(ii), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(6)(A)(ii) (2000). 
CWA 3 309(g)(4)(c), (8), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g)(4)(c), (8) (2000). 
"' CWA 5 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(6)(A). 
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Clauses (i), dealing with EPA actions, and (ii), dealing with state actions, 
are exactly parallel, except that (i) ends with "under this subsection7' while 
(ii) ends with "under a State law comparable to this subsection." Every 
court considering clause (i) has held that it refers only to EPA adminis- 
trative penalty actions.??' The plainest and most logical reading of the 
parallel state provision is that clause (ii) also refers only to administrative 
penalty actions. Of course, it is a familiar canon of statutory construction 
that similar terms in a statute should be interpreted in the same way.'?" 
Clause (iii) is even clearer, for it uses the same operative words for both 
EPA and state assessed penalties that have been paid. The structure of the 
paragraph admits no other reading than that it bars duplicative EPA or 
citizen enforcement only when the state assesses an administrative pen- 
alty. 
Moreover, the legislative history of subsection 309(g) indicates the 
intent of Congress was to prevent EPA from abusing the authority to as- 
sess paltry penalties against continuing or serious violations warranting 
judicial action for injunctions and severe penalties.'?' It would make no 
sense for Congress to allow citizens to act to prevent EPA from this prac- 
tice, but not to allow citizens and EPA to act to prevent states from doing so. 
The first court of appeals decision to consider the issue, North and 
South Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, however, held 
that a state administrative action need not be an action taken under state 
authority comparable to subsection 309(g) to bar a citizen suit under sub- 
section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii), as long as the state has comparable administra- 
tive penalty assessment authority somewhere in its arsenal.??%s discussed 
above, the court was far less interested in interpreting the words of the 
statute than in forwarding its policy of deferring to state enforcement 
decisions. Other courts have followed its lead, relying on the absence of 
the word "penalty" in (ii)."(' They ignore the unanimous precedent that an 
EPA subsection 309(a) compliance order does not bar a citizen suit under 
(i), even though (i) also omits the word "penalty" and EPA obviously has 
subsection 309(g) authority elsewhere in its arsenal. The inclusion or 
omission of the word "penalty" in (i) and (ii) does not bear on this issue 
because subsection 309(g) is an authority to issue penalty orders and nothing 
else. There is no reason for (i) and (ii) to mention "penalty," because they 
both describe the government's ongoing administrative action, and under 
subsection 309(g) or a comparable state authority, that action can only be 
"' See supra Part II.A.3.b.(i). 
"j See ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 324. 
"-'See srcpra Part II.A.2. 
"5  949 F.2d 552, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1991). 
"6 United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 792 n.34 (E.D. Va. 1997), 
off 'd it1 pcrrr, rev'd irl part 011 other grourlcls, 19 1 F.3d 5 16, 525-26 (4th Cir. 1999); Sierra 
Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476, 1484-85 (D. Colo. 1994); Atl. States Legal 
Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1186, 1187-89 (N.D. Ala. 1988). 
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assessment of a penalty. Congress used "penalty" in (iii) to describe the 
violator's compliance with the government's penalty order, not to de- 
scribe the purpose or contents of the government's action. The evident 
purpose of "penalty" in (iii) is to limit the preclusion in completed ac- 
tions to instances in which the violator is not a scofflaw, but actually has 
paid the penalty assessed. There is no inconsistency in interpreting (i), 
(ii) and (iii) all to refer only to penalty orders; indeed, it is the only con- 
sistent interpretation, for there is no discernable reason for completed 
administrative proceedings under (iii) to preclude subsequent enforce- 
ment actions only if the violator actually pays a penalty, when ongoing 
administrative proceedings under (ii) may preclude concurrent enforce- 
ment where the government is not attempting to assess a penalty. 
Indeed, the court in Scituate admitted as much. "[A] narrow reading 
of section 309(g)(6)(A) . . . turns on the logistical happenstance of statu- 
tory drafting."??' The theme and variations nature of the preclusion device 
that Congress used throughout the EPA and citizen enforcement provi- 
sion of the environmental statutes makes it clear that the words Congress 
used in the preclusion device reflect its intent rather than "happenstance." 
The decision admits that it simply ignored the words of the statute to fol- 
low the court's policy choices. 
A few pre-Scit~iate courts had reached similar results, relying on 
deference to the state's enforcement d i sc re t i~n ."~  Other courts have fol- 
lowed Scituate.'" Some courts have taken the Scituate line of reasoning 
to extremes to hold that virtually any action on the part of the state will 
bar a citizen suit.''0 The Scituate court and its followers focus exclusively 
on what they term the secondary nature of citizen suits, compounding the 
illogic of the Court's reasoning in Gwaltney by ignoring the Supreme 
Court's primary plain meaning rationale for its holding in that decision 
and the importance it placed on the conclusion that only government ac- 
tions for compliance could bar citizen suits. They also fail to see that their 
rulings make EPA a secondary enforcer as well, for the subsection 309(g) 
preclusion applies to EPA in the same manner as it does to citizen ac- 
tions. However, it is not credible that Congress intended to make EPA a 
secondary enforcer when its avowed purpose in enacting subsection 309(g) 
'?' 949 F.2d at 556. 
"* Conn. Coastal Fisherrnen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co.. Inc.. 777 F. Supp. 173. 
183-86 (D. Conn. 1991): N.Y. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. N.Y. City Dep't of Sanitation. 
772 F. Supp. 162. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991):Atl. Strrtes Legrrl Fotrr~d.. Irlc., 682 F. Supp. at 1189. 
'"For a similar case. see Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Investments Co.. 904 F. 
Supp. 1 177 (D. Or. 1995). rell'd, 94 F.3d 5 14 (9th Cir. 1996). 
"O In  Willitr~rls Pipe Line Co. I: Bayer Corp.. for instance. the state had issued a series 
of directives to a permit violator to investigate and remediate the violations. The record did 
not disclose whether the directives "were written or oral, or their specific content." 964 F. 
Supp. 1300. 1320 n. 17 (S.D. Iowa 1997). The court held that "a citizens suit [sic] may be 
barred even absent formal administrative proceedings where . . . the state has authority to 
issue orders and assess penalties for violations but chooses instead to order compliance 
and settle informally with the violator." Id. at 1322. 
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was to strengthen EPA enforcement. Indeed, the legislative history con- 
tains not one hint that it intended to make EPA enforcement secondary. 
These decisions ignore the plain meaning of the statute and the intent of 
Congress, in favor of policies of their own, to the detriment of achieving the 
goals of the CWA. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil 
Company of California, I ~ c . , ' ~ '  provided an accurate analysis of the wording 
and structure of subsection 309(g)(6)(A) to reject the holding in Sciruate. 
The court rejected, for three reasons, the Scituate holding that the subsec- 
tion 309(g) bar on citizen suits applied when the state had administrative 
penalty authority comparable to subsection 309(g) somewhere in its ar- 
~ e n a l . ' ~ ~  First, the plainest reading of the statute is that when subsection 
309(g)(6)(A)(iii) bars an action because a state "assessed [a penalty] un- 
der this subsection, or such comparable State law," the state must have as- 
sessed the penalty under a comparable state law to activate the bar.233 Sec- 
ond, subsection 309(g)(4) requires that EPA administrative penalty as- 
sessment proceedings have a list of procedural safeguards for the respon- 
dent and for other interested parties.*" The court was right; the legislative 
history demonstrates that Congress included the safeguards in subsection 
309(g) to prevent the government from abusing its enforcement discretion 
by issuing lenient penalties for serious ongoing violations rather than requir- 
ing compliance, an abuse that may be made by either state or federal en- 
fo rcer~ .? '~  To be comparable to subsection 309(g), state administrative 
penalty procedures must contain such safeguards. The requirement that 
comparable state provisions contain safeguards against abuse by enforc- 
ers would be meaningless if the state uses non-comparable authorities 
lacking such safeguards to bar subsequent enforcement. This reasoning ap- 
plies even if the safeguards were provided when the state used the com- 
parable enforcement authority in some other case. 
Finally, the court concluded that a contrary result would cause state 
actions to be more preclusive than EPA actions, since only EPA actions 
assessing penalties would bar a citizen suit, while all state administrative 
orders, whether assessing a penalty or not, would preclude citizen suits as 
long as the state had an unused comparable penalty authority somewhere 
in its arsenal.?" Indeed, EPA filed an amicus brief making just that point."' 
Although not noted by the court, the ultimate consequences of its third 
line of reasoning are even more persuasive. If, as some courts hold, any 
"' 83  F.3d 1 1  1 I (9th Cir. 1996). See also Knee Deep Cattle Co.,  9 4  F.3d at 516 (fol- 
lowing Urliorl Oil in holding that a state must actually use its penalty authority to bar a 
citizen suit under subsection 309(g)). 
83  F.3d at 1 1 18. 
zn Id, 
2'4 Id. 
See Miller, strpra note I ,  at 445-49. 
"6 Citizens for a Better Env't., 83 F.3d at 1 1 18. 
237 Id. at 1 I 18-20. 
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state order or action could bar citizen suits or EPA actions, it would make 
both citizens and EPA secondary enforcers. By enacting subsection 309(g), 
however, Congress intended to strengthen EPA's enforcement authority 
by giving it a new remedy, rather than to curtail its enforcement authority 
by allowing the states to oust its enforcement authority with ineffective 
actions. The Senate Committee envisioned that the new authority would 
increase the number of EPA enforcement actions, adding new administra- 
tive penalty actions to an undiminished number of civil actions and con- 
tinuing administrative penalty orders.238 Many courts have no trouble fol- 
lowing Citizens for a Better Environment, easily discerning that the plain 
reading of the statute mandates its result and recognizing that state ad- 
ministrative compliance order authorities are no more comparable to sub- 
section 309(g) than is EPA's own compliance order authority in subsection 
3 0 9 ( ~ i ) . ~ ~ ~  
The court also held that not only must the state use its comparable 
administrative penalty authority to invoke the subsection 309(g) preclu- 
sion to bar a citizen suit or an EPA action, the state must also assess a pen- 
alty and be diligently pursuing the penalty under subsection 309(g)(6)(A) 
(ii) or have finally assessed a penalty that the violator pays under subsec- 
tion 309(g)(6)(A)(iii). 
( e )  What Is a Penalty? 
In many cases, violators agree to perform good works in lieu of 
payments to the government, and seek to use these works as a shield against 
subsequent enforcement. This practice raises the question of whether these 
See the discussion in srrpra Part II.A.2. 
'39Natural Res. Def. Council v. NVF Co., No. 97-496-SLR, 1998 WL 372299. at "12 
(D. Del. June 25, 1998) (holding that state monitoring of voluntary action was not assess- 
ment of a penalty to invoke the subsection 309(g) bar); Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC 
Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1347 (D.N.M. 1995) ("Defendants, and many courts, 
wish to read more into the citizen suit bar of this subsection than exists. Although their 
desire is well-founded, and their policy goals are laudable, their vision cannot be recon- 
ciled with the literal terms of the statute."). The preclusion is narrowly drawn to operate 
only if the state has commenced and is diligently assessing a penalty or has assessed a 
penalty that has been paid. See also Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai), 
Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Haw. 1995) (determining that the state must assess a penalty to 
bar citizen suits); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 822 
F. Supp. 174, 184 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that subsection 309(g) does not bar citizen suita 
when the state assessed no penalty). The most recent of this line of decisions, Old Tirner. 
Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central Ciry Sanitation District, summarized the case law on both sides 
of the issue and examined the evolution of the enforcement provisions of the statute to 
reach its conclusion. 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 1999). In particular, it quoted remarks 
of Sen. Chaffee, one of the primary drafters of subsection 309(g) and a conferee in recon- 
ciling the House and Senate versions of the provision. He repeated in different terms the 
basic tenet that citizen suits are precluded "where the Federal Government or a State has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an admi~~istrative civil penalfy action." Id. at 
1 1  14 (emphasis added by the court) (quoting 133 CONG. REC. 1264 (1987)). See also Knee 
Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 94  F.3d 5 14, 5 16 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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good works may be considered penalties under subsection 309(g). The 
CWA does not define "penalty." The Miscellaneous Receipts Act, how- 
ever, requires that penalties be paid to the T r e a s ~ r y , ? ~ ~  which leads to the 
inference that a payment resulting from a subsection 309(g) or other ac- 
tion is a penalty only if it is in the form of a payment to the Treasury, unless 
Congress otherwise  provide^.?^' Good works are therefore not penalties,'42 
although they may have a role to play in settlements of enforcement ac- 
tions in addition to penalties."' Violators may also wish to make payments 
to the Treasury but avoid the opprobrium associated with the payment of 
a "penalty" by calling it something else. Faced with this, one court stated 
that the violator "simply 'cannot have it both ways,"' and held that a pay- 
ment defendant went to great lengths to have characterized as a payment 
rather than a penalty, was not a penalty.'w This seems fair, for a penalty 
must have some stigma to meet its objective of deterrence. Moreover, a de- 
fendant may secure benefits from disgorging its assets in forms other than 
penalties.'45 
Whether the violator's payment is a penalty turns on the same two 
principles whether it results from an EPA or state action: the payment must 
be to the Treasury (or the state equivalent) and good works do not qual- 
ify. Some state statutes require that violators pay penalties into a special 
fund for environmental improvement rather than into the state t rea~ury."~ 
Such payments are denominated penalties by the state statutes and thus 
carry the appropriate opprobrium for stigma purposes. And while they even- 
tually may be applied to environmental good works, they are applied at a 
time and manner of the state's discretion; thus, the violator cannot claim a 
?'O 3 1 U.S.C. 9: 3302(c)(l) (2000). 
?a'  Congress did provide in the CAA citizen suit provision subsection 304(g)(2). 42 
U.S.C. 9 7604(g)(2) (2000). that courts could direct that up to $100.000 of civil penalties 
assessed in citizen suits could be "used in beneficial mitigation projects which are consis- 
tent with this chapter and enhance the public health or the environment." 
"'See Sierra Club v. Elec. Controls Design. Inc.. 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990). 
IJ'CAA subsection 304(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9 7604(g)(2) (2000) is a limited departure 
from the Miscellaneous Receipts Act requirement that penalties be paid to the Treasury. 
The other citizen suit provisions, e.g.. CWA # 505. 33 U.S.C. 5 1365 (2000). contain no 
comparable exceptions to the general rule. I t  is common. however. for consent decrees to 
contain agreements by defendants to undertake such good works as an offset against what 
otherwise would be a penalty payment to the Treasury. Citizen enforcers. more concerned 
with improving the local environment than enriching the Treasury. are especially amenable 
to such offsets. EPA and the Department of Justice call such good works Supplemental 
Environmental Projects ("SEPs") and will agree to them in consent decrees under condi- 
tions elaborated in EPA policy on the subject. See the discussion of SEPs in 2 ENVTI.. L. 
INST.. LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 9-237-9-240 (Sheldon N. Novick et al. eds.. 
2004). 
''' Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1 1  1 1 .  1 1  16 (9th Cir. 
1996) (quoting plaintiff's brief). 
x5 The payment of penalties may not be tax deductible, while payments for good works 
may be. 
'*See, e.g.,  CAL. WATER CODE 5 13385(n)(l) (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Q: 30: 
2205 (West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. 9: 130A-306 (2004). 
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reputational benefit from any resulting environmental improvement. Such 
payments should be considered penalties for CWA subsection 309(g) pur- 
poses. 
c. When Must the Government Commence a Subsection 309(g) 
Action To Bar a Successive EPA or Citizen Penalty Action? 
In addition to the question of which types of enforcement actions re- 
sult in preclusions, it is necessary to determine when these actions must be 
undertaken by the enforcer to remain within the ambit of subsection 309(g). 
Subsection 309(g)(6)(B) lifts the preclusion against citizen penalty ac- 
tions if the citizen files suit either (1) prior to the commencement of "an 
action under this subsection7' or (2) if "an action under this subsection7' was 
commenced after the citizen gave notice of his section 505 action and 
filed his complaint prior to 120 days after the notice.247 
The first part of this bar-lifting provision is comparable to the provi- 
sion in the citizen suit section that the bar is activated only if the gov- 
ernment commences its action before the citizen commences an action. 
Courts interpreting the citizen suit provisions have routinely held that 
government actions filed after the commencement of the citizen suit do 
not bar the citizen Courts considering the issue under subsection 
309(g) come to the same c o n c l u ~ i o n . ' ~ ~  Working together with the notice 
requirement of section 505, the first part of this bar lifting provision has 
the same effect as the notice and bar provision of section 505, discussed in 
Part One.250 Together, they encourage government enforcement by giving 
the government notice that the citizen is about to act, allowing the gov- 
ernment free rein if it acts first, and giving the government sixty days in 
which to act first. If the government does not act within that time, the 
citizen is free to proceed. 
The second part of this bar-lifting provision is less deferential to 
government enforcers than the comparable provisions of the citizen suit 
section; it allows citizens to proceed even if the government does com- 
mence a penalty action before the citizen suit is filed, as long as the citi- 
zen served its notice before the government commenced its a~ t ion . ' ~ '  This 
actually undercuts the intended purpose of the section 505 preclusion de- 
vice. The purpose of the notice is to encourage government enforcement, 
and the purpose of the bar is to give the government free rein if it re- 
247 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B) (2000). 
'4X Miller, suprcr note I, at 449-52. 
'49 Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1373 (M.D. Ga. 
2001); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Hercules Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 1538-39 
(D.N.J. 1993). 
Miller, supra note I, at 449-52. 
"' Alrarnaha Riverkeepers, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; Pub. Interest Research Group of 
N.J., Inc. v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 8 17 F. Supp. 1 164, 1 172 (D.N.J. 1993); Mass. Pub. 
Interest Research Group v. 1CI Americas, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D. Mass. 1991). 
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sponds to the notice within sixty days by commencing and diligently prose- 
cuting an enforcement action.?52 The subsection 309(g) variant provides 
less encouragement of government enforcement, because it does not al- 
ways give the government free rein if it commences its action within 
sixty days after the citizen suit notice.253 The legislative history of subsec- 
tion 309(g) does not explain this divergence from the delay and bar elements 
of the citizen suit preclusion. The divergence probably reflects the rela- 
tively lenient nature of the subsection 309(g) sanction. 
The main questions with subsection (B)'s lifting of the bar are whether: 
(1) the bar against citizen suits is lifted by state actions as well as by EPA 
actions, and (2) the bar against EPA actions is lifted in the same manner 
as for citizen actions. As for the first question, subsection 309(g)(6)(B) 
lifts the bar for actions "under this subsection" in specified circum- 
stances. EPA penalty assessments, of course, are "under this subsection" 
and the bar is accordingly lifted for them under those circumstances. 
Most courts assume, without analysis, that the bar is also lifted for state 
penalty assessments under the same  circumstance^.^^^ A plain reading of 
the statute, however, suggests that it lifts the bar on citizen suits only for 
EPA penalty assessments. It applies only to penalty actions "under this 
subsection," subsection 309(g), not a provision of state law. If states im- 
pose administrative penalties, they do so using their comparable state au- 
thority, not using the federal subsection 309(g) authority. To interpret 
subparagraph (B) as lifting the bar for state action is to read "under this sub- 
section" as if it read "under this subsection or comparable state law." 
This, of course, ignores the plain meaning of "under this subsection," and 
the fact that Congress used "under this subsection or comparable State 
law" elsewhere in subsection 309(g) when it intended that meaning. 
'5'See Miller, supra note 1, at 421-23 (noting legislative history establishing encour- 
agement of government enforcement as the purpose of the notice and delay provision). 
'53 CWA 8 309(g)(6), 33 U.S.C. 5 13 19(g)(6) (2000). 
'"Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 94 F.3d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1996); Ark. 
Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 382 (8th Cir. 1994); Altanlaha 
Riverkeepers, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry 
Bosma Dairy, No. CY-98-3011, 2001 WL 1704240, at *7 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2001); Kara 
Holding Corp. v. Getty Mktg., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Old 
Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1 1  13-15 (D. 
Colo. 1999); N. Cal. River Watch v. Sonoma County Water Agency, No. C 97-4263.CRB. 
1998 WL 886645 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1998); Natural Res. Def. Council v. NVF Co., No. 
97-496-SLR, 1998 WL 372299, at *I 1 (D. Del. June 25, 1998); Sierra Club v. Hyundai 
Am., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1178-79 (D. Or. 1997); Sierra Club v. Colo. Ref. Co., 852 
F. Supp. 1476, 1484 (D. Colo. 1994); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Elf Ato- 
chem N. Am., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1164, 1172 (D.N.J. 1993); Pub. Interest Research Group 
of N.J., Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., No. 89-3146, 1990 WL 66178 (D.N.J. May 17, 1990); 
Mass. Pub. Interest Research Group v. ICI Americas, Inc. 777 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D. 
Mass. 1991); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Yates Indus., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 438, 
444-45 (D.N.J. 1991), recorzsideratiorz denied ir l  part arzd grarlted in part or1 other 
grounds, 790 F. Supp. 5 1 1  (D.N.J. 1991). 
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Noting this, the court in California Sportfishing Protection Alliance 
v. City of West Sacramento held that the bar against citizen suits was 
lifted only for federal penalty assessments, not for state penalty assess- 
men t~ . "~  It conducted an exhaustive review of the legislative history of the 
subsection and could find no discussion or indication of what Congress 
intended by omitting reference to state actions in subsection 309(g)(6)(B) or 
that it intended to omit it. The court acknowledged the omission could 
have been a result of inadvertence, a drafting error, or a deliberate choice 
on federalism grounds.256 Although most courts considering the matter have 
assumed the bar-lifting provision applies to state as well as EPA actions, 
California Sportfishing rightly noted that they made this assumption without 
analysis or acknowledgment of the apparent plain meaning of the stat- 
~ t e . ~ ~ '  The one court examining the California Sportfishing analysis re- 
jected it as leading to absurd results.258 Indeed, the results are worse than 
that court recognized, as the discussion in the following paragraphs makes 
clear. 
Subsection (B) lifts the bar only for subsequent citizen actions, not 
for subsequent EPA actions. No matter when a state commences a pen- 
alty action, it will bar an EPA or citizen judicial penalty action, as long 
as the state diligently prosecutes it. Curiously, it bars EPA only from 
seeking judicial assessment of a penalty under subsection 309(d), not EPA 
assessment of an administrative penalty under subsection 309(g). Read liter- 
ally, however, subsection 309(g) gives states the ability to thwart the use 
of penalties as deterrents under the CWA because the small cap on sub- 
section 309(g) penalties virtually eliminates its use as a deterrent of seri- 
ous violations. Reading the provision as some courts do, it also gives 
states the ability to thwart the use of injunctive remedies to require com- 
p l i a n ~ e . ' ~ ~  Under their interpretation, a state may refrain from acting while 
EPA or a citizen proceeds with a compliance action, wait until the eve of 
trial or even until the defendant has rested its case, and only then com- 
mence and diligently pursue an insignificant administrative penalty ac- 
tion under authority comparable to subsection 309(g) to bar EPA or citi- 
zen action for significant penalties or to secure compliance, at least for the 
same violations for which the state assessed the penalty. 
There is no apparent reason on the face of the statute or in the legis- 
lative history of subsection 309(g) that the assessments should have such 
different effects depending on which level of government makes them. 
Indeed, the legislative history emphasizes the congressional intent to 
2ss 905 F. Supp. 792, 802-03 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
lS6 I t  was probably inadvertence or a drafting error, because the preclusive effect of 
state actions was an addition to the amendment made at the last minute in the Conference 
Committee. See id.; see also supra Part II.A.2. 
lS7 905 F. Supp at 802 n. 10. 
258 Sierrcc Club, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1 182. 
259 See irzfru Part II.A.3.e. 
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strengthen EPA's enforcement authorities and not to weaken citizen en- 
f o r ~ e m e n t . ~ ~ ~  A similar omission in subsection 309(g)(7) does additional 
damage. It provides that EPA penalty assessments do not affect the viola- 
tor's obligation to comply with the CWA. If it is interpreted by giving 
meaning to the paragraph's failure to mention state penalty assessments, 
the subsection may mean state penalty assessments could affect a viola- 
tor's obligation to comply with the CWA. Indeed, a literal reading of para- 
graphs (g)(6) and (7) leads to surprising results. Commencement and 
diligent prosecution by EPA of a subsection 309(g) penalty has the fol- 
lowing consequences: (1) EPA may not seek penalties under other CWA au- 
thorities; (2) citizens may not seek penalties in citizen suits, unless they 
commenced their action within the prescribed times; and (3) violators pay- 
ing penalties must still comply with the CWA. Commencement and dili- 
gent prosecution by a state of a penalty under state law comparable to sub- 
section 309(g) would have the following consequences: (1) EPA may not 
seek penalties under subsection 309(d), but it may under subsection 309(g); 
(2) citizens may not seek penalties in citizen suits, even though they filed 
the suits long before the state commenced its penalty action;Bnd (3) vio- 
lators paying state penalties may no longer be obligated to comply with 
the CWA. 
The end result is that a violator who would have to spend millions of 
dollars to comply may be able to insulate itself from compliance or any sig- 
nificant penalty by paying a minimal administrative penalty to the state un- 
der comparable administrative penalty authority. This is an absurd result that 
undermines implementation and enforcement of the CWA. It turns a pro- 
vision that Congress intended to increase EPA's enforcement abilities and 
to increase the number of EPA enforcement actions into a provision that 
makes EPA a distinctly secondary enforcer. 
An examination of the legislative history of the provision demonstrates 
that Congress did not intend these results and that they were inadvertent, 
resulting~from last-minute redrafting of the provision- to include compa- 
rable state actions in the preclusion device.261 The results are absurd, and 
"Citizen suits are a proven enforcement tool. They operate as Congress intended- 
to both spur and supplement government enforcement actions. They have deterred violators 
and achieved significant compliance gains." S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28 (1985); see also slr- 
pra Part II.A.2 (discussing the legislative history of CWA subsection 309(g)). 
26' The Senate bill contained essentially the same language as subsection 309(g)(6)(A), 
but it  included no reference to state penalty assessments under comparable state law. S. 
REP. 99-50, at 101-02 (1985). The House bill provided essentially the language of subsec- 
tion 309(g)(6)(A)(ii), with no reference to section 505, but would have amended section 
505 to bar citizen suits if EPA or a state "has commenced and is diligently pursuing the 
assessment of a civil penalty under section 309(g) of this Act." H . R .  REP. NO. 99-189, at 
91, 103 (1985). 
Moreover, the Senate bill contained nearly the same language as subsection 309(g)(6)(B). 
S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 101-102 (1985). The House bill did not, but it included a provision 
to the effect that EPA was not authorized to assess a subsection 309(g) penalty if the state 
had already assessed an "appropriate" penalty. H . R .  REP. NO. 99-189, at 103 (1985). The 
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the statute should be interpreted to avoid them.262 The easiest way to avoid 
those absurd results is to interpret the remainder of subsection 309(g) pre- 
clusions in accordance with their plain meaning-not to interpret them to 
bar injunctive actions for compliance instead of just actions for penal- 
ties.263 Congress should amend subsection 309(g) to eliminate this and the 
other anomalies in the provision discussed in this Article. 
Whether a government penalty proceeding bars a successive action 
depends on when the government "has commenced" the action and whether 
it is diligently prosecuting it. Subsection 309(g) does not define "has com- 
menced." It does, however, require EPA to notify both the violator and 
the public of proposed penalty assessment orders and offer them the op- 
portunity to comment and request a hearing prior to issuing the penalty 
assessment order.261 EPA has promulgated regulations establishing proce- 
dures for penalty assessments, including filing an administrative com- 
plaint.26s Part One of this Article concluded that EPA "commences" an 
administrative penalty proceeding when it files an administrative com- 
plaint with the Regional Hearing Clerk pursuant to the agency's Consoli- 
dated Rules of Practice.266 When does a state commence its penalty as- 
sessment proceeding? States are not bound to follow EPA's procedural regu- 
lations to have comparable penalty assessment authorities. They are, how- 
ever, required to have comparable authorities, including comparable pen- 
alty assessment  procedure^.^^' Therefore, a state commences its proceed- 
ings by a preliminary filing giving notice of the agency's intent to issue a 
penalty assessment order. Exactly what the filing is will depend on the 
particulars of the state's procedures. 
Some courts have held that the issuance of a negotiated consent order 
commences a state proceeding.268 Their conclusions are erroneous for sev- 
eral reasons. First, the "has commenced" language is found in section 
House bill also incorporated language that was virtually identical to subsection 309(g)(7). 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-189, at 103 (1985). Thus, the Senate bill addressed duplicative penalties 
by EPA and citizens, but not by states and EPA or citizens. The House bill addressed du- 
plicative penalties by EPA and states, but not between citizens and EPA or states. The Con- 
ference Committee attempted to combine the two by adding references to state penalty actions 
in subsection 309(g)(6)(B) and (7). The execution, however, was less than precise. 
262 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
263 See infra Part II.A.3.e. 
2M CWA 5 309(g)(2), (4). 33 U.S.C. 5 13 19(g)(2), (4) (2000). 
265 See 40 C.F.R. $ 5  22.1L.30 (2003). 
266 See Miller, supra note 1, at 452-56. 
267 Congress specified penalty assessment procedures, public participation procedures 
and judicial review procedures to prevent EPA from abusing subsection 309(g) authority 
by assessing small penalties for continuing, serious violations rather than seeking compli- 
ance injunctions and serious penalties. This concern and the specifics of the procedures are 
strong "evidence that Congress intended courts to consider all three classes of provisions 
when deciding whether state law is 'comparable.' . . . " McAbee v. Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 
1248, 1254 (1 1 th Cir. 2003). 
268See,  e .g . ,  McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1251 n.6; Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 
29 F.3d 376, 379-89 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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309(g)(6)(A)(i) & (ii), where i t  is followed by "and is diligently prose- 
cuting." "Is diligently prosecuting" is in the present tense, indicating the 
proceeding must be ongoing, not concluded for clauses (i) or (ii) to ap- 
ply.269 This is emphasized by subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(iii), using the past 
tense "has issued a final order" and "has paid a penalty," indicating the 
proceeding must be concluded and the defendant must have paid the pen- 
alty for clause (iii) to apply, and the defendant must have paid the penalty 
for the clause to apply. If the negotiated consent order is a penalty as- 
sessment order and the violator has paid the penalty, there is nothing for 
the government to do to diligently prosecute the order. If the negotiated con- 
sent order is a compliance or other non-penalty order, there may be much 
for the government to do to diligently prosecute it, but that is not the sort 
of order that bars successive prosecution under subsection 309(g), as rec- 
ognized by other 
d. How Diligently Must the Government Prosecute a CWA 
Subsection 309(g) Action To Bar a Successive EPA or Citizen 
Penalty Action? 
The mere initiation of an applicable enforcement action within the tim- 
ing restrictions is not sufficient to preclude subsequent enforcement. In- 
stead, the enforcer must continue to diligently prosecute the violation. 
The analysis of the meaning of diligent prosecution is slightly different 
for CWA subsection 309(g)(6) than in the preclusions in the citizen suit 
sections, but in both, the tense of the provision affects interpretation. Para- 
graph 309(g)(6) provides a bar in (i) and (ii) if EPA or the state "has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting" an administrative penalty ac- 
tion and in (iii) if either regulator "has issued" a final order and the viola- 
tor "has paid" a penalty. The same "has commenced and "diligently prose- 
cuting" test in the citizen suit preclusions applies only to ongoing prose- 
cutions, for "diligently prosecuting" is in the present tense. Its present 
tense meaning in the citizen suit provisions is emphasized by its close 
juxtaposition to the past tense "has commen~ed."~~'  The legislative dis- 
tinction between tenses is even more pronounced in the subsection 309(g) 
preclusion. Not only does i t  juxtapose the past and present tenses in "has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting" in (i) and (ii), it also juxta- 
poses the present and past tenses in (i) and (ii) with the exclusively past 
269 See Miller, supra note I ,  at 457-63. 
270 McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1256 (holding that a state order was not "comparable" to fed- 
eral CWA, and thus did not bar the successive action); Wash. Pub. Interest Research Group 
v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, l l F.3d 883, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that an EPA 
compliance order did not bar successive suits); Old Timer v. Blackhawk-Central City Sani- 
tation Dist., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1 1  14 (D. Colo. 1999) (holding that an EPA compliance 
order did not bar successive suits). 
17' Miller, supra note I ,  at 457-63. 
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tense in (iii). The fact that Congress distinguished between the tenses in 
both CWA subsection 309(g) and section 505 reinforces that it did so 
deliberately and intended the resultant meaning in both of them. That Con- 
gress intended its use of different tenses in section 505 to have meaning 
was the Court's primary reason for its holding in G ~ a l t n e y . ~ ' ~  That rea- 
soning applies doubly here. Thus, diligent prosecution is not a require- 
ment for the bar under (iii) when a penalty has been finally assessed and 
paid, but is required in (i) and (ii), when prosecutions by EPA and states 
are still ongoing. This is consistent with the notion that diligent prosecu- 
tion reflects the effort put into the prosecution rather than the results 
achieved.273 
Diligent prosecution in the context of the citizen suit provisions meant 
that the action commenced was capable of and calculated to require compli- 
ance and was being prosecuted with sufficient energy and vigor to be rea- 
sonably capable of securing compliance.274 That flowed from the wording 
of the phrase "diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court . . . to re- 
quire compliance."275 Subsection 309(g), on the other hand, does not con- 
dition the preclusion on the government action requiring compliance. This 
concept has no bearing on the diligent prosecution requirement in sub- 
section 309(g) because it is such a limited remedy. It authorizes no action 
to require compliance, instead authorizing such small penalties that they 
can deter only the least serious violations. This reinforces the conclusion 
that "diligently prosecuting" has nothing to do with the amounts of pen- 
alties assessed.276 Subparagraph (iii), dealing specifically with penalties 
that have been assessed and paid, does not suggest that the amounts are 
relevant to whether the preclusion applies.277 Further, if the penalty 
amounts ultimately paid are not relevant to the preclusion, it is not rele- 
vant that the government prosecutes the assessment procedures with suffi- 
cient energy and vigor to be reasonably capable of securing a penalty 
with strong deterrent value. Instead, the context suggests that "diligently 
prosecuting" in subsection 309(g) is intended only to prevent the gov- 
ernment from initiating a penalty action and thereafter sitting on its hands 
while barring EPA and citizen penalty actions indefinitely. 
272 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987); 
see also id. 
273 "Diligent" is defined as "characterized by steady, earnest, and energetic application 
and effort." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 223 (1983). 
274 Miller, supra note I ,  at 463-73. 
275CWA 3 505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 3 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). 
276 Bur see Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1373 n.5 
(M.D. Ga. 2001) (noting that the state had assessed a $5,000 penalty for continuing viola- 
tions and commenting that "[s]uch leniency hardly qualifies as 'diligent prosecution."'). 
277 If citizens wish to protest the inadequacy of EPA assessed penalties, they may seek 
judicial review alleging the penalty amount is an abuse of discretion and ask the reviewing 
court to assess additional penalties. 33 U.S.C. 3 13 19(g)(8) (2000). 
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Courts have addressed whether prosecutions were diligent under sub- 
section 309(g) only because they reached the issue after making initial 
interpretive errors on the applicability of the subsection 309(g) bar. Rather 
than adhering to the language of subsection 309(g), these courts assessed 
the diligent prosecution of state actions other than penalty assessments 
under state law comparable to subsection 309(g).278 They also considered 
the diligence of the results of government actions that were completed rather 
than ongoing  prosecution^.^'^ Furthermore, they examined the diligence 
of state actions in connection with EPA and citizen actions not seeking 
penalties for the same violations covered by the state actions.280 These errors 
in interpretation are a far more serious detriment to effective EPA and 
citizen enforcement than the courts' failure to recognize that diligence in 
prosecution is a measure of the energy the state puts into its administra- 
tive penalty assessment proceedings rather than the results it achieves by 
its action. Examining the docket of an ongoing civil judicial action in 
comparison with the dockets of typical civil judicial actions in the juris- 
diction is a reasonable way to examine the diligence of the prosecution of 
the action.28' The same exercise should suffice for assessing the diligence 
of a state's prosecution of its penalty assessment. After all, the purpose of 
requiring diligent prosecution here is only to prevent the government 
from initiating a penalty action and then not prosecuting it, thus forever 
barring a penalty action by another party. 
e. When Congress Provides that a Government Penalty Action May 
Bar a Successive EPA or  Citizen Penalty Action Against the Same 
Violation, May the Government Action Bar Successive EPA or  
Citizen Actions Against Other Violations? 
From time to time, violators attempt to invoke past enforcement ac- 
tions to preclude subsequent enforcement against different violations, rais- 
ing the question of whether government action may bar successive EPA 
or citizen actions against other violations. Government actions preclude 
citizen actions only for the common violations they address.282 This issue 
recurs in CWA subsection 309(g). CWA subsection 309(g)(6)(A) provides 
278 See, e .g. ,  N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (involving a compliance order); Williams Pipeline Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. 
Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (involving an informal action); Atl. States Legal Found. v. 
Tyson Foods, 682 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (involving a compliance order); see 
supra Part II.A.3.b. 
279 See, e .g . ,  Scituate, 949 F.2d at 552; Cmty. of Cambridge Envtl. Health v. City of 
Cambridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550 (D. Md. 2000); Atl. States Legal Found., 682 F. Supp. at 
1186. 
See, e .g . ,  Cmfy. of Cambridge Envrl. Health, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 550; At/ .  States Le- 
gal Found., 682 F. Supp. at 1 186; see infra Part II.A.3.e. 
'8' See Miller, supra note I, at 464-65. 
282 See id.  at 473-78. 
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that "any violation" for which EPA or a state is assessing or has assessed 
and collected a penalty "shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action" 
under sections 309(d), 31 1, or 505.283 Thus, a plain reading of the provi- 
sion indicates it imposes two conditions on the preclusion. First, subsec- 
tion 309(g)(6)(A) precludes EPA and citizen actions only to the extent that 
they address violations for which the state is assessing or has assessed a 
penalty. As a result, it applies to the penalties assessed against any viola- 
tion, not against any violator. Second, the provision only precludes EPA 
and citizen actions for penalties, as opposed to other actions. 
The plain reading of the provision is supported by the expressio 
unius canon of statutory construction.284 To say that EPA and citizens are 
precluded from maintaining actions for "any violation" subject to a gov- 
ernment administrative penalty action means they are not precluded from 
maintaining actions for violations not subject to government administra- 
tive penalty actions. Similarly, to preclude EPA and citizens from main- 
taining penalty actions implies they are not precluded from prosecuting 
compliance actions. This latter point is reinforced by SDWA subsection 
1 4 2 3 ( ~ ) ( 5 ) , ~ ~ ~  the parallel provision to CWA subsection 309(g). In SDWA 
subsection 1423(c)(5), Congress provided that when EPA assesses an 
administrative penalty, the defendant "shall not be subject to an action" 
by EPA or citizens under other enforcement provisions of the statute.286 
Congress knew how to preclude all successive actions when EPA assessed 
an administrative penalty; Congress was clear about when it intended 
preclude such actions and when it did not in CWA subsection 309(g). 
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended this plain 
meaning of the statute. The Senate Report explained the provision explic- 
itly in this regard. 
This limitation applies only to an action for civil penalties for 
the same violations which are the subject of the administrative civil 
penalties proceeding. It would not apply to an action for civil 
penalties for a violation of the same requirement of the Act that 
is not being addressed administratively or for a past violation of 
another pollutant parameter . . . . In addition, this limitation 
283 33 U.S.C. $9 1319(d), 1321, 1365 (2000) (emphasis added). The CWA citizen suit 
provision, subsection 505(a), provides that citizens may not commence suits against viola- 
tions of the CWA "[elxcept as provided in . . . subsection 309(g)." The section 505 preclu- 
sion does not bar a citizen suit because of an EPA or state administrative penalty proceed- 
ing. See Miller, supra note 1 ,  at 436-45. It only incorporates whatever preclusion subsec- 
tion 309(g) imposes. 
284 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 323. 
'" 42 U.S.C. $ 300h-2(c)(5) (2000). 
286 Id. 
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would not apply to: 1) an action seeking relief other than civil 
penalties (e.g., an injunction or declaratory judgment) . . . . 287 
The House Conference Report repeats this set of limitations on the sub- 
section 309(g) bar almost verbatim.288 
Determining the scope of the preclusion raises several issues. The 
most obvious is whether a government penalty action against violations 
on particular dates may bar a successive action for violations of the same 
requirement on subsequent dates. The plain reading of the provision and 
its legislative history indicate that the government action should not pre- 
clude a successive enforcement action in such a situation. It is no surprise 
that when a state assessed and concluded a penalty action, collecting a 
penalty for violations occurring two years prior to the commencement of 
a citizen suit, a court held that the state action did not bar a citizen suit 
for violations subsequent to the state action.2s9 A contrary ruling would 
allow violators to continue their violations forever without further penalty, 
just by paying the state for a one-day violation. 
In a variant of this issue, another court held that a citizen suit against 
a violation of requirements relating to pollutant A was not precluded by a 
government action against a violation of requirements relating to pollut- 
ant B, although remedial actions to be taken to bring pollutant B into com- 
pliance should also bring pollutant A into compliance.290 It so held because 
the two actions were not against the same violations and the govern- 
ment's action was injunctive in nature and application of the preclusion 
"would effectively insulate Defendant Plant from any civil liability for its 
allegedly impermissible and repeated lead  discharge^."'^' Some courts 
have held that when a state issues an administrative order against a viola- 
tion, subsection 309(g) bars citizen actions against future violations, al- 
though they are based on the false predicate that subsection 309(g) will 
bar citizen suits when states issue compliance orders.292 Subsection 
309(g), however, does not address the effect of compliance orders and 
many of the citizen suit preclusion devices do not either.293 
The plain reading of subsection 309(g) and its legislative history also 
indicate that a government penalty action does not bar a citizen suit for 
287 S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28 ( 1985). 
288 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-1004, at 133 (1986). 
'89N. Cal. River Watch v. Sonorna County Water Agency, No. C 97-4263, 1998 WL 
886645, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1998); see also Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Acme Elec- 
tro-Plating, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 57 (D. Conn. 1993); Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. 
Co., 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996). 
290 Atl. States Legal Found. v. Montgomery County N. Reduction Plant, No. C-3-95- 
156, 1996 WL 1670982 (S.D. Ohio Mar. I 1, 1996). 
29' Id. at *6. 
19' Lockett v. EPA, 3 19 F.3d 678, 689-90 (5th Cir. 2003). 
292 E.g. ,  CWA 5 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365 (2000); see also Miller, supra note I, at 436- 
43. 
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an injunction requiring compliance. Yet in North and South Rivers Water- 
shed Assn., Inc. v. Town of S ~ i r u a r e , ~ ~ ~  the court held that the preclusion 
barred citizen suits for injunctions as well as for civil penalties. The court 
reasoned that section 505 does not differentiate among remedies, but "sim- 
ply provides civilians with a general grant of jurisdiction for all remedies 
available."295 It noted that the Court in Gwaltney had commented that the 
provision for civil penalties and injunctions were in the same sentence in 
section 505, but in different subsections in section 309, thus suggesting a 
relation between the two remedies in section 505 that was absent in sec- 
tion 309.296 From this and the Court's characterization of citizen suits in 
Gwaltney as supplemental, the First Circuit concluded that the "309(g) bar 
extends to all citizen actions brought under section 505, not merely civil 
penal tie^."^^' It labeled a contrary result "absurd," because it would defer 
to "the primary enforcement responsibility of the government only where 
a penalty is sought in a civilian action, as if the policy considerations 
limiting civilian suits were only applicable within that context."298 
The Court's rejection of the clear statutory language of subsection 
309(g) that bars only civil penalty actions is a high-water mark in the Court's 
substitution of its policy judgment for legislative policy judgment. This sub- 
stitution is harmful in its own right, and moreover, the Court's policy 
judgment is flawed. While it may be rational to bar a citizen suit for a pen- 
alty after the state has assessed an administrative penalty under a state 
law comparable to subsection 309(g), it is not rational to bar a suit for an 
injunction because the state has assessed such a penalty. An administra- 
tive penalty with an upper limit of $125,000 will not deter a serious vio- 
lation of a legal obligation that would require the expenditure of millions 
of dollars. If EPA and citizens cannot seek an injunction after a state has 
assessed a small penalty in such a situation, compliance with the statute will 
have been subverted. Under the Scituate rationale, the state can insulate a 
violator from compliance with the statute by assessing a small adminis- 
trative penalty. Contrary to the Scituate court's opinion, that policy and 
result is absurd. Nevertheless, some courts have followed Scituate in this 
holding.299 
'"949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991). 
295 Id. at 557-58 (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 
- 
U.S. 49, 58 (1987)). 
296 Id. at 557-58 (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58). This might enable the First Circuit 
to conclude the provision would not block an EPA request for an injunction, while it would 
block a citizen request for one. As discussed in the text, however, the provision does not 
block either EPA or citizens from seeking an injunction to require compliance. 
297 Id. at 558. 
298 Id. 
299 Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Investment Co.,  904 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Or. 1995), 
rev'd, 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996), followed Scituate without elaboration. The Eighth Cir- 
cuit rejected some of the First Circuit's reasoning but came to the same conclusion in Ar- 
kansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994). I t  com- 
mented that the opposite result was not absurd, although it  was "undesirable" because i t  
Heinonline - -  29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 67 2005 
Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 29 
The first decision rejecting the reasoning and results of Scituate was 
Coalition for a Livable West Side, Inc. v. New York City Department of 
Environmental Pr~tection.~" There the court found "no basis for the First 
Circuit's redrafting of the statute" because "[tlhe language of 3 [309](g)(6) 
is clear and unambiguous," and creates a "bar [that] applies only to civil 
penalty actions."30' It found such partial bar supported by the policy un- 
derlying the preclusion device: preventing duplicative penalties for the 
same violation while authorizing compliance injunctions against viola- 
tions that continued despite the assessment of penalties. Moreover, it 
found the fear of defendants being "whipsawed" between government 
and citizen enforcement actions to be unfounded, for trial courts have suffi- 
cient authority to prevent that result, including the authority to stay citi- 
zen actions. It noted that federal courts in citizen suits should treat with 
deference injunctive relief already granted by state courts.302 That defer- 
ence is not owed, however, where the state has only assessed a relatively 
small administrative penalty. Most courts outside the First and Eighth Cir- 
cuits reject the reasoning and results of Sci tu~te.~O~ 
The Scituate approach ignores the underlying reason the CWA pro- 
vided three sets of enforcers. Previous water pollution control legislation 
"could result in undue interference with, or unnecessary duplication of, the legitimate ef- 
forts of the state agency." Id. at 383. Lockett v. EPA, 176 F. Supp. 2d 628, 636 (E.D. La. 
2001), followed ICI Americas without elaboration. 
830 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
Id. at 197. 
'02 Id. 
'03 See PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, 
J.) ("Although broad reading of 'actions' would be consistent with Congress's evident desire 
that citizens' suits supplement rather than displace state enforcement, we do not consider 
the argument strong enough to override the statutory text, especially when we consider the 
interminable character of much administrative process."); Atl. States Legal Found. v. 
Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Kara Holding Corp. v. Getty Petroleum 
Mktg., Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Sierra Club v. Hyundai Am., Inc., 23 
F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1179 (D. Or. 1997); United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 
769, 79 1 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 191 F.3d 5 16, 525 
(4th Cir. 1999); Atl. States Legal Found. v. Montgomery County N. Reduction Plant, No. 
C-3-95-156, 1996 WL 1670982, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 1996); N.Y. Coastal Fisher- 
men's Ass'n v. N.Y. City Dep't of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Orange 
Env't, Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). These cases followed 
Livable West Side without elaboration. The court in California Sportfishing Protection 
Alliance v. City of West Sacramento followed the reasoning of Livable West Side, finding 
the language to be "unambiguous that only civil penalty actions are barred." 905 F. Supp. 
790, 806 (E.D. Cal. 1995). Although it acknowledged some strength in the logic of Sciru- 
ate, it found such reasoning "perilous" when "dealing with a statute so complex as the 
Clean Water Act which has within it so many cross currents." Id. at 806. These complex 
"cross currents" run throughout section 505. See Miller, supra note I, at 445-49; Sierra 
Club v. Hyundai Am., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d (D. Or. 1997); Friends of Santa Fe County v. 
LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1995). In Friends of Santa Fe, the court 
found the subsection 309(g) bar simply to prevent duplicative penalties for the same viola- 
tion: "many courts wish to read more into the citizen suit bar of this subsection than exists. 
Although their desire is well-founded and their policy goals are laudable, their vision can- 
not be reconciled with the literal terms of the statute." 892 F. Supp. at 1347. 
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was ineffective, in part because it was not well en f~ rced .~"  It is more 
likely to be effectively enforced with three rather than only one or two en- 
forcers. This is particularly true where the government's enforcement re- 
sponse is a small subsection 309(g) administrative penalty of up to only 
$125,000. In the context of violations that cost far more to correct, this has 
little or no deterrent value; if significant violators can be insulated from 
compliance by paying traffic ticket penalties to state officials, enforcement 
of and compliance with the CWA are thwarted. This was not Congress's 
purpose in enacting subsection 309(g). 
B. Enforcement Provisions Requiring Prior Notice to the State and 
Barring Federal Action if the State Commences "Appropriate" Action 
The foregoing analysis shows subsection 309(g) to be a complex pre- 
clusion containing a strict limitation based on each of the three elements 
commonly used by Congress to preclude subsequent enforcement by EPA 
and citizens. Other preclusions against EPA enforcement use each of the 
three elements or a subset of them. This Section discusses preclusions in 
several statutes that incorporate each of the notice, delay and bar elements 
and analyzes legal issues that arise under these provisions. 
The EPA enforcement provisions in the SDWA, FIFRA and CWA all 
include preclusion devices under which EPA may enforce only after giv- 
ing the state notice, waiting thirty days, and determining that the state has 
not taken "appropriate" enforcement action. These versions of the preclu- 
sion device incorporate all three of its elements, in virtually the same form 
found in most of the citizen suit provisions. 
The SDWA provisions are the most restrictive on subsequent EPA en- 
forcement. The SDWA has two primary regulatory programs: drinking 
water standards for public water supplies and permits for underground injec- 
tion of wastes and other materials. Both programs may be administered 
either by EPA or by states with programs approved by EPA as meeting statu- 
tory criteria. EPA may enforce against violations of either drinking water 
standards or underground injection requirements without restriction in states 
lacking approved programs.305 But in states with approved programs, it 
must first notify the state and the violator and, for drinking water stan- 
dards violations, provide advice and technical assistance to them. Under 
either program, if the state has not "commenced appropriate enforcement 
action" after thirty days, EPA may itself commence an administrative or 
civil action for compliance and penalties.306 
" See Miller, supra note I, at 407 n.22. 
305 SDWA $5  1414(a)(2), 1423(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. $0 300g-3(a)(2), 300h-2(a)(2) (2000). 
Subsection 1414(a)(2)(B) requires EPA to give prior notice to the local elected official 
responsible for the water supply system. 42 U.S.C. 5 300g-3(a)(2)(B). 
306 SDWA $5 1414(a)(l), 1423(a)(I), 42 U.S.C. $ 5  300g-3(a)(l), 300h-2(a)(l). For 
drinking water standards violations, if the state in which the violation occurs has an ap- 
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FIFRA, by contrast, authorizes EPA as the sole regulator of pesticide 
manufacture and sale, but contemplates enforcement against violations of 
pesticide use regulations by either EPA or states with EPA-approved pro- 
grams or cooperative agreements with EPA.307 There are no restrictions on 
EPA enforcement of the federal manufacture and sale provisions. Nor are 
there restrictions on EPA enforcement of the use requirements in states 
lacking approved use programs or cooperative agreements. But in states 
with approved use enforcement programs or cooperative agreements, EPA 
may not enforce against use violations without "referring" the violation 
to the state, providing the state thirty days to act, and finding the state has 
not commenced "appropriate enforcement action."308 These restrictions 
do not operate during emergency conditions requiring immediate action.309 
CWA subsection 309(a) provides EPA a choice when enforcing in a 
state with an approved permit program: It may proceed (1) under subsec- 
tion 309(a)(3), requiring it only to provide the state with copies of its 
enforcement  document^,"^ or (2) under subsection 309(a)(l), which re- 
quires EPA first to give a notice of violation to the state and the violator, 
wait thirty days, and then proceed only if the state has not commenced 
"appropriate enforcement action.""' This is not much of a burden on EPA; it 
may always choose to enforce under subsection 309(a)(3), unencumbered 
by the notice, delay and bar preclusion, but if it does give the state and 
violator a notice of violation, it chooses the notice, delay and bar route 
and is bound by the requirements of section 309(a)(l). Of course, EPA 
could also give the state informal prior notice of its intent to proceed un- 
der subsection 309(a)(3) and not give the violator prior notice, doubly 
indicating that it is not proceeding under subsection 309(a)(l). This pro- 
cedure has the advantage of giving the state the courtesy of notice with- 
out invoking the potential preclusion of subsection 309(a)(l). 
It might be argued that subsection 309(a)(3) is a drafting error and 
should be interpreted to include the notice and delay provisions of sub- 
section 309(a)(l), but subsection 309(a)(3) would be redundant if it did 
not authorize EPA to enforce without prior notice to the state. Where possi- 
ble, statutes should be interpreted to avoid rendering portions of them su- 
proved program, EPA must provide the state a copy of the order issued by EPA, and the 
order does not become effective until EPA has afforded the state an opportunity to confer. 
'07 FIFRA Q 26, 7 U.S.C. Q 136w-I (2000). Pesticide use must comply with directions 
on pesticide labels approved by EPA in the course of registering the pesticide. 
FIFRA Q 27(a), 7 U.S.C. Q 136w-2(a) (2000). 
IWFIFRA Q 26(c), 7 U.S.C. Q 136w-2(c) (2000). FIFRA does not contain a provision 
comparable to those in CAA section 303, CWA section 504, and SDWA section 1431, 
allowing EPA to take action to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment without 
prior notice to the state and without a violation of the statute. EPA's authorization in FIFRA 
subsection 27(a) to act without prior notice to the state, when EPA enforces against viola- 
tions of the statute creating emergency conditions, in part makes up for FIFRA's lack of 
emergency authority. 
CWA Q 309(a)(3)-(4). 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(a)(3)-(4) (2000). 
CWA Q 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(l). 
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perf luou~."~ Moreover, the legislative history demonstrates that this result 
is exactly what Congress intended. The Committee report accompanying 
the House CWA bill, for instance, lists four enforcement authorities the bill 
gave EPA, including both EPA's authority to issue administrative compli- 
ance orders without the preclusion device and its authority to issue such 
orders with the preclusion device.313 More pointedly, EPA's comments to 
Congress on the proposed subsection 309(a)(3) indicated that the subsec- 
tion might be a drafting error and should be amended to make it subject 
to the notice and delay requirements of subsection 309(a)(1).314 Congress 
ignored the suggestion. 
These preclusions on EPA enforcement are almost identical to the no- 
tice, delay and bar preclusions Congress typically placed in citizen suit 
provisions."Wne difference is that the EPA delay period is shorter, thirty 
days, rather than the sixty-day delay period common in citizen suit provi- 
sions. The legislative history does not explain the reason for this differ- 
ence. Perhaps more importantly, the bar on EPA action is activated by an 
"appropriate state enforcement action," while the bar on citizen action is 
usually activated by commencement and "diligent prosecution" of specific 
types of enforcement actions "to seek compliance." Again, the legislative 
history provides no explanation for the difference. 
These preclusions on EPA enforcement action raise several legal is- 
sues. Is an EPA enforcement action invalid without the required prior notice 
and delay? When is a state action "commenced"? What is a state enforce- 
ment action? What is an "appropriate" state enforcement action? While 
there are few reported decisions on these issues in the EPA preclusions 
except for in the context of CWA subsection 309(g), decisions on identi- 
cal issues in the citizen suit preclusions address all of the issues.316 Be- 
cause these EPA preclusion devices are virtually identical to the preclu- 
sion devices in the citizen suit sections, they should be interpreted in the 
same way."' 
With regard to whether an EPA enforcement action is invalid without 
the required prior notice and delay, the Court has held that the preclusion 
device in citizen suit provisions bars citizen actions unless plaintiffs have 
"'See ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 324 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 
759. 778 (1988); S .  Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc. 476 U.S. 498, 510 n.22 (1986)). 
' I ' H .  REP. NO. 92-91 1 ,  at 114-15 (1972), reprinted in CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
srrpra note 40, at 801-02. 
31" Id. at 160, reprinted in CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40, at 847. 
' I 5  See Miller, supra note I ,  at 449-52; supra Part I .B.  
" 6  See Miller, srrpra note I .  
"'There is one significant difference regarding the notice required in the citizen and 
EPA enforcement preclusion devices. The citizen suit preclusion devices typically require 
citizens to give notice "in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation." 
E.g. ,  CWA 5 505(b), 33 U.S.C. 3 1365(b) (2000). EPA has promulgated rather detailed 
regulations. See 4 0  C.F.R. Parts 54, 135, 254, 374 (2003). The EPA enforcement sections 
contain no such requirements. 
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complied with the required notice and delay period.j18 The Court did not 
go so far as to hold that the notice was a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
suit, but held that a citizen suit must be dismissed absent proper notice 
and delay. This leaves open a multitude of questions regarding the effects 
of technical deficiencies in notices, and courts are split on whether tech- 
nical deficiencies will defeat an enforcement action.319 Both the Court's 
holding and remaining questions regarding the effect of technical de- 
ficiencies with notices in the citizen suit preclusion device apply to the 
preclusion device in EPA enforcement provisions.320 They are reinforced 
by cases holding that the notice and delay elements in the EPA enforce- 
ment provisions are mandatory, even when their preclusion devices lack 
the bar element.32' 
Discussing when a state action is "commenced" virtually all the re- 
ported decisions in citizen suit cases hold that state actions barring citi- 
zen suits are "commenced" by formal initiation of the action, such as the 
filing of a complaint with a court or administrative tribunal,322 noting that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 provides that a civil action is commenced 
by filing a complaint in court.323 Because these decisions interpret the 
same word, in the same statute, in the same context and in different ver- 
sions of the same preclusion device, the interpretation should apply to the 
preclusions on EPA enforcement as 
The third issue is which state enforcement actions may bar a federal ac- 
tion. The structures of the statutes are of some help here, as is precedent 
from an analogous question under the citizen suit statutes. In all three stat- 
utes, the state "enforcement action" language appears in sections provid- 
ing EPA specific enforcement authorities and entitled, in whole or in part, 
" e n f o r ~ e m e n t . " ~ ~ ~  Because "enforcement" is used in the same sections to 
refer to both EPA and state actions, the word should have the same mean- 
ings, whether the enforcer is a state or federal entity.326 Those provisions 
which indicate exactly what Congress meant by federal enforcement: the 
exercise of the particular enforcement mechanisms Congress conferred 
3 1 8  Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989). 
3 ' 9  See Robin Kundis Craig, Notice Letters and Notice Pleadings: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Sujjicierzcy of Er~vironmental Citizen Suit Notice, 78 OR. L. REV. 
105 (1999). 
''O See supra note 3 17. 
3 2 1  See infra Part 1I.C.; ir~fra note 350. 
-'?'See Miller, supra note I ,  at 452-56. 
323 Clorox Corp. v. Chromium Corp., 158 F.R.D. 120, 125 (N.D. I l l .  1994). 
The same or similar terms in a statute should be interpreted in the same way. See 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 324 (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) and 
United Savings Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 
(1988)). 
325CWA 5 309, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319 (2000) ("Enforcement"); SDWA 8 1414, 42 U.S.C. 
5 300g-3 (2000) ("Enforcement of drinking water regulations"); FlFRA 8 27, 7 U.S.C. 
5 136w-2 (2000) ("Failure by the State to assure enforcement of State pesticide use re- 
quirements."). 
3'6 See supra note 3 12. 
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on EPA included ordering compliance, assessing administrative penalties, 
and seeking civil penalties, injunctive relief and criminal sanctions. This 
analysis suggests that unless otherwise specified, state enforcement ac- 
tions may bar EPA enforcement actions only if the state actions are the same 
types of actions EPA is authorized to take. The preclusion devices in the 
citizen suit provisions and judicial interpretation of them reinforce this 
conclusion. Although the citizen suit preclusion devices usually specify 
the types of government action that will bar citizen suits, they also spec- 
ify that only action for "compliance" will do so.327 Only enforcement ac- 
tions are actions for compliance. 
What is an "appropriate" state enforcement action? Here, the struc- 
tures of the statutes are helpful. In the EPA enforcement provisions, Con- 
gress directed EPA to issue orders requiring compliance and gave courts 
jurisdiction to restrain violations and require compliance.328 Because EPA 
enforcement actions seek compliance,329 a state action is "appropriate" to 
bar federal action only if the state action seeks and is capable of achiev- 
ing compliance. The citizen suit provisions bar suit if the government has 
taken specified actions,330 often in court, "to require c~mpliance."~~' The 
legislative history of the citizen suit preclusions equates an action "ap- 
propriate" to bar a citizen suit with an action capable of and calculated to 
achieve compliance.332 Indeed, even the Supreme Court emphasized that 
the provisions "specifically provide that citizen suits are barred only if 
the Administrator has commenced an action 'to require compliance."'333 
Not every state "enforcement" action is capable of or calculated to require 
compliance. An administrative order to comply may be incapable of achiev- 
ing compliance when directed at a powerful, recalcitrant industry that has 
disregarded a series of previous compliance orders. An administrative order 
requiring an action other than compliance is not calculated to require 
compliance, nor is an administrative order that appears to require com- 
pliance but is really an extension of a compliance date to accommodate 
the violator. Decisions addressing the issue interpret the requirement that 
state actions be capable of and calculated to require compliance to bar a 
citizen suit in accordance with its plain meaning and legislative history.334 
The remaining question is who must determine if a state action is 
"appropriate" to bar EPA enforcement. Of necessity, EPA must make the 
initial determination, because it must decide whether or not to act. Only 
j2'See Miller, supra note 1 ,  at 436-45. 
E.g.,  CWA Q 309(a)(l), (3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(l), (3). 
jZ9 In the CWA enforcement provision, for instance, EPA is to issue orders requiring 
violators "to comply," and courts are to exercise authority to "restrain" violations and "to 
require compliance." CWA Q 309(a)(l), (a)(3), (b), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(a)(l), (a)(3), (b). 
"O See Miller, supra note 1 ,  at 436-45. 
j3 '  E.g.,  CWA Q 505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. Q 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
33Z See Miller, supra note 1 ,  at 445-48. 
j3' Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49,60 n.7 (1987). 
334 See Miller, supra note 1 ,  at 436-45. 
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later may the defendant ask a court to decide whether EPA made an ac- 
ceptable determination. That raises the question of whether the court is 
reviewing EPA's determination or making the determination de novo. If it 
is reviewing EPA's determination, United States v. Mead CO.'.'~ holds that 
EPA's determination is not entitled to deference following Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,336 because EPA did not make 
the determination in a rulemaking or other formal action. Even under Mead, 
however, EPA may be entitled to some deference."' Perhaps Heckler v. 
Chaney governs, holding that agency decisions to enforce are entitled to the 
utmost deference.338 However, Heckler v. Chaney defers to prosecutorial 
discretion because there is no law generally applicable to when govern- 
ment enforcement is appropriate against a violator. 
There are several differences between the situations here and in Heckler 
v. Chaney. First, there are two enforcers here: the question is which of 
them receives the most deference in federal judicial review. Second, the 
statute specifies that EPA may enforce if the state does not take "appro- 
priate" enforcement action, meaning an action capable of and calculated 
to achieve compliance. Third, Heckler v. Chaney challenged the agency's 
decision not to enforce, while this question addresses decisions to en- 
force. Finally, this may not be a question of judicial review at all. If EPA 
must allege in its complaint that the state did not take appropriate en- 
forcement action, EPA may have the burden of proof on the issue. This is 
different from judicial review, although the degree of burden that EPA 
must bear may be calculated in the same manner as the degree of defer- 
ence to which its decision would be accorded on judicial review. 
335533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
33b467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
337 The Court noted: 
[tlhe fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has 
been understood to vary with the circumstances, and courts have looked to the de- 
gree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and 
to the persuasiveness of the agency's position. . . . The approach has produced a 
spectrum of judicial responses, from great respect at one end, to near indifference 
at the other. 
533 U.S. at 228 (2001) (internal citations omitted). Prior to Mead, courts had generally 
looked to Chevron and deferred to an agency's interpretation of a statute it administered if 
the statute was ambiguous and the agency's interpretation was reasonable. In Mead, the 
Court limited Chevron deference, but did not impose bright-line limits. It indicated that 
Chevron deference should be accorded to decisions by agencies acting under "express 
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that 
produces regulations or ruling for which deference is claimed." Id. at 229. It noted further 
that most of the agency interpretations to which it had accorded Chevron deference were 
"the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication." Id. at 230. EPA 
decisions that a state action is "appropriate" to bar a deferral action are not such formal 
actions and hence not subject to Chevron deference. But they are subject to some degree of 
deference, which EPA can enhance by making the determinations with care, transparency, 
and some degree of formality. 
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
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C. Enforcement Provisions Requiring Prior Notice to the State 
The next most stringent preclusion provisions against EPA enforce- 
ment require only one of the three basic preclusion elements. This Section 
investigates cases in which statutes require only notice before the initia- 
tion of subsequent enforcement activity. This type of preclusion is pre- 
sent in the CAA and RCRA, and each statute's provisions will be dis- 
cussed in turn. 
The CAA requires EPA to give the state and the violator notice thirty 
days before commencing administrative or civil enforcement actions for 
violations of state implementation plans, but not for other violations.339 
As originally enacted, the CAA provision authorized EPA to enforce only 
if the violation continued for more than thirty days after the notice.340 The 
purpose of the notice, as drawn from the original notice provision itself, 
was to enable the violator to escape from enforcement by complying within 
thirty days.341 The notice requirement was, and still is, followed by a pro- 
vision authorizing EPA, upon finding a state is generally not enforcing its 
state implementation plan, to declare a "period of federally assumed en- 
f ~ r c e m e n t . " ~ ~ V h e  only difference between EPA's normal enforcement 
authority and its authority during a period of federally assumed enforce- 
ment is that during the latter it may enforce against violations of state 
implementation plans without prior notice. The purpose of the notice ap- 
parent from the "federally assumed enforcement" provision is to enable 
the state to enforce rather than to enable violators to come into compli- 
a n ~ e . ~ ~ ~  The fact that EPA is not required to give the state or the violator 
prior notice before enforcing federally developed requirements of the 
CAA reinforces this.344 This makes policy sense, because state implemen- 
tation plans are developed by states and are state law, unenforceable fed- 
erally until federalized by EPA approval. The notice requirement was ill- 
suited to that purpose of enabling enforcement, however, for it did not 
bar EPA from enforcement if the state took enforcement action, but only 
if the violator came into compliance. 
'j9CAA 5 113(a)(l), (3), 42 U.S.C. 8 7413(a)(I), (3) (2000). 
340CAA 5 113(a)(l), 84 Stat. 1686 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a)(1)). 
24' The current version allows EPA to enforce thirty days following the notice regard- 
less of whether the violation is continuing. Now the violator no longer can escape from 
enforcement by quick compliance. 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a)(I). 
CAA 5 1 13(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a)(2). 
343 United States v. B & W Inv. Props., 38 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe notice 
of violation requirement for state implementation plans serves a different function than 
simply alerting the violator . . . allowing the state to act to enforce its own implementation 
before the EPA steps in."). 
344 The purpose of the requirement that citizens give prior notice to EPA and states of 
the citizens' intent to enforce is to give the government prosecutors the opportunity to take 
the enforcement action themselves without the interference of a pending citizen suit. 
Miller, supra note I, at 4 4 5 4 8 .  
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The requirement was amended in 1990, continuing to require EPA to 
give the state and the violator thirty day's prior notice before commenc- 
ing administrative or civil actions for violations of state implementation 
plans, but no longer barring EPA from enforcement under any circum- 
stances after the thirty-day waiting period.345 In terms of either rationale 
for the notice, this amendment seems an empty formality. Of course, if 
circumstances change within the thirty-day delay period, EPA may decide 
not to enforce and either enforcement by the state or compliance by the vio- 
lator might be a significant change of circumstances. But this leaves the 
choice of whether to enforce under such circumstances entirely with 
EPA. Whereas in the earlier version Congress ruled out enforcement if 
the violator had come into compliance. 
The EPA enforcement provision in RCRA Subchapter 111, the haz- 
ardous waste regulatory program, requires EPA to give prior notice to a 
state before issuing an administrative order or commencing a civil action 
against a violator in the state, but only if the state has an approved haz- 
ardous waste regulatory p r ~ g r a m . ~  This is similar to the CAA prior no- 
tice requirement before EPA enforcement against violations of state im- 
plementation plans, but there is no waiting period and no provision for a 
"period of federally assumed enforcement." Since prior notice is required 
only in states with approved programs, the evident purpose of the notice 
is to allow these states, rather than EPA, to enforce. Since there is no waiting 
period before EPA can enforce, however, the notice again seems an empty 
gesture. Defendants have argued that EPA may not enforce under RCRA 
if a state has already done so, but this is a losing argument because Con- 
gress knew how to provide such a bar, could have provided such a bar, and 
did not.)47 
A plain reading of these provisions requires EPA to give prior notice 
to the state before enforcing. This reading is supported by the juxtaposi- 
tion with neighboring provisions that do not require prior notice.348 
The same reasoning might lead to the conclusion that if EPA com- 
mences an enforcement action without giving the required notice, its ac- 
tions also must be dismissed. Indeed, one pre-Hallstrom decision held the 
CANS prior notice provision to be jur i~dic t ional ,~~~ but its persuasiveness 
is dubious in view of the Court's refusal to so hold in Hallstrom. Other 
345 Pub. L. NO. 101-549, Q 701, 104 Stat. 2399,2672-73 (1990). 
)46 RCRA Q 3008(a)(l), (2), 4 2  U.S.C. Q 6928(a)(1), (2) (2000). 
347 See infra Part 1II.C. 
In its neighboring provision, the CAA does not require EPA to give thirty days prior 
notice before enforcing against violations of federally promulgated standards. CAA 
§ 113(a)(3), 4 2  U.S.C. Q 7413(a)(3) (2000). In its neighboring provisions, RCRA does not 
require EPA to give prior notice before enforcing against violations in a state without an 
EPA approved state program. RCRA Q 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. Q 6928(a). See also supra Part 
1I.B. 
349 See United States v. Ford Motor Co., 736 F. Supp. 1539, 1547 (W.D. Mo. 1990). 
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courts have held that the CAA's prior notice provision is mandatory,350 
but they were decided prior to the amendment of CAA subsection 113(a) 
in 1990, which deleted the bar element that had precluded EPA from en- 
forcement unless the violation continued for thirty days after the notice. 
As long as the device contained a bar, EPA enforcement could be avoided 
by compliance within the delay period. Once Congress removed the bar 
from the CAA preclusion device, however, neither the violator nor the 
state could prevent EPA from taking action. The same is true for the RCRA 
preclusion device. Under these circumstances, no harm is done if EPA 
fails to give proper notice, and there is no reason to hold the notice to be 
mandatory. That result would avoid the issue of deciding the effect of 
technical defects in notices if notices are held to be mandatory. As noted 
above, however, the CAA's thirty-day waiting period at least offers both 
the state and the violator the opportunity to convince EPA not to enforce. 
Since EPA's failure to give such notice would deprive them of this con- 
gressionally mandated opportunity, the CAA notice should be interpreted 
as mandatory and an EPA action without it should be dismissed or stayed 
pending notice. This does not leave EPA without remedy if the violation 
would cause real damage during the waiting period. Under the CAA,35' as 
under most of the statutes,352 EPA may issue an order or seek an injunc- 
tion to abate imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or 
welfare or the environment from air emissions, without a waiting per i~d , '~ '  
and even in the absence of a violation of the statute. 
D. Enforcement Provisions Requiring Subsequent Notice to the State 
Like the preceding Section, the preclusions discussed in this Section 
require the satisfaction of only the notice element to avoid preclusion. The 
preclusions in this Section, however, require notice after, rather than be- 
fore, initiation of subsequent enforcement. The CWA and CAA both con- 
tain specific provisions to this effect, requiring that EPA notify the state 
3501d. at 1550 ("The Act is clear in its requirement that EPA must serve Ford with a 
notice of violation of the applicable plan before it  may proceed with either administrative 
or judicial enforcement proceedings. The requirement is jurisdictional."); United States v. 
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1 122, 1.1 28 (D. Colo. 1987)("[B]efore the EPA is 
authorized to bring a civil enforcement action . . . (I)  the EPA must issue a NOV to the 
alleged offender, and (2) the violation alleged must continue for thirty days after the issu- 
ance of the NOV."); see also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 1060, 1063 (1st 
Cir. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 530 (1990); Navistar Int'l Transp. Co. v. EPA, 
858 F.2d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding the notice requirement in CAA section 120, 42 
U.S.C. (j 7420, is mandatory but technical defects in  the notice are insufficient to defeat 
EPA's action.). 
'51 CAA 9 303,42 U.S.C. 9 7603 (2000). 
352 See, e.g., CWA 504, 33 U.S.C. 1364(a) (2000); RCRA 7003,42 U.S.C. 6973 
(1990). 
353 The imminent and substantial endangerment provisions may require that EPA con- 
sult with the state before commencing action. See, e.g., CAA § 303,42 U.S.C. § 7603. 
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when it  takes admini~trat ive~~~  or civil actions5 against violators in the 
state. The CAA requires that EPA send to the state copies of EPA-issued 
orders to comply with federally developed requirements and notice of the 
commencement of all civil enforcement actions, while the CWA requires 
that EPA do so immediately. A plain reading of those provisions does not 
require EPA to give prior notice to the state, a reading that is supported 
by their juxtaposition with neighboring provisions that do require prior 
notice.356 The CAA requires EPA to give prior notice to the state when en- 
forcing against violations of state implementation plans, but only requires it 
to give subsequent notice to the state when enforcing against violations 
of federally developed requirements. This reflects, although imperfectly, 
the degree of state involvement in the development, implementation and 
enforcement of the particular  requirement^.^^' The CWA requirement is 
354 CWA $ 5  309(a)(4)-(5). 404(s)(2), 33 U.S.C. $ 9  13 19(a)(4)-(3, i344(s)(2) (2000); 
CAA 1 13(a)(3)-(4). 42 U.S.C. $j 7413(a)(3)-(4) (2000). 
355 CWA $9 309(b), 404(s)(3), 33 U.S.C. 13 19(b), 1344(s)(3); CAA 8 1 13(b), 42 
U.S.C. 7413(b). 
356 In its neighboring provision, the CAA requires EPA to give thirty days prior notice 
before enforcing against violations of state implementation plans and permits, a require- 
ment discussed in supra Part 1I.C. CAA § 113(a)(3)-(4). (b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3)-(4), 
(b). In its neighboring provision, the CWA requires EPA to give the state thirty days prior 
notice before enforcing against violations of the statute and to refrain from further en- 
forcement if the state initiates appropriate enforcement within that time, a requirement 
discussed in the same section. CWA 3 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(l). 
357 States are expected to develop implementation plans to achieve federally promul- 
gated ambient air quality standards and to develop and administer permit programs ad- 
dressing all CAA requirements for affected sources. CAA §§ 110, 501-507, 42 U.S.C. 
$ 5  7410, 7661-7661f (2000). EPA must give states notice prior to taking enforcement 
action against a violation of one of these requirements. On the other hand, EPA is to de- 
velop, implement and enforce standards for new sources, hazardous air pollutants, acid 
rain precursors, and ozone depleting substances. CAA $ 8  1 1 1-1 12, 401-4 16, 601-6 18, 42 
U.S.C. $ 9  741 1, 7651-76510, 7671-7671q (2000). EPA must give states only slrbseq~rerlt 
notice after taking enforcement action against violations of one of these requirements. But 
these distinctions are imprecise. See United States v. B & W Inv. Props., 38 F.3d 362, 365- 
66 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining the distinction and holding that CAA subsection 113(b)(3) 
does not require EPA to give prior notice before enforcing federally promulgated hazard- 
ous waste emission standards). 
If a state fails to develop an implementation plan meeting the CAA's criteria, EPA it- 
self ultimately may have to develop the plan. CAA § 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (2000). 
But EPA must give the state thirty days prior notice before taking enforcement action 
against violations of a state implementation plan, whether the state or EPA developed it. 
This prior notice is mandatory. See B & W Inv. Props., 38 F.3d at 363-66. At the same 
time, the statute contemplates that EPA will delegate to states its implementation authori- 
ties over federally developed requirements. CAA $ 5  I l l(c), 112(1), 42 U.S.C. $ 3  741 I(c), 
7412(1) (2000). EPA, however, is required only to give subsequent notice to the state when 
enforcing against these violations, whether or not EPA has delegated implementation to a 
state. Moreover, states are to develop permit programs applying all CAA requirements to 
permitted sources, whether states or EPA developed the requirements. CAA $5 501-507, 
42 U.S.C. $ 5  7661-7661f (2000). The enforcement provision requires EPA to give the state 
thirty day's prior notice of EPA enforcement actions against violations of "an applicable 
implementation plan or permit," while it also authorizes EPA to proceed to enforce with 
subsequent notice only for violations of "subchapter V," the CAA subchapter establishing 
the CAA permit program. Evidently, Congress has made the CAA far too complex for it to 
maintain complete consistency in the degrees of state involvement warranting prior or 
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less complicated but more curious. The basic regulatory device of the 
CWA is a permit program that may be implemented either by EPA or by 
a state with an EPA-approved program that meets all of the federal crite- 
ria.358 If Congress followed the pattern it established in the CAA, it would 
have required EPA to give prior notice before enforcing against violations 
in a state with an approved program and subsequent notice after enforcing 
against violations in states without approved programs. Instead, it required 
EPA to give notice, albeit subsequent notice, to states without approved 
programs, but left to EPA the choice to give either prior or subsequent 
notice to states with approved programs.359 
These "subsequent notice" requirements, by their very nature are not 
conditions precedent to EPA enforcement. Not surprisingly, the few re- 
ported decisions considering the issue hold they are not conditions prece- 
dent to The paucity of decisions probably results both from EPA's 
faithfully providing states with subsequent notice and from the defen- 
dants' expectations that courts will not hold that EPA's failure to provide 
subsequent notice deprives EPA of jurisdiction to proceed with properly 
commenced enforcement actions. 
E. Enforcement Provisions with No Preclusions on 
Successive Enforcement 
Up to this point, we have considered preclusion devices that use any 
or all of the basic notice, delay and bar elements to govern subsequent en- 
forcement. The final and weakest type of device uses none of these three 
elements, instead allowing unrestrained subsequent enforcement by EPA. 
Many EPA enforcement provisions contain no preclusions on EPA 
enforcement."' Of course, there are no reported decisions on the lack of 
statutory preclusions in these provisions. Common law preclusions may 
still be relevant, however, if EPA commences an enforcement action after 
citizens have taken an enforcement action under the citizen suit provision 
of the statute or if the state has taken enforcement action under compara- 
ble state authority. 
Despite the lack of controversy over these provisions, they are in- 
structive for interpreting the other provisions because of the pattern of the 
statutes in which they are found. Congress placed no preclusions on EPA 
enforcement in statutes that contemplate exclusive federal implementa- 
subsequent notice by EPA to a state. 
358 See CWA Q 402, 33 U.S.C. Q 1342 (2000). 
359 Compare CWA Q 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(a)(l) (2000), with CWA 5 309(a)(3), 
33 U.S.C. Q 1319(a)(3). 
360 B & W 1nv. Props ,  38 F.3d at 365-66. 
361 FlFRA Q 14, 7 U.S.C. Q 136(1)(2000); TSCA Q Q  16, 207, 15 U.S.C. $ 8  2615, 2647 
(2000); MPRSA Q 105,33 U.S.C. Q 1415 (2000); EPCRKA 5 325,42 U.S.C. 3 1 1045 (2000). 
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tion and enforcement362 or in parts of statutes that do so.363 Statutes or 
provisions that contemplate implementation and enforcement by both EPA 
and states3@ impose stronger versions of the preclusion on EPA enforce- 
ment discussed above. This pattern indicates that Congress varied the 
strength of the preclusions in EPA enforcement provisions to match the 
strength of EPA's role in relation to the role of the states in implementing 
the particular program being enforced. Congress used variants of the 
statutory preclusion knowingly and advisedly, intending the exact meas- 
ure of preclusion provided in each enforcement provision. Interpreting 
the preclusions differently than their plain meanings ignores the legisla- 
tive intent inherent in this pattern. 
111. LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT INFERRED FROM 
OTHER PROVISIONS 
The preceding analysis described the various preclusions against subse- 
quent EPA enforcement by analyzing the plain meaning, legislative his- 
tory, and structure of the environmental statutes. While this analysis is 
proper and should be exhaustive, some defendants in environmental cases 
have attempted to infer additional preclusions against EPA action. This Part 
examines the arguments levied by these parties and concludes that the pri- 
mary reason all but one of these arguments fail is that, when Congress in- 
tended to limit EPA enforcement in such circumstances, it explicitly limited 
it by the preclusion devices in the enforcement provisions themselves. 
Defendants argue that federal law, including federal enforcement au- 
thorities, ceases to operate in the state once EPA approves a state program, 
thereby making federal enforcement impossible. The statutes, however, do 
not provide that they are suspended in a particular state upon approval of 
that state's environmental program. Indeed, the statutes confer many authori- 
ties on EPA to oversee approved state programs. Those statutory authorities 
would be meaningless if the federal statutes were suspended upon approval 
of the state programs. 
Defendants next argue that, if EPA approval of a state's program sus- 
pends the federal program but not the federal statute and its enforcement 
authorities, violations of the approved state programs are violations of state 
law and the federal statutes do not authorize federal enforcement against 
violations of state law. Under some of the statutes, however, violations of 
362TSCA $5 16, 207, 15 U.S.C. $5  2615; 2647 (regulating the manufacture and sale of 
chemicals); MPRSA 5 105, 33 U.S.C. 5 1415 (regulating ocean dumping); EPCRKA 5 325, 
42 U.S.C. 5 1 1045 (concerning emergency planning and public disclosure relating to manufac- 
ture and use of hazardous chemicals). 
363 FIFRA 50  9, 14, 7 U.S.C. 55  1368, 136j (2000) (regulating the registration and sale 
of pesticides); CWA $5  31 1-312, 33 U.S.C. $5  1321-1322 (2000) (regulating spills of oil 
and hazardous waste and use of marine sanitation devices); CAA 5 205, 42 U.S.C. 5 7524 
(2000) (regulating automobile emissions). 
364 For example, the permitting programs of the CAA, CWA, and RCRA. 
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approved state programs are violations of federal law, and all of the stat- 
utes authorize federal enforcement against violations of approved state pro- 
grams. 
Next, defendants argue that the statutes do not authorize successive fed- 
eral enforcement against violations of approved state programs if states 
have already taken an action against the violations. Congress developed 
the preclusion device to deal with successive enforcement and varied the 
device's three elements in each of the EPA enforcement provisions to 
establish just how Congress intended to limit successive EPA enforce- 
ment under each statute, including whether and to what extent a state action 
would bar a successive EPA enforcement action. Thus, the wording of the 
enforcement provisions' preclusion devices should be looked to for de- 
termining whether Congress intended to preclude EPA enforcement; Con- 
gress did not intend that such a preclusion be inferred from other provisions. 
Finally, defendants argue that the statutes do not authorize federal 
enforcement against provisions of approved state programs that are be- 
yond the scope of or more stringent than the comparable federal require- 
ments. The structure of the statutes and EPA's interpretation of them sug- 
gest that a provision in an EPA-approved state program that is more 
stringent than its federal counterpart is federally enforceable, while a provi- 
sion in such a state program that is beyond the scope of the federal program 
is not. 
Although defendants make these arguments under all of the statutes, 
they make them most frequently and most fervently under RCRA because of 
the uniquely defendant-friendly wording in its state program approval 
provision. Ultimately, however, their arguments fare no better under RCRA 
than under the other statutes. Because the analysis under the CAA and 
CWA is virtually identical, the Article considers them together. RCRA is 
considered individually because although the analysis under RCRA is paral- 
lel to that under the CAA and CWA, it is complicated by its unique lan- 
g ~ a g e . ~ ~ ~  
A. Does EPA Approval of a State Program To Implement a Federal 
Statute Suspend Operation of the Federal Statute in that State? 
1.  The CAA and CWA 
The CAA and the CWA do not hint that they are suspended, in whole 
or in part, by EPA approval of a state's air or water pollution control pro- 
gram. Moreover, that concept is inconsistent with their statutory struc- 
tures for several reasons. First, both statutes establish major federally ad- 
36s While this Article could make similar analyses under other statutes, most enforce- 
ment litigation occurs under these three statutes, thus rendering such further analysis of 
limited value. 
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ministered regulatory programs that are not part of the core cooperative 
federalism programs. The CAA, for instance, establishes a program to 
regulate motor vehicle emissions administered directly by EPA and not 
through approved state implementation plans."6 The CWA establishes a 
program to prevent and penalize spills of oil and hazardous substances ad- 
ministered by EPA and the Coast Guard and not through approved state 
permit  program^.'^' It would not make sense for EPA's approval of a state's 
implementation plan or permit program to suspend these other environ- 
mental protection programs in the state. Such suspension would elimi- 
nate important federal environmental protections without replacing them 
with state protections. 
Second, in addition to the regulation of pollution sources that may 
be accomplished either by EPA or states with EPA-approved programs, 
both statutes confer general authorities on EPA alone. For instance, both 
authorize EPA to make grants to state environmental agencies to adminis- 
ter pollution control  program^."^ It would not make sense for EPA's ap- 
proval of a state's implementation plan or permit program to suspend EPA's 
grant authority, because the greatest need for federal financial assistance 
to states occurs when states administer approved plans and programs. 
Third, both the CAA and the CWA contemplate that EPA may approve 
a state permit program encompassing some but not all of the federal per- 
mit program. Under the CAA, for instance, EPA may approve a state 
permit program that does not include sources of pollutants in areas that 
have already attained National Ambient Air Quality Standards or sources 
subject to national emission standards for hazardous air  pollutant^.'^^ The 
CWA authorizes EPA to approve state permit programs covering a "signifi- 
cant and identifiable" "major category of  discharge^.""^ EPA's approval 
of a partial state permit program does not foreclose its implementation 
and enforcement of the uncovered portion of the federal program. 
Finally, both statutes establish EPA oversight authorities on state 
implementation and enforcement of the approved plans and programs. The 
266CAA QQ 202-250, 42 U.S.C. QQ 7521-7590 (2000). The CAA preempts state regu- 
lation of motor vehicle emissions placed on motor vehicle manufacturers, except for very 
limited programs that are more stringent than EPA's. CAA Q 209, 42 U.S.C. 5 7543 (2000). 
It also requires under some circumstances that states include in their implementation plans 
programs to test motor vehicle emissions from vehicles being used by consumers to ensure 
that they meet federal emission standards. See, e .g . ,  CAA 5 182(a)(2)(B), (b)(4), (c)(3), 42 
U.S.C. Q 75 1 la(a)(2)(B), (b)(4), (c)(3) (2000). See also CAA 55 601-618,42 U.S.C. $5 7671- 
767 lq (2000) (concerning the Stratospheric Ozone Protection Program). 
367 CWA Q 3 1 1, 33 U.S.C. Q 1321. The Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. $0 2701-2761 (2000), 
has subsumed much of the substance of this provision. See also CWA 5 404, 33 U.S.C. 
Q 1344 (2000) (concerning the Wetlands Protection Program, a separate permit program 
largely administered by the Army Corps of Engineers). 
368CWA Q 105.33 U.S.C. 5 1255 (2000); CAA Q 105,42 U.S.C. Q 7405 (2000). 
369 CAA Q 502(d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(C), (f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 766la(d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(C), (f)(3) 
(2000). 
270 CWA Q 402(n), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(n) (2000). 
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CAA, for instance, charges EPA with the responsibility for assuring that 
states' approved plans actually achieve the federal air quality standards 
and requires the agency to impose sanctions on states if the plans do not.37' 
The CWA authorizes EPA to withdraw approval of state permit programs 
and to veto state-issued permits that do not meet federal  standard^.'^^ Both 
statutes authorize EPA to enforce against violations of state implementa- 
tion plans and state-issued permits and to declare "periods of federally 
assumed enforcement" if it finds widespread failure of the state to en- 
force the approved pr~gram.'~"t would not make sense for EPA's approval 
of a state program to suspend these oversight authorities, for such authori- 
ties are not activated until EPA approves the state program. Such an in- 
terpretation would render those authorities meaningless. This interpreta- 
tion is to be avoided, as statutes should be interpreted to give meaning to 
all of their parts.374 Finally, it has long been held under the CWA that 
EPA may enforce against violations of a permit issued by a state with an 
approved program, even if the state already has commenced an enforce- 
ment action.375 
2. RCRA 
The analysis of whether EPA approval of a state program suspends 
operation of the federal RCRA standards in that state under RCRA is paral- 
lel to the analysis under the CAA and CWA, but is complicated by differ- 
ent language in RCRA. Congress provided in RCRA subsection 3006(b) 
that an EPA approved state permit program operates "in lieu of the Fed- 
eral program under this subchapter" (subchapter 111), effectively suspend- 
ing the federal program in states with approved  program^."^ However, it 
did not define the "program" that was suspended."' In determining what 
is suspended, it is important to recognize that RCRA follows the same statu- 
tory pattern as the CAA and CWA with regard to the relationships between 
the entire federal statute and the approved state programs. First, RCRA 
establishes major regulatory programs that are not part of the core coop- 
erative federalism program. For instance, it creates in Subchapter IV a 
solid waste regulatory program that is not part of its core hazardous 
37' S e e ,  e.g., CAA Q 179,42 U.S.C. Q 7509 (2000). 
372 CWA 8 402(b)-(d), 33 U.S.C. Q 1342(b)-(d). 
j7' CWA Q 309(a)(l)-(3), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(a)(I)-(3) (2000); CAA Q 1 13(a)(l)-(b), 4 2  
U.S.C. Q 7413(a)(l)-(b) (2000). 
374See ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 324 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 
759, 778 (1988) and South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S.  498, 510 n.22 
(1986)). 
'15 United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981). 
276 RCRA Q 3006(b), 4 2  U.S.C. Q 6926(b) (2000). 
377 Wyckoff CO. v. EPA, 796 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Flanagan, 
126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1287 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
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waste permit program.378 It would make no sense for EPA's approval of a 
state hazardous waste program to suspend EPA's non-hazardous solid waste 
program in the state, for that would eliminate an important federal envi- 
ronmental protection without replacing it with state protections. 
Second, RCRA contains general authorities, some of which relate to, 
but are not part of, the core hazardous waste program. For instance, like 
the CAA and CWA, RCRA authorizes EPA to make grants to states to ad- 
minister hazardous and solid waste control programs.379 It would be coun- 
terproductive for EPA's approval of a state program to suspend these au- 
thorities and requirements for the same reasons that it is counterproduc- 
tive under the CAA and CWA. The plain meaning of subsection 3006(b) 
is that EPA approval of a state program suspends only the Federal program 
under Subchapter 111. The subsection 3006(b) begins by stating that "[alny 
State which seeks to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program 
pursuant to this subchapter" shall submit its program for EPA approval. 
If EPA approves the program, the "State is authorized to carry out such 
program in lieu of the federal program under this subchapter . . . ."380 To 
the extent these authorities are not contained in Subchapter 111, they fall 
outside whatever program is suspended. 
Third, RCRA, like the CAA and CWA, contemplates that EPA may 
approve state programs that cover some, but not all, of the federal require- 
ments. In the case of RCRA, however, Congress limited partial state pro- 
grams to those covering all of the requirements of the original statute, au- 
thorizing EPA to issue permits covering requirements of the federal pro- 
gram added in subsequent  amendment^.^^' EPA approval of a partial state 
program, therefore, does not displace portions of the federal program for 
which EPA has not approved the state program. 
Finally, RCRA establishes EPA oversight authorities over approved 
state programs, authorizing EPA to withdraw its approval of state programs 
and to enforce against violations of permits issued by states with ap- 
proved programs.382 These authorities are in Subchapter III.383 The "Fed- 
eral program" suspended by subsection 3006(b) cannot be the entire Sub- 
chapter I11 itself, for it would not make sense for EPA's approval of a state 
hazardous waste program to suspend the oversight authorities Congress 
RCRA $ 9  4001-4010, 42 U.S.C. $9 6941-6949a (2000). Subchapter IV authorizes 
EPA only to establish standards to be met by solid waste disposal facilities. 
379 RCRA 9 2007, 42 U.S.C. 9 6916 (2000). 
38042 U.S.C. 5 6926(b) (2000) (emphasis added). 
RCRA 9 3006(~)(4),  (g), 42 U.S.C. 9 6926(~)(4),  (g) (2000). This reflects the fact 
that while Congress enacted the full hazardous waste permitting program in 1976, i t  sub- 
stantially amended that program in many details in 1984. States meeting the requirements 
for approval under the 1976 statute could not meet many of the particulars added in 1984, 
requiring both state and EPA action to issue permits meeting all of the statute's amended 
requirements. 
RCRA $5 3006(e)-3008(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. $ 9  6926(e)-6928(a)(l) (2000). 
383 RCRA $5  3001-3019(e), 42 U.S.C. $5  6921-6939(e) (2000). 
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granted EPA for approved state programs. That would render the over- 
sight authorities superfluous, again an interpretation to be avoided.384 On 
the other hand, once EPA approves a state hazardous waste program un- 
der RCRA, there is no need for EPA's own regulations to continue in ef- 
fect, to the extent they impose on the regulated public requirements that 
are now governed by the approved state's hazardous waste regulations. 
Therefore, it is logical to consider the federal regulations to be the "Fed- 
eral program" that is suspended. 
Nevertheless, defendants argue that EPA approval of a state RCRA pro- 
gram suspends all of RCRA, including EPA and citizen enforcement au- 
thorities, because RCRA subsection 3006(b) states that once EPA ap- 
proves a state program, the 
State is authorized to carry out such program in lieu of the Fed- 
eral program under this subchapter in such State and to issue and 
enforce permits for the storage, treatment, or disposal of haz- 
ardous waste . . . . 385 
This provision cannot suspend all of RCRA, however, for its very words 
limit its suspension to the federal program under Subchapter 111. When 
EPA approves only part of a state Subchapter I11 program, it cannot sus- 
pend that part of the federal program for which the partially approved state 
program has no counterpart. Such suspension would eviscerate those fed- 
eral requirements. It cannot suspend the oversight authorities in Subchap- 
ter 111, for they can only operate after EPA approves a state program. It 
makes no sense for it to suspend the EPA enforcement authorities in Sub- 
chapter I11 for violations of approved state programs for the same reasons. 
Defendants reply that the subsection 3006(b) phrase means nothing if it 
does not at least suspend EPA's enforcement authorities. 
For subsection 3006(b) to suspend federal enforcement authorities, ei- 
ther: (1) the federal enforcement authorities must be included in the su- 
perseded "Federal program" or (2) "in lieu of '  must modify "issue and 
enforce permits." Parsing the sentence fragment demonstrates that neither 
of these assertions can be sustained by a grammatical plain reading.386 
384 See supra note 374. 
385 42 U.S.C. fj 6926(b) (2000). 
386 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 323 (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling 
Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992), and United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 
(1988)); see also United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1059 (D. Colo. 
2000) (parsing the sentence fragment). 
The subject of this sentence fragment is the approved "State" and the verb is the pas- 
sive "is authorized." The object is the long conjunctive phrase, composed of two infinitive 
sub-phrases. A more understandable restatement of the sentence fragment is: "the State is 
authorized: ( I )  to carry out its approved program in the State in lieu of the Federal pro- 
gram, and (2) to issue and enforce permits for the storage, treatment, or disposal of haz- 
ardous waste." 
Defendants' first argument is that RCRA's federal enforcement authorities are included 
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The structure and wording of the EPA enforcement sections also 
demonstrate that subsection 3006(b) does not supersede EPA enforcement 
authority. The House Report accompanying RCRA stated that: 
[tlhis section [section 30061 develops a structure under which 
states can plan and implement a state hazardous waste program, 
in lieu of the federal program which is developed and imple- 
mented by the Administrat~r.'~' 
EPA, of course, develops a regulatory program of standards for the regu- 
lated public to comply with, not a statutory program for the enforcement 
of the regulatory provisions. The EPA enforcement provision specifically 
requires EPA to give notice to a state with an approved program before 
commencing civil or administrative enforcement against violations in the 
state.388 This authority would be meaningless if subsection 3006(b) sus- 
pended EPA's enforcement authority when EPA approved a state program. 
The EPA enforcement provision also authorizes EPA to suspend or re- 
voke a permit "issued by the Administrator or a State under this subchap- 
ter."389 EPA could not suspend a permit issued by a state under RCRA 
until EPA had approved the state's program, and it could not do so after 
approval if approval suspended federal statutory authority.390 Congress 
within the superseded "Federal program" in the first infinitive sub-phrase, "to carry out 
such program in lieu of the Federal program . . . ." That reading of the first sub-phrase, 
however, renders the second sub-phrase, "and to issue and enforce permits," redundant and 
without meaning. If the superseded "Federal program" includes permit issuance and en- 
forcement, the second sub-phrase adds nothing to the first. On the other hand, giving full 
force and meaning to the second phrase does not deprive the first phrase of meaning, if the 
state program operating "in lieu o f '  the superseded "federal program," is that set of state 
regulations establishing standards and procedures for permit issuance operating in place of 
EPA regulations doing the same. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 29 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238,6267. 
Defendants' second argument is that "in lieu o f '  modifies "to issue and enforce per- 
mits." But "in lieu o f '  is placed in the middle of the first sub-phrase, behind the introduc- 
tory infinitive. That confines its meaning to the first of the two sub-phrases. To modify the 
second as well as the first infinitive sub-phrase, it should either be placed before both sub- 
phrases or repeated in the second sub-phrase. On the other hand, "in lieu o f '  has meaning 
when it modifies only the first sub-phrase. Thus, as a matter of grammar, the "in lieu o f '  
language in subsection 3006(b) does not suspend federal enforcement authorities when 
EPA approves a state program, but does suspend the EPA regulations that apply to the 
regulated public in the absence of an approved state program. There is no reason to assume 
Congress used tortured grammar, intending "in lieu o f '  to apply to both sub-phrases, be- 
cause the correct grammatical reading applying it only to the first sub-phrase has meaning 
and makes sense. Legislative history supports this conclusion. 
387 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 29 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6267 
(emphasis added). 
388 RCRA 5 3008(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(a)(2) (2000). 
389 RCRA 5 3008(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(a)(3). 
390RCRA subsection 3005(d) contains similar authority, but appears to give EPA au- 
thority only to revoke EPA-issued permits. 42 U.S.C. 5 6925(d) (2000). RCRA 5 3008(a)(3) is 
not redundant because it authorizes EPA to revoke state-issued permits. 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(a) 
(3) (2000). 
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also amended the criminal provisions in section 3008 to clarify its intent 
that federal enforcement authorities continue unimpeded in a state after 
EPA approved the state's hazardous waste regulatory program. As originally 
written in 1980, for instance, subsection 3008(d)(4) made criminal of- 
fenses of various fraudulent actions regarding records that "regulations 
promulgated by the Administrator under this [subtitle]" required the regu- 
lated public to maintain.39' In 1984, Congress amended the subsection to 
expand the offenses by adding the parenthetical phrase ("or by a State in 
the case of an authorized State program") between "Administrator" and 
"under."392 Moreover, it used the same federal and state regulation word- 
ing when it added the new offense of transporting hazardous waste with- 
out a manifest in subsection 3008(d)(5).393 The first two offenses in the 
subsection are treating, storing or disposing of hazardous waste without 
or in violation of a permit "under this [subtitle]," evidencing similar in- 
tent.394 Again, these provisions would be meaningless if subsection 3006(b) 
suspended the federal enforcement provisions when EPA approved a state 
program. 
The conclusion that subsection 3006(b) does not suspend EPA en- 
forcement authority is reinforced by the subsection's failure to suspend 
citizen suit authority when EPA approves a state program. Subsection 3006 
(b) does not suspend citizen suit authority because it only suspends the 
federal program "under this [subtitle]." Subsection 3006(b) is in Sub- 
chapter I11 which does not include the citizen suit provision.395 
These factors lead to the conclusion that RCRA's federal enforce- 
ment authorities are not suspended by EPA's approval of state hazardous 
waste programs. If there is any ambiguity, deference must be given to 
EPA's interpretation of the statute if it is a reasonable one and is embod- 
ied in a r ~ l e m a k i n g . ~ ~ ~  EPA has repeatedly interpreted RCRA in rulemak- 
39' Pub. L. No. 96-482, 9 13, 94 Stat. 2334, 2340 (1980). 
392 Pub. L. No. 98-616, 9 232(a)(3), 98 Stat. 3221, 3257 (1984). Congress also changed 
the wording of subsection 3008(d)(3) to conform to this language. 
393 Id 3 9 4 k ~ ~  $ 5  3008(d)(l), (2), 42 U.S.C. $9 6928(d)(l), (2). Prior to amendment in 
1984, RCRA subsection 3008(d)(l) made it  an offense to transport hazardous waste to a 
facility without a permit "under section 3005 (or section 3006 in the case of a State pro- 
gram)." Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 3008(d)(l), 90 Stat. 2795, 2812 (1976). In 1984, Congress 
shortened that wording to "a permit under this [subtitle]." Pub. L. No. 98-616, 9 232(a)(l), 
98 Stat. 3221, 3256 (1984). It used the same shortened phrase in  the new subsection 
3008(d)(2), making it an offense to treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste without or in 
violation of a "permit under this [subtitle]." Pub. L. No. 98-616, Q 232(a)(2), 98 Stat. 3221, 
3256 (1984). Unired Stares v. MacDonald & Warson Wasre Oil Co. rejected the contention 
that when Congress dropped the reference to state-issued permits in  subsection 3008(a)(l), 
i t  decriminalized the action in states with approved programs. 933 F.2d 35, 44-45 (1st Cir. 
1991). 
39542 U.S.C. 9 6926(b) (2000). Subchapter VII contains the citizen suit provision. 
RCRA 9 7002,42 U.S.C. Q 6972 (2000). 
396 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). 
Because EPA's interpretation is embodied in its rulemakings, deference under Chevron 
survives United Stares v. Mead Co.,  533 U.S. 218 (2001). For examples of judicial defer- 
Heinonline - -  29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 87 2005 
8 8 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 29 
ings to continue EPA enforcement authority after it has approved the state 
programs.397 EPA has also repeatedly interpreted RCRA in formal adjudi- 
cations to continue EPA enforcement authority after it has approved state 
programs.398 
Not surprisingly, courts universally hold that when EPA approves a 
state hazardous waste program, subsection 3006(b) suspends operation of 
the "Federal program."399 Also, most courts considering the question have 
held that EPA's approval of the state program does not suspend EPA and 
citizen enforcement authorities over violations of the approved state pro- 
gram.400 Most courts have held that the wording and structure of the stat- 
ence to EPA's interpretation that RCRA's federal enforcement authorities-both of EPA 
and citizens-operate in states with approved programs as well as in other states, see 
United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2001). and Wyckoff Co. v. EPA, 796 
F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1986). 
397 40 C.F.R. 5 271.16(~) (2004) provides that penalties assessed by states for viola- 
tions of approved RCRA programs be "appropriate to the violation," and, in a note to the 
subsection, EPA warns that it  may commence an enforcement action for additional penal- 
ties when it believes the state has assessed inadequate penalties. In 40 C.F.R. § 271.19(e) 
(2004), EPA notes it may take action to suspend violated state-issued permits under RCRA 
subsection 3008(a)(3). In approving the Idaho RCRA program, EPA stated that it "retains 
the authority under [section 30081 of RCRA to undertake enforcement actions in author- 
ized States" and that, for such actions, it "will rely on Federal sanctions, Federal inspec- 
tions authorities . . . rather than the authorized State analog." Hazardous Waste Manage- 
ment Program Codification of Approved State Hazardous Waste Program for Idaho, 55 
Fed. Reg. 50,327, 50,327-28 (Dec. 6, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 272). quoted in 
Elias, 269 F.3d at 1010 n. 14. In approving the Texas program, EPA reiterated its interpreta- 
tion that both EPA and citizen suit enforcement authorities survived approval of the state 
program. See Texas; Decision on Final Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Manage- 
ment Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,300, 48,304 (Dec. 12, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
271), quoted in Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 258, 261-62 (M.D. Pa. 1989). EPA 
also used similar language in approving Colorado's program. See Texas; Final Authoriza- 
tion of State Hazardous Waste Management Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 41,036, 41,037 (Oct. 
19, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 27 I), quoted in United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 
10 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (D. Colo. 1998), aff'd on other grounds, 191 F.3d 1224, 1229 
(10th Cir. 1999). 
398 Bil-Dry Corp., 9 E.A.D. 575 (2001); Gordon Redd Lumber Co., 5 E.A.D. 301, 308 
(1994); S. Timber Prod., lnc. 3 E.A.D. 371, 378 (1990); Martin Elecs., 2 E.A.D. 381, 385 
(1987). 
399 Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999); AM Int'l, Inc. v. 
Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342, 1350 (7th Cir. 1997); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 
F.2d 1343, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); United 
States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Power 
Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo. 2000), aff'd, 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2000); 
Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1039-40 (E.D. Tex. 1995); 
Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33,43 (D. Me. 1994); Orange Env't, Inc. v. 
County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Clorox Co. v. Chromium 
Corp., 158 F.R.D. 120, 123-24 (N.D. Ill. 1994); City of Heath v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F. 
Supp. 971, 979 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 
953, 958-59 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 258, 261 (M.D. Pa. 
1989); Williamsburg-Around-the-Bridge Block Ass'n v. Jorling, No. 98-CV-47 1, 1989 WL 
98631 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1989); Thompson v. Thomas, 680 F. Supp. 1.3 (D.D.C. 1987). 
4WElias, 269 F.3d at 1003; Power Eng'g Co., 191 F.3d at 1229; Ashoff v. City of 
Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 41 1 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 
F.3d 1361 (5th Cir. 1996); MacDonald & Warson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d at 35; Wyckoff 
Co., 796 F.2d at 2000-01; United States v. Flanagan, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1286-90 (C.D. 
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Ute indicate the approved state "program" operating in lieu of the federal 
program is the set of state regulations establishing requirements and stan- 
dards applicable to the regulated public handling hazardous waste and, 
correspondingly, the federal "program" that is suspended by the approval 
of the state program is not RCRA itself, but the set of EPA regulations 
promulgated under Subchapter I11 to do the same.401 The courts have not 
defined the superseded Subchapter I11 regulations with any precision, but 
the logic of the decisions leads to the conclusion that EPA approval of a 
state hazardous waste permit program does not suspend all EPA Sub- 
chapter I11 regulations. Several types of federal Subchapter I11 regula- 
tions cannot be suspended. First, Subchapter I11 charges EPA and other 
federal agencies with some responsibilities that continue after EPA ap- 
proves state programs.402 Second, Congress authorized EPA to approve 
only part of the state's RCRA hazardous waste program when it meets 
some but not all of the federal  requirement^.^^' When EPA does so, the fed- 
eral regulations corresponding to the approved portions of the state pro- 
gram are suspended, but the remainder of the federal regulations continue 
to operate.404 Third, federal RCRA regulations relating to EPA oversight 
of approved state programs cannot be suspended, for the statute author- 
izes oversight of approved permit programs, which can begin only after 
they are approved. Of course, the conclusion that regulated entities can- 
not violate federal regulations when EPA has approved a comparable state 
program is little help to violators if EPA and citizens can enforce against 
violations of the approved state regulations, a question that is considered 
in the next Section. 
Cal. 2000); L.E.A.D. v. Exide Corp., No. CIV. 96-3030, 1999 WL 124473 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 
19, 1999); Glazer, 894 F. Supp. at 1029; Acme Printing Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 
1237, 1244 (E.D. Wisc. 1995); Clorox Co. ,  158 F.R.D. at 124; Murray, 867 F. Supp. at 33; 
Coalition for Health Concern, 834 F. Supp. 953, 958-59 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Sierra Club v. 
Chem. Handling Corp., 824 F. Supp. 195, 197 (D. Colo. 1993); Lutz, 725 F. Supp. at 261. 
40' Elias, 269 F.3d at 1012; AM Int'l, Inc., 106 F.3d at 1350; Power Eng'g Co.,  125 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1059-60; Orange Env't, bzc., 860 F. Supp. at 1020-21; Coalition for Health 
Concern, 834 F. Supp. at 958-59; Clorox Co. ,  158 F.R.D. at 123. 
40'For instance, RCRA section 3017 charges EPA with the responsibility to control the 
export of hazardous waste, a responsibility that is peculiarly federal since it  involves for- 
eign relations and working with the Secretary of State. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (2000). RCRA 
subsection 3016(a) requires all federal agencies to report to EPA every two years the in- 
ventory of sites on which they treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste, and section 3021 
requires the Department of Energy to make a series of reports with regard to its generation 
and disposition of mixed hazardous and radioactive waste. 42 U.S.C. $ 5  6937(a), 6939c 
(2000). 
403This seeming anomaly came about because states with approved programs met 
RCRA's requirements as it was enacted in 1976, but not as it was amended substantially in 
1984, prompting Congress to authorize the continued operation of the pre-1984 portion of 
RCRA by states with already approved programs and the operation of the post-1984 por- 
tions of the program by EPA until it approves new parts of the state's program developed 
to meet the new federal requirements. See RCRA 5 3006(g), 42 U.S.C. 6926(g) (2000). 
4c4 See Murray, 867 F. Supp. at 43; City of Heath, 834 F. Supp. at 979. 
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A few courts have concluded that the approved state programs super- 
sede all of RCRA or all of Subchapter 111, as well as EPA's implementing 
regulations.405 They have done so with little analysis. The decisions are 
wrong, for the reasons discussed above. The most considered opinion in 
this respect is Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Harmon is usually 
cited as an "overfiling" decision, holding that EPA may not enforce against a 
RCRA violation once a state has done so,407 an issue discussed below.408 
The opinion, however, initially concludes that the "in lieu of '  language "re- 
veals a congressional intent for an authorized state program to supplant 
the federal hazardous waste program in all respects including enforce- 
ment."409 " [I]n all respects," of course, includes the statute and its EPA 
enforcement provisions, as well as the regulations. The court admits, how- 
ever, that the "in lieu o f '  language "refers to the program itself," rather 
than to enforcement, but finds federal enforcement to be superseded because 
"the administration and enforcement of the program are inexorably inter- 
twined," without explaining what that means.410 The court later admits 
that EPA may enforce against a violation of an EPA approved state program 
under subsection 3008(a)(2) if EPA gives the state prior notice and the 
state fails to e n f ~ r c e . ~ "  However, administration and enforcement do not 
appear any less "inexorably intertwined" in that circumstance. 
The only support the Harmon court provides for its initial conclu- 
sion that approval of the state program suspends the federal statute as 
well as the federal regulations is that, under subsection 3006(b), EPA may 
revoke its approval of a state's program if the state fails to enforce it ade- 
quately. This, it concludes, confirms that states "have the primary role of 
enforcing their own hazardous waste pr~gram."~" This is a non sequitur. 
The court then "harmonizes" EPA's program revocation authority in sub- 
section 3006(e) with the requirement of subsection 3008(a)(2) that EPA 
notify a state with an approved program before taking enforcement ac- 
405 Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999); Dague v. City of 
Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1353 (1st Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds 505 U.S. 557 
(1992); Pape v. Menominee Paper Co., 91 1 F. Supp. 273, 276 (W.D. Mich. 1994); Wil- 
liamsburg-Around-the-Bridge Block Ass'n v. Jorling, No. 89-CV-47 l ,  1989 WL 9863 l ,  at 
*3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1989). 
191 F.3d at 894. 
 indee deed, courts seeking an easy way to distinguish it as not applying to the issue at 
hand comment that it is only an overfiling decision, addressing not whether but when EPA 
may enforce in a state with an approved program. United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 
101 1-12 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Flanagan, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 (C.D. Cal. 
2000) (explaining that Harmon "is not about if, but about when, the United States can 
bring a civil action in federal court after it has authorized a state program."). 
See infra Part 1II.C. 
409 191 F.3d at 899 (emphasis added). 
410 Id. Subsection 3006(b) does not actually mention "administration." 
This is an erroneous reading of subsection 3008(a)(2) which requires EPA to give 
notice to the state in these circumstances, but does not bar EPA from enforcing if the state 
enforces. 
412 191 F.3d at 899. 
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tion, concluding that EPA may take enforcement action in a state with an 
approved program only if EPA has withdrawn its approval of the state 
program or the state has failed to enforce. The court's conclusions are 
internally inconsistent, incomplete, and incorrect. 
First, the decision is internally inconsistent. In the same paragraph it 
concludes both that an "authorized state program . . . supplant[s] the fed- 
eral hazardous waste program in all respects including enforcement," and 
that EPA also may enforce against a violation of an approved state re- 
quirement if EPA first gives the state notice and the opportunity to en- 
force against the violation and the state fails to do s ~ . ~ "  It later concludes 
that EPA may enforce if it first revokes its approval of the state pro- 
These two exceptions to the court's assumption that EPA has no 
enforcement authority in a state with an approved program subsequently 
recur in its contention that EPA has no authority to "overfile" once the 
state has commenced an enforcement action. This Article subsequently con- 
siders the two exceptions in that 
Second, the decision is incomplete. It "harmonizes" its conclusion 
with the authorization in subsection 3008(a)(2) for EPA to enforce against 
violations in such a state, but fails to recognize that subsection 3008(a)(3), 
(c), and (d) also authorize EPA to enforce against violations in states with 
approved programs and to reconcile those authorities with its conclusion. 
Furthermore, the decision is incorrect. Its "harmonization," that EPA 
has enforcement authority if the state fails to enforce, reads the prior no- 
tice requirement of subsection 3008(a)(2) as if it were a three-element 
notice, delay and bar preclusion device, whereas the device includes only 
the notice element. Its "harmonization" that EPA has no enforcement 
authority if it first withdraws its approval of the state's program reads some- 
thing into the statute that simply is not there. There are fatal problems with 
these harmonization arguments that the court did not recognize. These are 
explored subsequently.416 
The decision did not recognize the pattern Congress developed in the 
environmental statutes of varying the strength of the preclusion device in 
EPA and citizen enforcement provisions in accordance with the balance 
Congress intended to strike between federal and state authorities. If Con- 
gress had intended a different balance in RCRA subsection 3008(a)(2), it 
would have included either or both of the delay or bar elements as it did 
in RCRA subsection 7002(b) and in other environmental statutes or it 
would have given EPA limited enforcement authority as it did in RCRA 
subsection 4 0 0 5 ( ~ ) . ~ ~ '  The government does not appear to have made this 
argument. It did, however, make the lesser argument that Congress's in- 
413 Id. (emphasis added). 
414 Id. 
415 See infra Part 1II.C. 
416  See infra Part 1II.C. 
4 ' 7  See supra Parts I.B. 1-2. 
Heinonline - -  29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 91 2005 
92 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 29 
clusion of the notice, delay and bar in RCRA's citizen suit preclusion device, 
subsection 7002(b), and its omission of the delay and bar in subsection 
3008(a)(2) preclusion device is evidence it intended not to include them 
in section 3008. The court dismissed this by stating that the "mere fact 
that Congress did not choose to employ the exact same language as con- 
tained in an unrelated part of the act" had no bearing on the interpretation 
of subsection 3008(a)(2).418 The two sections, of course, are not unrelated. 
They both authorize federal enforcement of RCRA: section 3008 author- 
izes enforcement by EPA and section 7002 authorizes enforcement by 
citizens acting in EPA's stead as private attorneys general. Section 7002 
cross-references section 3008, authorizing courts to assess section 3008 
civil penalties in citizen suits. The preclusions in the two sections are 
part of the same grand pattern of preclusion devices Congress developed 
in the EPA and citizen enforcement authorities in all the environmental 
statutes. The court did not recognize that its interpretation of the statute 
would leave citizen enforcers with considerably greater authority than 
EPA to enforce against violations in states with approved programs. Un- 
der the Court's theory, EPA approval of a state program suspends Subchap- 
ter I11 statutory authority, which includes EPA but not citizen enforce- 
ment authority. In short, the court substituted its preferred balance between 
EPA and state enforcement authority for the balance that Congress intended 
and wrote into the statute. 
The court makes one last attempt to justify its conclusions with leg- 
islative history. It quotes three passages from the House Report accom- 
panying the 1976 enactment of RCRA. The first two are to the effect that 
states with approved programs have "primary enforcement authority" and 
may "take the lead in the enforcement."419 These observations are com- 
patible with EPA retaining the power to enforce after a state's program is 
approved. Indeed, they imply that EPA has at least a secondary enforce- 
ment role in states with approved programs. The final House Report pas- 
sage the court cites states, "EPA 'after giving the appropriate notice to a 
state that is authorized to implement the state hazardous waste program, 
that violations of this Act are occurring and the state [is] failing to take 
action against such violations, is authorized to take appropriate action 
against those persons in such state."'420 This passage does not mention a 
delay period for the state to take action and it does not assert that EPA is 
barred from taking an enforcement action if the state has done so. In dis- 
cussing subsection 3008(a)(2), the Committee report merely stated that 
before taking an enforcement action in a state with an approved program, 
EPA "must give notice to the state 30 days prior to" enforcing.421 Again, 
418 19 1 F.3d at 900. 
419  Id. at 901. 
420 Id. 
42' Indeed, this passage does not occur in  the Committee's discussion of section 3008, 
but rather in its discussion of section 3006. H. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 31 (1976), reprinted in 
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this is no support for the court's conclusion that EPA's enforcement au- 
thority is displaced by its approval of a state program. In fact, the pas- 
sage supports the conclusion that EPA retains its enforcement authority 
after approving a state program. In any event, the history of what Congress 
actually did indicates that Congress intended for EPA to enforce against 
violations in a state with an approved program. 
The Harmon court is wrong: EPA's approval of a state hazardous 
waste program does not suspend operation of the federal RCRA in the 
state any more than its approval of a CAA or CWA permitting program sus- 
pends operation of the CAA and CWA in the state. The same result ap- 
pears to follow under RCRA Subchapter IV, governing non-hazardous 
solid waste. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit held in Ashoff v. City of Ukiah422 
that citizens could enforce against federal criteria for sanitary landfills re- 
gardless of whether EPA had approved a state's solid waste landfill pro- 
gram.423 
B. May EPA and Citizens Enforce State Law After EPA Approves a 
State Program? 
The second argument that defendants use to infer preclusions against 
EPA enforcement is that once a state program has been approved, neither 
EPA nor citizens may enforce the approved state law. As discussed above, 
EPA's approval of a state program does not suspend operation of the fed- 
eral statute or its enforcement authorities in the state. Nevertheless, the 
requirements governing the behavior of the regulated public at that point 
may be state regulations or state permits. Defendants argue that EPA and 
citizens cannot use federal enforcement authorities to enforce against 
violations of state law. There are three approaches to addressing this as- 
sertion. One is that EPA's approval of a state program "federalizes" it, so 
that the approved state law becomes federal law. Another is that the fed- 
eral statutes make violations of the approved state law violations of fed- 
eral law, without resort to the concept of "federalizing" state law. The 
final approach is that the federal enforcement provisions authorize enforce- 
ment against violations of approved state programs. 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238,6269. 
422 130 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 1997). 
423 The decision seems to enunciate the theory that upon EPA approval of the state 
program, it "becomes effective" under RCRA and therefore enforceable under it. Id. at 
41 1-12. The court, however, held that if the approved state program has a requirement that 
is more stringent than the federal criteria, the citizen may only enforce to the limits of the 
federal criteria. Id. at 413. See infra Part 1II.D. for a discussion of this issue. It also cites 
RCRA subsection 4005(a), authorizing citizens to enforce against violations of the federal 
criteria, "even after EPA has approved a state program." 130 F.3d at 41 1 n.3. Although 
subsection 4005(a) does not contain the quoted language, that is the import of the subsec- 
tion, which prohibits "open dumping" except under a schedule for compliance established 
by states with approved programs. "Open dumps" are landfills not meeting the federal 
criteria for sanitary landfills. RCRA 5 4005(a), 42 U.S.C. 5 6945(a) (2000). 
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The first approach, as noted above, considers a federally approved 
state program to be federal law, at least for the purposes of federal en- 
forcement provisions. The idea is articulated in a number of judicial de- 
cisions in various contexts,424 though the statutes do not explicitly incor- 
porate this "federalization" concept. Perhaps the courts embrace it as short- 
hand for a combination of the latter two approaches. It has been suggested 
that the Supreme Court rejected the "federalization" concept in United 
States Department of Energy v. Ohio,425 but the Court in that case was 
interpreting specific wording in an unrelated part of the statute426 in the 
context of a waiver of sovereign immunity.427 Waivers of sovereign im- 
munity are interpreted narrowly under their own set of doctrine and prece- 
d e n t ~ . ~ ~ ~  Regardless, the concept of federalization is sufficiently amorphous 
to encourage looking elsewhere for justification of federal enforcement 
against violations of approved state programs. 
The second approach, that the federal statutes make violations of the 
approved state law violations of federal law without "federalizing" the state 
law, flows from the structures of the statutes. The CWA, CAA and RCRA 
prohibit air and water pollution or the treatment, storage and disposal of 
hazardous waste except in compliance with a permit issued by EPA or a 
state with an approved program. These prohibitions make the specified 
actions illegal regardless of whether they occur in states with approved pro- 
grams. In essence, in states with approved programs, the prohibitions 
make violations of a permit issued under EPA-approved state law also 
violations of federal law. The basic prohibition of CWA subsection 301(a), 
for instance, makes it illegal to discharge a pollutant "[elxcept as in 
compliance with" various sections, including the permitting section.429 
Subsection 402(k), in the permitting section, provides that compliance 
with a permit "issued pursuant to this section" is deemed compliance with 
section 301 for the purposes of EPA and citizen enforcement provisions.430 
424 See La. Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (re- 
viewing regulations delegating CAA section 1 12 implementation authority to states). 
425 503 U.S. 607 (1992). The defendant in United States v. Flanagan made this argu- 
ment, but the court rejected it. 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see also 
United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1012 n.29 (9th Cir. 2001). 
426 503 U.S. at 609 (interpreting "arising under Federal Law" in CWA section 313, 33 
U.S.C. 1323 (2000)). 
427 United States Dep't of Energy, 503 U.S. at 615. 
428 There is a long history of attempts by Congress to waive the sovereign immunity of 
federal facilities in order to make them subject to federal and state environmental laws and 
to allow citizens and states to enforce them. The Court has found one attempt after another 
not explicit enough to accomplish a full waiver. Id. at 607 (holding that RCRA section 601 
and CWA section 313 do not waive sovereign immunity for assessment of federal or state 
civil penalty); EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) 
(holding that CWA section 313 did not waive sovereign immunity for state water permit- 
ting requirements); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (holding that CAA § 118 did 
not waive sovereign immunity for state air pollution permitting fee requirements). 
429 33 U.S.C. 13 I l (a) (2000). 
430 33 U.S.C. 1342(k) (2000). 
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Section 402 governs EPA's approval of state permit programs as well as 
the requirements of permits, whether issued by EPA or a state with an ap- 
proved program. Therefore, permits issued either by EPA or  states with 
approved programs are "issued pursuant to7' section 402. If permits is- 
sued by states with approved programs were not "issued pursuant to" sec- 
tion 402, compliance with those permits would not immunize their hold- 
ers from suit for violating subsection 301(a). 
Similarly, CAA subsection 502(a) prohibits violation of a permit "is- 
sued under this subchapter," a subchapter that authorizes EPA both to ap- 
prove state permit programs meeting the federal criteria and to issue per- 
mits in states without approved programs.43' RCRA subsection 3005(a) 
prohibits the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste "except in 
accordance" with a RCRA permit "issued pursuant to this Sec- 
tion 3005 also authorizes EPA and states with programs approved by EPA 
under RCRA section 3006 to issue permits.433 Section 3006 governs state 
programs "pursuant to this s u b ~ h a p t e r . " ~ ~ ~  RCRA subsection 3008(a) au- 
thorizes EPA to enforce against violations of "this subchapter," which 
includes subsection 3005(a) and its prohibition.435 Thus, all three statutes 
make it illegal to undertake the proscribed actions except in compliance 
with a permit issued by EPA or by a state with an approved program. Fed- 
eral statutes making violations of state law also violations of federal law 
have been upheld in other contexts as 
The third approach, that federal enforcement provisions authorize 
enforcement against violations of approved state programs, flows from 
the structures of the statutes' enforcement provisions. The EPA enforce- 
ment provisions of all three statutes authorize EPA to enforce against viola- 
tions in states with approved programs. CWA subsections 309(a)(l) and 
(3) authorize EPA to enforce civilly and administratively against viola- 
tions of "a permit issued by a State under an approved permit program," 
and subsection 309(c) makes such negligent and knowing violations crimi- 
nal offenses.437 CAA subsection 113(a) authorizes EPA to enforce civilly 
and administratively against violations of "an applicable implementation 
plan or permit," and subsection 113(c) makes such knowing violations 
criminal offenses.438 RCRA subsection 3008(d) authorizes EPA to enforce 
civilly and administratively against "a violation of any requirement of this 
subchapter," and subsection 3008(c) makes knowing violations criminal 
43' 42 U.S.C. 5  7661a(a) (2000). 
432 42 U.S.C. 5  6925(a) (2000). 
433 42 U.S.C. 5 5  6925(c), 6926 (2000). 
434 42 U.S.C. 5  6926(c). 
435 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(a) (2000). 
436 The Lacey Act, for instance, makes it a federal offense to violate specified state 
laws regulating fish and wildlife. 16 U.S.C. 5  3372 (2000); see also United States v. Bry- 
ant, 7 16 F.2d 1091, 1093 (6th Cir. 1983). 
437 33 U.S.C. 5  1319(a)(l), (a)(3), (c) (2000). 
43s 42 U.S.C. 5  741 3(a), (c) (2000). 
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offenses in states with approved programs.439 While it could be argued 
that a "violation of this subchapter" means only violations of federal 
regulations to the extent they are not superseded by approved state pro- 
grams, subsection 3008(a)(2) requires EPA to give notice to a state with an 
approved program before undertaking civil or administrative enforcement 
against violations in the state. If EPA cannot enforce in such states, that 
paragraph would be superfluous. Moreover, subsections 3008(a)(3) and 
(c) authorize EPA to issue administrative orders to revoke a violator's per- 
mit, whether issued by EPA or by a state, again authorizing EPA to en- 
force in states with approved programs, as only states with approved pro- 
grams may issue permits under the statute. Moreover, subsection 3005(d) 
gives EPA authority to suspend or revoke violators' permits where EPA is 
administering the program, making the permit suspension and revocation 
authorities in subsections 3008(a)(3) and (c) superfluous unless they in- 
clude the authority to suspend or revoke state-issued permits. Several of 
the RCRA criminal offenses also specifically include violations of regu- 
lations promulgated by states with approved programs,440 provisions that 
also would be superfluous if EPA could not enforce state requirements 
that operate in lieu of the federal program after EPA approves a state pro- 
gram. The citizen suit provisions of all three statutes also authorize citi- 
zen enforcement against violations of the statutes regardless of whether 
they are administered by EPA or states.44' Thus, all three statutes specifically 
authorize federal enforcement in states with approved programs. 
C. May EPA Enforce Against a Violation of an Approved State Program 
When the State Has Already Enforced Against the Violation, i.e., 
May EPA "Over-le?" 
The question addressed in this Section is whether the statutes preclude 
EPA from enforcing against a violation that the state has already en- 
forced against (commonly known as " ~ v e r f i l i n g " ) . ~ ~  
In statutes or parts of statutes where Congress was most deferential 
to state administration and enforcement, it either entirely withheld enforce- 
ment authority from EPA, or used the preclusion device with all three ele- 
439 42 U.S.C. 8 6928(a), (d). 
"' RCRA 5 3008(d)(3)-(5), 42 U.S.C. 8 6928(d)(3)-(5). 
"' CWA subsection 505(a) authorizes suit against violations of "an effluent standard or 
limitation," and subsection 505(f) defines that term to include violations of section 301 or 
of permits "issued under" section 402. 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a), (f) (2000). As discussed above 
in this section, these include discharges without or violating permits issued by either EPA 
or a state with an approved program. 
"2 The related question of whether common law doctrines may preclude such succes- 
sive action though its answer may be affected by the statutory question, is not addressed 
here. If the statutes preclude overfiling, the common law preclusions are irrelevant. On the 
other hand, if the statutes explicitly permit overfiling, they may override common law pre- 
clusions. 
Heinonline - -  29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 96 2005 
20051 Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions 97 
ments to bar EPA enforcement if the state had already taken "appropri- 
ate" enforcement action. Congress used the preclusion device with all 
three elements in the citizen suit provisions of all of the statutes, but never 
precluded all successive citizen actions.443 In most statutes or parts of stat- 
utes, Congress used the preclusion device in EPA enforcement provisions 
with only one or two elements. In a few statutes, it created no role for 
state implementation and did not use any form of the preclusion device in 
the EPA enforcement provisions. 
Congress's constant and varying use of the preclusion device unmis- 
takably demonstrates that it explicitly addressed overfiling in the EPA and 
citizen enforcement provisions, precluding or limiting overfiling in them 
when it intended and allowing overfiling when it intended. 
The presence of a limited preclusion device in an EPA enforcement 
provision demonstrates congressional intent to limit overfiling but not bar 
it altogether. The particular wording of the preclusion device in each pro- 
vision demonstrates the "precise conditions" of preclusion Congress in- 
tended to operate under that provision.444 The absence of the preclusion de- 
vice in an EPA enforcement provision demonstrates Congress intended 
not to limit overfiling. This is perhaps most evident in EPA enforcement 
provisions where Congress precluded or limited EPA overfiling against 
some types of violations, but not others.445 
Not surprisingly, EPA interprets the statutes to give it overfiling au- 
thority, except where clearly precluded or limited by a particular statute.446 
At the same time, EPA is cognizant of the prerogatives of the states and 
the implicit criticism of the state's enforcement that overfiling imp lie^.^' 
EPA seeks to avoid controversies with states by encouraging them to un- 
dertake more aggressive enforcement so that EPA need not consider over- 
filing or by declining to overfile where the state action is marginally ef- 
fective although not as aggressive as EPA action would be.44a 
443 See Miller, supra note 1, at 416-20. Under CWA section 505, for instance, Con- 
gress did not preclude citizens from suing if the government did not act first, did not en- 
force judicially to seek compliance and did not prosecute vigorously to secure compliance. 
M4 Cal. Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. City of Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792, 801 
(E.D. Cal. 1995). 
445 This is particularly pronounced in CWA section 309. Congress specifically pre- 
cluded EPA from overfiling under the CWA for penalties when the state had assessed pen- 
alties for the same violation, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (2000). and from overfiling if EPA 
chose to issue a notice of violation to the state at the onset of EPA action and the state 
commenced an "appropriate enforcement action." 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(l). Congress did 
not preclude EPA from overfiling under any other circumstances in the section. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 13 19(a)(3). 
4J6 See supra notes 442-443 and accompanying text; infra notes 4 5 8 4 6 7  and accom- 
panying text. 
447 Indeed, it has a number of policy documents restricting the instances in which it 
will overfile and requiring its regional offices to enter into memoranda of understanding 
with states to coordinate their enforcement efforts, with the objective, among other things, 
to minimize overfiling. See infra notes 468472;  supra note 10. 
The most extensive commentary on the issue investigated the frequency of EPA 
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Except under RCRA, there are few reported decisions on overfiling, 
perhaps because defendants recognize that the statutes grant EPA overfiling 
authority and because EPA avoids overfiling in many cases.M9 Not sur- 
prisingly, in cases where overfiling has been challenged, courts have had 
little trouble holding that the statutes authorize EPA to o ~ e r f i l e . ~ ~ ~  
Under RCRA, however, the issue is more clouded by the congressional 
declarations in the state program approval provision that an approved state 
program operates "in lieu of '  the federal program and that the actions of 
an approved state have the "same force and effect" as actions by EPA.4" 
These declarations led the Eight Circuit to hold in Harmon Industries, 
Inc. v. Browner that EPA did not have authority to overfile under RCRA.452 
As discussed above, the opinion also contains contradictory conclusions 
on whether the "in lieu o f '  language suspends federal enforcement au- 
thority when EPA approves a state program.453 
The Harmon court held that if. EPA may enforce in a state with an ap- 
proved program when the state takes no action, the "same force and ef- 
fect" language precludes EPA from enforcing when the state takes an en- 
forcement action. Its analysis depends entirely on its contention that the 
"same force and effect" language in subsection 3006(d) covers enforce- 
ment actions by the state, although the heading of the subsection is "Ef- 
fect of State  errn nit.""^ If that heading has any meaning, it can only be 
that the state's action in issuing a permit has the same force and effect as 
EPA's action in issuing a federal permit. The court's interpretation of the 
subsection renders the heading meaningless, an interpretation to be 
avoided.455 In an earlier era when printers added section and subsection 
headings to congressionally written statutory text, it made sense to disre- 
gard headings as a meaningful part of the statute. Here, however, because 
Congress wrote the "Effect of State permit" heading and enacted it as 
overfiling and found it to be very infrequent. Ellen R. Zahren, Overfiling Under Federal- 
ism: Federal Nipping at State Heels to Protect the Environment, 49 EMORY L.J. 373, 375 
n.18 (2000) (noting the testimony of an assistant administrator before a Congressional 
Committee that EPA overfiled in only a handful of cases a year); see also Joel A. Mintz, 
Enforcement "Overfiling" in the Federal Courts: Some Thoughts on the Post-Harmon 
Cases, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 425,427 (2003). 
M9 See infra notes 468-472; supra note 10. 
450United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2001) (RCRA); United 
States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. 191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 1999) (CWA); S. Ohio Coal Co. v. 
Office of Surface Mining, 20 F.3d 1418 (1994) (CWA); United States v. 1TT Rayonier, 
Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1980) (CWA); United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 
143 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (CAA); United States v. LTV Steel Co., Inc., 118 
F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (CAA); United States v. City of Youngstown, 109 F. 
Supp. 2d 739, 741 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (CWA); United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 
41 1 (D. Md. 1985) (CAA); United States v. Harford Sands, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 
1983) (CAA); United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 741-42 (D. Del. 1981) (CWA). 
451 RCRA 5 3006(b), (d), 42 U.S.C. 5 6926(b), (d)(2000). 
452 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999). 
453 See supra Part 1II.B. 
4"42 U.S.C. 5 6926(d). 
455 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 324. 
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part of the statute, it is entitled to consideration when interpreting the mean- 
ing of the subsection.456 An often-cited precedent suggests ~therwise,''~' 
but it is easily d i s t i n g u i ~ h e d . ~ ~ ~  
The Harmon court found support for its conclusion in RCRA sub- 
section 3006(e), authorizing EPA to withdraw its approval of a state pro- 
gram if EPA determines the state is "not administering and enforcing" the 
program "in accordance with the requirements o f '  the section.459 The court 
evidently believed this provision was the remedy Congress intended EPA 
to use when a state enforced against a violation, but did so inadequately. 
Thus, the court concluded that EPA could enforce in a state with an ap- 
proved program only if the state "took no action" or if EPA first with- 
drew its approval of the state program.460 
The court may have thought this an optimal solution, assuring ade- 
quate enforcement of RCRA, while preserving the supremacy of the state 
in administering and enforcing its approved program. Unfortunately, it 
preserves state supremacy but does not assure adequate enforcement. Under 
the court's analysis, as long as the state takes some enforcement action, 
EPA can take no enforcement action unless it revokes its approval of the 
state program.46' The court did not recognize that this leaves several holes 
456 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 3 47.14 (5th ed. 
1992). 
457 Bd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519,526-29 (1947). 
458 While the section heading in the Trainmen statute and the subsection heading in 
subsection 3006(d) both appear to narrow the following text, they have nothing else in 
common. The Court in Trainmen interpreted one of seventeen subsections in a section of 
the Interstate Commerce Act entitled "Commission procedure; delegation of duties; rehear- 
ings." Id. at 527. One of those subsections dealt with intervention. Read alone, the subsec- 
tion applied to intervention both in administrative proceedings before the Commission and 
in judicial proceedings in which the Commission was a party. The appellees contended that 
the section heading limited the reach of the intervention subsection to administrative pro- 
ceedings before the Commission. Id. The Court disagreed, reasoning that: the section was a 
long and complicated collection of many authorities; the section heading was nothing more 
than an incomplete summary of its contents; several of the subsections included authorities 
beyond administrative proceedings before the Commission; and the intervention subsection 
was one of a number of latter-day amendments to the section. Id. at 527-28. Moreover, the 
Court cited legislative history demonstrating Congress was aware that some of the subsec- 
tions did not deal with administrative procedures, making clear that it did not intend the 
section heading to narrow any of the subsection authorities to only administrative proceed- 
ings. Id. at 528': 
The relationship between subsection 3006(d) and its heading is entirely different. It is 
not a section heading followed by seventeen disparate subsections. It is a subsection head- 
ing followed by a thirty-one word, single sentence subsection. In Trainmen, the administra- 
tive proceeding description in the section heading referred to much of the section, but not 
all of it, and in particular not to the intervention subsection. In subsection 3006(d), the 
subsection heading can refer only to the sentence that follows it. Congress wrote "[elffect 
of State permit" to have some meaning. The only meaning it could have is that the state 
actions in the subsection that have the same effect of federal actions are permit actions. 
Nothing in the legislative history of subsection 3006(d) suggests otherwise. Neither the 
reasoning nor the facts of Trainmen suggest a contrary interpretation. 
459 42 U.S.C. $ 5  6901-6992k (2000). 
4" See supra Part 1II.B. 
46' "If the state fails to initiate any action, then the EPA may institute it own action." 
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in the compliance/enforcement net. First, the court held that if the state 
took any action against a violator, it would bar all EPA enforcement against 
the same violator.462 In other words, state enforcement against one viola- 
tion by a defendant would foreclose EPA from enforcing against entirely 
different violations by that defendant, perhaps even at different facilities. 
Worse, if the state issued an administrative order deferring compliance 
indefinitely, reducing the substantive requirements with which the viola- 
tor must comply, or simply penalizing a continuing violation at one dol- 
lar a day, such actions would foreclose EPA from ever seeking compli- 
ance. This, of course, would enable the state to shield RCRA violators from 
EPA enforcement and from compliance with RCRA. Carried to an ex- 
treme, it could allow a state to render RCRA inoperative within its borders. 
The court would likely reply that Congress gave EPA a remedy for 
that eventuality: revocation of EPA's approval of the state program. Yet 
the court did not fully consider the nature of revocation of state program 
approval. Revocation of a state's program is a shotgun rather than a ra- 
pier remedy in the context of federalism. Revocation of program approval 
would run counter to the Congressional preference for state implementa- 
tion of the program. Worse, from EPA's perspective, it would require an 
immediate injection of federal personnel to conduct implementation tasks 
previously performed by state personnel. It is the sort of remedy that EPA 
would use only if it was clear the state was incapable of administering or 
was systematically undercutting the program. The rapier remedy of EPA 
overfiling is much less disruptive. Moreover, the only court considering 
this issue, albeit under the CWA, expressed "skepticism whether a state au- 
thority's unsatisfactory handling of a single permit would ever warrant EPA 
revocation."463 In all probability, that court would have reached the same 
conclusion if the state had failed to enforce adequately against only one 
violator. 
EPA revocation of approval of a state program may be a remedy in a 
situation in which a state renders RCRA entirely inoperative within its 
borders by issuing inconsequential enforcement orders against all viola- 
tors, thus shielding them from successive EPA enforcement for compli- 
ance with RCRA. Revocation is an inappropriate remedy, however, in situa- 
tions of serious but not pervasive instances of the practice.4M Moreover, 
- 
Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 
562 Id. 
46'Save the Bay, Inc. v. Adm'r, EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1290 (5th Cir. 1977). By contrast 
to RCRA, Congress gave EPA a remedy under the CWA when a state issues a permit that 
fails to meet the requirements of the CWA: EPA can veto the state permit and issue a fed- 
eral permit. CWA § 402(d)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4) (2000); see also United States v. 
Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 740 (D. Del. 1981); ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 326 (not- 
ing the "[r]ule against interpreting statutes to be retroactive" and citing Bowen v. George- 
town Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.  204 (1988)). 
4M EPA has on occasion raised the specter of states sabotaging the federal program by 
similar means. In United States v. General Motors Corp., i t  argued that states could thwart 
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even if EPA did revoke its approval of the state's program in such a situa- 
tion, it is not clear under the Harmon court's analysis that revocation of 
approval would remove the shield against EPA enforcement that the ear- 
lier state order had conferred on the violator. Unless the revocation of 
approval is retrospective, an order made by the state prior to revocation 
would still have the same force and effect as if EPA had issued the order 
itself; it would preclude EPA from further enforcement. The Court's gen- 
eral presumption against retrospective application of government action, 
unless it is clearly intended, might assure this result.465 RCRA subsection 
3006(e) does not specify that revocation of approval of a state program is 
retrospective. Indeed, the provision requires EPA to notify the state and 
allow it to take appropriate corrective action within a reasonable time 
before revoking approval of the program.466 This suggests that revocation 
would not be retrospective. 
Moreover, the consequences of retrospective revocation of approval 
would be problematic. The state program approval could not have been void 
from the beginning, since the inadequate enforcement action justifying 
revocation occurred later. If revocation is retrospective to the time that the 
inadequate enforcement action was taken, actions taken by the state after 
that time but in conformity with RCRA also would be ineffective. That 
would yield a counterproductive and chaotic result. 
The Harmon court did not defer to EPA's interpretation of the stat- 
ute. EPA has long interpreted the statute to allow it to overfile. This interpre- 
tation was enunciated in an opinion of its General Counsel in 1986.467 Soon 
thereafter the opinion was attached to a policy statement, "Guidance on 
RCRA Overfiling," which instructed that "[rlegions should continue to 
overfile RCRA enforcement actions when the state fails to take timely 
and appropriate EPA's Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB") 
and, before the EAB's creation, EPA's Chief Judicial Officer ("CJO"), 
adopted this interpretation in rejecting challenges to RCRA administra- 
tive penalty assessments.469 EPA has also incorporated this interpretation 
enforcement of the CAA by flooding EPA with revisions to their state implementation 
plans. 876 F.2d 1060, 1067 (1 st Cir. 1989). 
465 E.g., Landgraf v. US1 Film Prods., 51 1 U.S. 244, 280-86 (1994). 
4" See 42 U.S.C. 5 6926(e) (2000). 
Effect on EPA Enforcement Action Taken by State With Approved RCRA Program, 
Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, EPA General Counsel, to Lee M. Thomas, EPA 
Administrator (May 9, 1986), available at http:Nwww.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/ 
policies/civil/rcra/rcraoverfiling-mem.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with the 
Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
468 Memorandum from A. James Barnes, Deputy Administrator (May 19, 1986), avail- 
able at http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/policies/civiYrcra/rcraoverfiling-mem.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
469 Bil-Dry, 9 E.A.D. 575 (2001); Harmon Elecs., lnc., 7 E.A.D. 1, 9-10 (1997); Gordon 
Redd Lumber Co., 5 E.A.D. 301, 308 (1994); S. Timber Prods., Inc., 3 E.A.D. 37 1, 378 
(1990); Martin Elecs., Inc., 2 E.A.D. 381, 385 (1987). 
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into its rule making^.^^^ Thus, EPA's interpretation is entitled to Chevron4" 
deference, even under Mead.472 The Eighth Circuit's opinion not only com- 
pletely ignores EPA's longstanding interpretation, but i t  reads a subsec- 
tion heading out of the statute. Not only is the decision ill-conceived, but 
its result allows states effectively to modify the application of national stan- 
dards by inadequate enforcement, thereby undermining national uniform- 
ity of regulatory standards and protection of public health. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Harmon court is correct in concluding 
that subsection 3006(d) deems a state's enforcement action to have the same 
force and effect as an EPA enforcement action, the impact of that conclu- 
sion on EPA overfiling depends on the force and effect an EPA enforcement 
action would have on a successive EPA enforcement action. The court does 
not ask whether an EPA enforcement action would bar a subsequent EPA 
enforcement action or the extent to which it would do so. While the court 
used res judicata as a separate basis of its analysis,473 it did not do so as 
part of its subsection 3006(d) analysis.474 Nothing in the text of RCRA sec- 
tion 3008, the EPA enforcement section, bars EPA from subsequent en- 
forcement if EPA has already enforced. Because the section's goal is com- 
pliance, it would be contrary to the section's purpose to bar EPA from sub- 
470 The note following 40  C.F.R. § 27 1.16(c) (2003) cautions that when a state with an 
approved program assesses inadequate penalties against a violation, EPA may bring an 
action for additional penalties. 
471 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
472 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Even if EPA's interpretation is 
not entitled to Chevron deference, it is entitled to respect in accordance with the formality 
of the procedures in which it developed the interpretation, the longevity and consistency of 
its interpretation, and the persuasiveness of the interpretation. Id. at 235-38. If EPA's pro- 
cedures were not formal enough to warrant Chevron deference, they were open, formal, 
subject to notice and comment, and judicial review. The interpretation has been in force 
and followed consistently since at least 1986, and it is a persuasive and reasonable inter- 
pretation. 
EPA's CJO ruled in BKK Corn. that EPA is orecluded from enforcine in a state with an 
- z - 
approved plan if the State had taken reasonable and appropriate enforcement action against 
the same violations. No. RCRA-IX-84-0012, 1984 WL 50073 (Apr. 13, 1984). vacated, 
No. IX-84-0012, 1985 WL 57150 (Oct. 23, 1985). His decision was based on the same 
rationale as the decision in Harmon: the "in lieu o f '  language of RCRA subsection 
- - 
3006(b) and the language in subsection 3006(d) that actions of states with approved pro- 
grams are "deemed to be the actions" of EPA. He came to a substantially different conclu- 
sion than Harmon, however, for the Eighth Circuit held that EPA was precluded from en- 
forcement when the state had taken any enforcement action, not just a reasonable and ap- 
propriate one. In response to a petition for reconsideration by EPA staff, the Administrator 
dismissed the complaint and vacated the final order of the CJO and the initial decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge, rendering them without value as precedent in the Agency. 
RCRA 3008, 84-85 (Oct. 23, 1985). EPA did not object to the policy enunciated in the 
CJO's opinion or even to its application to the facts. It objected to enshrining the interpre- 
tation of the statute in a formal agency interpretation of the statute. Because of concessions 
by the staff, the Administrator was able to declare the controversy over and dismiss the 
case without addressing the legal issue. Shortly after this event, EPA issued its policy on 
overfiling under RCRA. See supra note 450. 
473 Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 19 1 F.3d 894,902-03 (8th Cir. 1999). 
474 Id. at 899-901 (citing 42 U.S.C. 5 6926 (2000)). 
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sequent enforcement if its initial enforcement against a violator was inef- 
fective in securing compliance. Not surprisingly, if EPA issues a compli- 
ance order to a violator and the order does not secure compliance, nothing 
in the text of the section bars EPA from issuing a subsequent order, seek- 
ing an injunction, or seeking a criminal sanction.475 Indeed, the section ex- 
plicitly contemplates such subsequent enforcement,476 as do citizen s ~ i t s . ~ "  
The other statutes have similar provisions contemplating successive en- 
forcement by EPA against the same or different  violation^.^'^ Indeed, noth- 
ing in any of the statutes precludes the government from taking both civil 
and criminal actions against the same violations.479 Furthermore, EPA would 
be expected to take successive actions against the same violator if its vio- 
lations continued after the first action. If subsequent EPA enforcement in 
this context is barred, it is barred by common law, not by RCRA. 
Harmon spawned a burst of commentary, much of which is critical of 
the decision and argues that it does not apply under other statutes.480 Courts 
have rejected attempts to invoke Harmon under other statutes,481 and have 
also rejected further attempts to invoke it under RCRA, but often because 
it was di~tinguishable.~~? Moreover, the EAB has rejected it, though also 
475 RCRA $ 3008,42 U.S.C. 8 6928. 
476 See RCRA 8 3008(c), 42 U.S.C. $ 6928(c). 
477 See supra Pan I.C. 
478 CWA subsection 309(d) and CAA subsection 113(b)(2) authorize a court to assess 
penalties for violations of EPA compliance orders. 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(d) (2000); 42 U.S.C. 
9: 7413(b)(2) (2000). 
479 See LAND & NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DIRECTIVE 
NO. 5-87: GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS (1987), avail- 
able at http://www.sprlaw.comlhtml/guidelines.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with 
the Harvard Environmental Law Review); Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, 
Parallel Proceedings Policy (June 22, 1994), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTI- 
TUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES DESKBOOK 199 (1996). 
480 Cristiana Coop, Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 253 (2001); 
Lisa Dittman, Comment, Overjling: Policy Arguments in Support of the Gorilla in the 
Closet, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 375 (2000); Bryan S. Miller, Harmonizing RCRA's Enforce- 
ment Provisions: RCRA Overjling in Light of Harmon Industries v. Browner, 5 ENVTL. L. 
585 (1999); Bryan S. Miller, Understanding Overfiling: The Impact of Two Recent Federal 
Cases on EPA Over$ling, 15 J .  ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 21 (2000); Mintz, supra note 448; 
Zahren, supra note 448. The Miller articles favor the Harmon decision; the others criticize 
it, presenting legal and policy reasons to justify overfiling. 
48'See United States v. Bryant, 716 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1983). 
482 United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 101 1 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Flanagan, 
126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("Browner is not about if, but about when, 
the United States can bring a civil enforcement action in federal court after it has author- 
ized a state program."); United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F, Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo. 
2000), aff'd on other grounds, 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002) (offering a detailed and 
analytic rejection of Harmon). 
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in a case that was disting~ishable.~~' Not surprisingly, EPA has announced it 
will not follow Harmon, even under RCRA, except in the Eighth Cir~ui t .~~ ' '  
D. May EPA and Citizens Enforce Against Violations of Approved State 
Program Requirements that Are More Stringent Than or Beyond the 
Scope of the Superseded Federal Program? 
The final imputed preclusion promoted by defendants would bar EPA 
and citizens from enforcing against violations of approved state programs 
that are either more stringent or beyond the scope of existing federal regula- 
tions on the subject. Unlike the spurious arguments heretofore discussed 
in this Section, this imputed preclusion has merit in some cases, but not 
others, depending on the enforcement mechanism used in each statute. This 
Section will examine the different possible approaches to resolving this 
complex issue, then discuss the application of the imputed preclusion in 
each statute. 
A state requirement that is more stringent than a federal requirement 
regulates a pollutant or an activity already subject to a federal requirement, 
but regulates it more than the corresponding federal regulation. A state 
requirement that is beyond the scope of a federal requirement regulates a 
pollutant or an activity that is not regulated at all by the federal program. 
A federally approved state program might include both state requirements 
that are more stringent than the corresponding federal requirements and 
state requirements that are beyond the scope of the federal requirements. 
The statutes establish minimum criteria that state programs must 
meet to gain EPA approval485 and explicitly preserve the rights of the states 
to provide requirements more stringent but not less stringent than the federal 
requirements.486 EPA, therefore, could not disapprove part of a state pro- 
gram because it was more stringent than the federal program.487 EPA, how- 
483 Bil-Dry Corp., 9 E.A.D. 575 (2001). Although the EAB took pains to reject Harmon, 
the appeal it decided was of an EPA penalty assessment for a violation in a state with an 
approved program, but not in a case where the state had already taken enforcement action. 
EPA simply had not overfiled. 
484 "In the wake of the Eighth Circuit's opinion, EPA's General Counsel has reaffirmed 
that while Harmon is final and binding on EPA in that particular case, the Agency would 
not adopt the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of RCRFA nationwide." Bil-Dry Corp., 9 
E.A.D. 575, 590 (2001) (citing Letter from Gary S. Guzy to Congressman David M. 
McIntosh, at 3 (May 22, 2000)). 
CWA 5 402(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(b) (2000); RCRA 5 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. 8 6926(b) 
(2000); CAA 5 I lO(a), 42 U.S.C. 5 7410(a) (2000). See supra Part 1II.C. 
486 CWA 5 510, 33 U.S.C. 8 1370 (2000); CAA Q 1 16, 42 U.S.C. Q 7416 (2000); RCRA 
Q 3009.42 U.S.C. 5 6929 (2000). 
487 This may not be true for RCRA, which requires EPA to approve state programs that 
are "equivalent to the Federal program" and "not [inlconsistent" with the Federal or State 
programs applicable in the other States. 42 U.S.C. Q 6926(b) (2000). This would give EPA 
authority to disapprove a state program, for example, that went so far beyond the federal 
program as to effectively remove the state as a repository of hazardous wastes. If all states 
did so, of course, interstate movement of hazardous waste would be threatened and inter- 
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ever, could disapprove of part of a state program because it was beyond 
the scope of the federal program, i.e., it was not responsive to the statu- 
tory criteria for approving the program. Such disapproval would not in- 
validate the state requirements; they would remain in effect under state law, 
but would not become effective under federal law. None of the statutes ex- 
plicitly address whether state requirements more stringent than or beyond 
the scope of federal requirements are federally enforceable. As an ab- 
stract proposition, it may be argued that neither should be federally enforce- 
able, for both are beyond the requirements that EPA and citizens could en- 
force in the absence of an approved state program. As a practical matter, 
however, many of the more stringent state requirements are inseparable from 
the corresponding federal requirements. As to these requirements, the under- 
lying federal requirement could not be achieved without enforcing the 
more stringent state equivalents. The same cannot be said for state require- 
ments that are beyond the scope of the federal requirements. This suggests 
that state requirements that are more stringent than federal requirements 
should be federally enforceable while state requirements that are beyond 
the scope of federal requirements should not be. Of course, these general 
propositions may be ovenidden by the wording of the particular statutes. 
1. Three Approaches to the Question 
Confronted with attempts to enforce against violations of federally ap- 
proved state programs that are more stringent than their corresponding fed- 
eral requirements, courts could rule either that the more stringent state 
standards: (1) are not federally enforceable; (2) are federally enforceable, 
but only up to the level of the corresponding federal requirements; or (3)  are 
enforceable in their entirety. The first alternative leaves the correspond- 
ing federal requirements unenforceable. A state, thus, could insulate all 
its sources from federal standards simply by submitting a state program 
slightly more stringent than every requirement in the federal program and 
then not enforcing the state requirements. If EPA and citizens could not 
enforce the federal requirements because they were supplanted by the 
state requirements,488 and could not enforce the approved state requirements 
because they were more stringent than the federal requirements, pollution 
sources in the state would be effectively insulated from the federal require- 
ments. This first alternative, therefore, is unacceptable, as it thwarts the 
very purposes of the federal statutes. 
The second alternative appears to meet exactly the purposes of the fed- 
eral statutes and to be the correct alternative. As a practical matter, how- 
ever, it is feasible only when both the state and federal standards are stated 
state manufacturing would be imperiled from lack of places to treat and dispose of  hazard- 
ous waste. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
488 See supra Part 1I.B. 
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in numerical units of measurement. To demonstrate, assume a pollution 
source emits 1.5 ppm of the organic pollutant subject to a 1.0 ppm fed- 
eral limitation and a 0.5 ppm state limitation. The pollution source vio- 
lates both requirements. EPA or citizens could obtain a federal injunction 
requiring the source to comply with the 1.0 ppm federal standard, thus leav- 
ing the source in violation of the more stringent 0.5 ppm state standard. 
The state, if it chose, would still be able to obtain a state injunction to 
comply with its more stringent standard. There is no problem with sepa- 
rable enforcement as long as the federal and state requirements are stated 
in quantitative units of measurement. 
Federal and state requirements that are not stated in quantitative units 
of measurement, however, may not be separable. For instance, require- 
ments that are narrative and qualitative may not be separable from re- 
quirements that are stated in quantitative units of measurement. The number 
and location of groundwater monitoring wells surrounding a facility, for 
example, must be "sufficient" and "appropriate" to indicate the quality of 
groundwater affected by the permitted facility.489 Many RCRA regulatory 
requirements are established by the professional judgment of the permit 
writer.490 Since there is no objective standard useful for comparison of the 
federal and state standard, any attempt to draw a line where the federal stan- 
dard ends and the state standard begins will be in vain. 
Enforceability by EPA and citizens only up to the level of the federal 
requirement could be effective in instances in which state and federal 
limitations are separable, leaving the first or third alternatives to apply in 
other instances. However, that scheme brings with it the undesirable re- 
sults inherent in the first and third alternatives, albeit on a more limited basis 
than if either alternative applied in all cases. Moreover, it does not help 
to determine whether the first or third alternatives apply in such circum- 
stances. 
That conclusion leaves only the third alternative, that state require- 
ments are enforceable in their entirety. While federal enforcement of the 
more stringent state standard may be overkill in terms of the environmental- 
489 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 264.97(a) (2004): 
The ground-water monitoring system must consist of a sufficient number of wells, 
installed at appropriate locations and depths to yield ground-water samples from 
the uppermost aquifer that: (1) represent the quality of background water that has 
not been affected by leakage from the regulated unit . . . and (2) Represent the 
quality of ground-water passing the point of compliance. 
490 If the state's regulation adds after "appropriate" in the federal regulation "but at 
least every 25 feet," the state requirement is a more stringent state requirement when it 
requires more monitoring wells than an EPA permit writer would require under the federal 
regulation. It is impossible, however, to determine whether the state requirement is more 
stringent than the federal requirement in a particular permit without a parallel federal per- 
mit issuance in order to determine whether the federal requirement would allow more than 
twenty-five feet between the wells. 
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protection purpose of the federal statute, it is consistent with the policy 
and goals of the federal statutes to allow states to establish pollution abate- 
ment standards more stringent than the federal  standard^.^^' Courts that have 
rejected the third alternative have done so because federal enforcement of 
the more stringent state standard removes from the state its prosecutorial 
discretion to determine if and when the more stringent part of the state 
standard may be enforced.492 This rationale allows the state discretion to 
insulate sources from the federal standard, unacceptably defeating the 
environmental-protection purpose of the federal statute. 
This holding should not be followed because the state can preserve 
its discretion not to enforce its more stringent state standard, while pre- 
serving the federal enforceability of the federal standard. It can do so by 
not submitting the more stringent portion of the state standard as part of 
the state program to be approved by EPA. For instance, in the monitoring 
well example,493 the state could simply submit a clone of the federal regu- 
lation to EPA for approval and, after approval, amend the state regulation 
to make it more stringent. This leaves a less stringent standard as part of 
the approved and federally enforceable state program, and the more 
stringent portion of the standard enforceable by the state but not part of 
the approved and federally enforceable state program. Such part-approval 
amendments could trigger federal review to determine whether the state 
program still qualifies for federal approval. This requires a statute-specific 
analysis, but generally the statutes preserve the states' authority to have 
requirements more stringent than the federal requirements.494 
Because the objectionable result of the third alternative can be avoided 
by the state, it is the preferable alternative, either alone or in combination 
with the second alternative. Moreover, it is preferable alone rather than in 
combination with the second alternative because applying it alone results 
in a single rule for the federal enforceability of more stringent state stan- 
dards in approved state programs. 
2.  Statute-by-Statute Analysis 
This abstract analysis, however, may be greatly affected by differences 
between the federal statutes. The CWA, for instance, requires state water 
49' These statutes generally have state administration as a policy. See, e.g., CWA Q 101(b), 
33 U.S.C. Q 1251(b). At the same time, they preserve the rights of states to have standards 
more stringent than the federal standards. See, e .g . ,  CWA Q 510, 33 U.S.C. 5 1370 (2000). 
Stricter state standards provide more environmental protection than less stringent federal 
standards, thus furthering the environmental protection goals of the statutes. See, e .g. ,  
CWA Q 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a). 
492Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that RCRA 
does not authorize citizen suits based on more stringent state standards). 
493 See supra note 490. 
494 See, e .g . ,  CWA 5 510, 33 U.S.C. 5 1370 (2000); RCRA Q 3009, 42 U.S.C. Q 6929 
(2000); CAA Q 1 16 ,42 U.S.C. 5 7416 (2000). 
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pollution standards that are more stringent than federal standards to be 
included as conditions in permits and to be complied with.495 It also re- 
quires EPA to include in permits all conditions that a state in which the per- 
mitted discharge is located deems necessary to meet state requirements 
relating to water.496 The Supreme Court held in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson 
County v. Washington Department of Ecology that federal agencies issu- 
ing permits have no choice but to include such conditions in permits, even 
though they do not originate in federal  requirement^.^^' These conditions 
could include state standards that are either more stringent than their cor- 
responding federal standards or beyond the scope of the federal program. 
The CWA also authorizes both EPA and citizens to enforce against viola- 
tions of permits, whether issued by EPA or states.498 It follows that both 
may enforce against violations of permit conditions derived from state stan- 
dards that are more stringent than the corresponding federal standards. 
EPA's regulations, however, establish that provisions of approved state 
programs beyond the scope of the CWA are not federally enforceable, al- 
though the regulations do not specifically address the enforceability of 
permit conditions based on such state provisions.499 
Relying on EPA's regulations and misapplying other Supreme Court 
precedent, one court has held that citizens may not enforce against viola- 
tions of conditions in state-issued permits that are beyond the scope of the 
CWA.500 It does not make sense, however, for EPA and citizens to enforce 
state provisions beyond the scope of the CWA in EPA-issued permits, but 
not in state-issued permits. The court did not consider this. It issued its 
495 CWA subsection 301(b)(l)(C) requires compliance with more stringent state stan- 
dards. 33 U.S.C. Q 131 l(b)(l)(C) (2000). CWA subsection 402(a)(l)(A) requires EPA to 
include section 301 requirements in permits, 33 U.S.C. Q 1342(a)(l)(A) (2000), and CWA 
subsection 402(b)(l)(A) requires states with approved programs to do so as well, 33 U.S.C. 
Q 1342(b)(l)(A). Finally, CWA subsection 309(a) authorizes EPA to enforce against viola- 
tion of "any condition" based on section 301 in a permit issued by EPA or a state with an 
approved program. 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(a) (2000). 
496 CWA $5 302(b)(l)(C), 401(a), 401(d), 33 U.S.C. Q Q  1312(b)(l)(C), 1341(a), 1341(d) 
(2000). 
497 51 1 U.S. 700 (1994). 
CWA Q Q  309(a)(l), 505(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. Q Q  13 19(a)(l), 1365(a)(l) (2000). 
499 40 C.F.R. Q 123.1(i)(2) (2004). 
500 Atl. States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co. held that requirements in a permit 
issued by a state with an approved program broader in scope than the federal standards 
were not enforceable by citizens. 12 F.3d 353, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1994) The court relied on 
United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio which held that citizens could not enforce the pen- 
alty provisions in an approved state program because they did not arise under federal law. 
503 U.S. 607, 624-25 (1992). In that case, Ohio, suing the Department of Energy ("DOE") 
under the citizen suit provisions of the CWA and RCRA, was thwarted in its attempt to 
have penalties assessed under the penalty provisions of the federal statutes because the 
Court held the statutes did not waive sovereign immunity in that regard. Id. at 620. Ohio 
then tried to have penalties assessed under the state statute, but the Court held that that was 
beyond the jurisdiction of the citizen suit provisions. Id. at 625-26. The decision, of 
course, does not deal with state standards or requirements, but with state procedures. It 
also involved an asserted waiver of federal sovereign immunity, subject to a long history of 
narrow interpretation. See supra note 428. 
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opinion before PUD No. I and might well have come to a different conclu- 
sion in light of that decision. Under the peculiar structure and wording of 
the CWA, conditions of permits derived from state requirements that are 
either more stringent or beyond the scope of their federal counterparts are 
enforceable by both EPA and citizens.50' 
The CAA contains no provision comparable to CWA subsection 30 1 (b) 
(l)(C), which requires EPA to include state requirements more stringent 
or beyond the scope of the corresponding federal requirements in EPA- 
issued permits. The conceptual basis of the CAA program is substantially 
different in this regard. EPA promulgates national ambient air quality 
standards for individual pollutants, and states develop implementation 
plans to achieve the federal standards.502 The implementation plans in- 
clude emission limitations on air pollution sources designed to reduce pollu- 
tion sufficiently to achieve the federal ambient air quality standards. For 
any source of a pollutant for which EPA has promulgated a standard, it is 
difficult to determine whether the state requirements in the implementa- 
tion plan are more or less stringent than federal requirements, for they are 
just part of the mix of controls on all sources that must, in the aggregate, 
achieve the federal standard. Indeed, the Court has held that EPA must ap- 
prove a state implementation plan that goes beyond and is more stringent 
than federal requirements.503 The structure of the CAA, therefore, sug- 
gests that state requirements in an approved implementation plan for an 
individual pollutant that are more stringent than federal requirements are 
federally enforceable. On the other hand, state requirements beyond the 
scope of the CAA may not fit this rationale. For instance, state requirements 
for controlling a pollutant for which EPA has not promulgated a standard 
are beyond the scope of the federal program and need not be federally en- 
forceable to achieve the goals of the CAA.S04 Courts have generally held that 
such requirements are not federally enforceable.505 
50' United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 795-96 (E.D. Va. 1997), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 19 1 F.3d 5 16, 526 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that EPA may enforce stricter state requirement included in permit issued by state with 
approved program); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 
(D. Md. 1987) (applying stricter state upset and bypass defense in citizen suit for violation 
of permit issued by state with approved program.). 
'OzCAA $5 109-1 l0 ,42  U.S.C. 00 7409-7410 (2000). 
503 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
504 Both the EPA and citizen enforcement provisions authorize enforcement against "an 
applicable implementation plan." 42 U.S.C. 09 7413(a)(I), 7604(a)(1), 7604(f) (2000). The 
CAA defines "applicable implementation plan" to mean a plan or portion of a plan ap- 
proved by EPA "which implements the relevant requirements for this chapter." 42 U.S.C. 
5 7602(q) (2000). State requirements beyond the scope of the CAA do not implement its 
requirements, while state requirements more stringent than the CARS requirements do 
implement its requirements. 
505 But see Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1041 (E.D. 
Tex. 1995) (holding that citizens may enforce requirements in State Implementation Plans 
("SIP") that are more stringent than federal standards, but not SIP standards that are be- 
yond the scope of the CAA). The Seventh Circuit discussed but did not decide the issue in 
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Under RCRA, EPA may not approve a state program unless it is 
"equivalent to" and "consistent with" the federal program under Subchapter 
III.506 A state may impose requirements on the handling of hazardous waste 
that are "more stringent" than those under Subchapter 111,507 but may not 
impose requirements that are "less stringent."508 Therefore, once EPA ap- 
proves a state RCRA program, the state may impose more stringent re- 
quirements on the regulated public than are required by RCRA. Most such 
requirements, of course, are contained in permits issued by the state. Be- 
cause the requirements imposed by RCRA are fairly stringent and most 
state programs are virtual clones of RCRA, this is not often the case, but 
it does occur on occasion. EPA may enforce civilly against violations of 
"any requirement of this ~ u b c h a p t e r . " ~ ~ ~  Its authority to enforce crimi- 
nally is detailed more explicitly, but includes treatment, storage and dis- 
posal of hazardous waste without or in violation of a "permit under this 
s u b ~ h a p t e r . " ~ ~ ~  Citizens may enforce against violations of "any permit, 
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition or order that has 
become effective pursuant to this ~hapter."~" At least with regard to the 
common violations of treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste 
without or in violation of a RCRA permit, the plain wording of the stat- 
ute makes it illegal for anyone to treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste 
without or in violation of an EPA issued RCRA permit.512 Once EPA ap- 
proves a state program, the state issues permits "in lieu o f '  EPA and the 
effect of a state permit is deemed to have the "same force and effect" as 
an EPA-issued permit.513 Insofar as they are incorporated in a state-issued 
permit, "more stringent state" requirements operate in lieu of EPA re- 
quirements and have the same force and effect as EPA requirements. EPA 
and citizens, therefore, may enforce them as if they were EPA require- 
ments. Indeed, EPA's regulations provide that more stringent standards in 
an approved state plan are enforceable under RCRA,514 while state re- 
quirements that are beyond the scope of RCRA are not part of the ap- 
proved plan and therefore are not federally enfor~eable ."~ The sole deci- 
sion of which the author is aware, addressing the issue under RCRA Sub- 
Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1994). I t  
did indicate that federal enforcement of SIP requirements more stringent than federal re- 
quirements was conceivable, for they might be counterbalanced by other SIP requirements 
that were less stringent than federal requirements, in a balance meeting the desired air 
quality. Id. 
506 RCRA Q 3006(b), 4 2  U.S.C. Q 6926(b) (2000). 
507 But see supra note 487. 
508 RCRA Q 3009,42 U.S.C. 5 6929 (2000). 
509 RCRA 3 3008(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. Q 6928(a)(1) (2000). 
510  RCRA 5 3008(d)(2)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. Q 6928(d)(2)(A)-(B). 
5 1 1  RCRA 5 7002(a)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C. Q 6972(a)(l)(A) (2000). 
5 1 2  RCRA 5 3005(a), 42 U.S.C. Q 6925(a) (2000). 
5 1 3  RCRA Q 3006(b), (d), 42 U.S.C. 5 6926(b), (d) (2000). 
5 1 4  4 0  C.F.R. Q 27 1 . 1  (h)(i)(l) (2003). 
5 1 5  4 0  C.F.R. Q 27 I .  1 (h)(i)(2). 
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chapter 111, cited these regulations as authoritative, but found the defen- 
dant had not adequately briefed its contention that the state requirements 
it allegedly violated were beyond the scope of RCRA.5'6 
The Ninth Circuit held in Ashoff v. City of Ukiah5" that citizens could 
enforce the minimum federal standard under RCRA Subchapter IV, regu- 
lating non-hazardous waste landfills, but not the more stringent state stan- 
dard, in essence allowing EPA and citizen enforcement only to the limit 
of the federal standards. Because the suit was to enforce against Subchapter 
IV violations rather than Subchapter I11 violations, the statutory analysis 
suggested above does not apply, although the practical difficulties with al- 
ternative two remain. Although the court did not notice the substan- 
tial differences between Subchapters I11 and IV support the court's conclu- 
sion. There is no federal program under Subchapter IV. EPA is to prom- 
ulgate "sanitary landfill" criteria for non-hazardous waste landfills. 
Landfills not meeting the federal criteria are declared "open dumps." States 
are to develop permit programs to close open dumps or make them con- 
form to the federal criteria and submit them to EPA for approval. Thereafter, 
states are supposed to implement and enforce the programs and permits. If a 
state's program is approved, EPA has no enforcement authority. If a state 
does not have an approved permit program, EPA does not develop one or 
issue permits, although it may enforce the federal criteria against indi- 
vidual open The court's conclusion appears to be grounded in its 
implicit observation that RCRA invests considerably less importance in 
the effective implementation and enforcement of the Subchapter IV pro- 
gram than it does in the Subchapter I11 program. The court could have 
reached the opposite conclusion, however, by finding that the more strin- 
gent state standard and the permit requirement based on it had "become 
effective" pursuant to RCRA upon EPA's approval of the state program 
and thus enforceable under the citizen suit provision, subsection 7002(a)(l) 
(A). But since EPA could not enforce the more stringent state standard in 
a state with an approved program, to allow citizens to do so seems anoma- 
lous. EPA cannot enforce even its own solid waste standards in a state with 
an approved program, while citizens may, which also seems anomalous.520 
In conclusion, analysis of the statutes suggests that requirements in 
federally approved state programs that are more stringent than corre- 
5 ' 6  Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1040-41 (E.D. Tex. 
1995). The court in United Stares v. Flanagan came to the same conclusion, although it 
was not squarely faced with the issue. 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1290 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
5 ' 7  130 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 1997). 
5 ' 8  The court instead noted differences between RCRA section 7002 .42  U.S.C. 5 6972 
(2000). on the one hand and CWA section 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365 (2000), and CAA section 
304, 4 2  U.S.C. 5 7404 (2000), on the other. It noted that the CWA and CAA provisions 
authorized citizens to enforce against state-issued orders, while the RCRA provision did 
not. Ashoff, 130 F.3d at 41 2-1 3.  
519 RCRA 5 4005(c), 4 2  U.S.C. 5 6945(c) (2000). 
520 See supra Part I.A.3. 
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sponding federal requirements generally are federally enforceable, par- 
ticularly if they are incorporated into permits. Conversely, requirements 
in federally approved state programs that are beyond the scope of the federal 
programs are generally considered not to be part of the federally approved 
programs and hence generally are not federally enforceable. Under the 
unique certification provision of the CWA,"' however, such requirements 
are enforceable when incorporated into EPA-issued permits. 
Part One observed that courts split dramatically when interpreting some 
parts of the preclusion device in citizen suit provisions, particularly on 
the meaning of "is diligently p r o ~ e c u t i n g . " ~ ~ ~  While most courts are con- 
tent to interpret the device in accordance with the plain meaning, others 
depart from its plain meaning to thwart citizen enforcement in favor of 
the prosecutorial discretion of the earlier government enforcer, usually a 
state government. Those courts find encouragement to disregard the plain 
meaning of the statutes in the Supreme Court's observation in Gwaltney 
of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Fo~ndat ion~~ '  that citizen enforce- 
ment supplements rather than supplants government enforcement. Part One 
analyzed Gwaltney and found it to be a deeply flawed opinion in this re- 
gard. Although Gwaltney did not interpret the preclusion device,524 every 
decision interpreting the device to defeat citizen suits has relied heavily 
on it. Their reliance on Gwaltney's observation is ironic, for the Court's 
primary interpretive technique in the decision was to apply the plain mean- 
ing of the tenses Congress used in the statute. Part One concluded that 
Congress intended exactly what it wrote in the citizen suit preclusion device: 
that courts should interpret the device in accordance with its plain meaning, 
and that those courts refusing to do so have ignored both congressional 
intent and dominant canons of statutory interpretation. 
The same split in courts interpreting the preclusion device in citizen 
suit provisions is evident in courts interpreting the preclusion device in 
EPA enforcement provisions, particularly in CWA subsection 309(g). The 
device in that provision partially precludes both citizen and EPA en- 
forcement and most decisions interpreting it have been in citizen suits. 
Courts thwarting subsequent enforcement under CWA subsection 309(g) 
do not merely support prosecutorial discretion by broadly interpreting "is 
diligently prosecuting," but do so by disregarding several limitations Con- 
gress carefully drafted into subsection 309(g)'s preclusion device.'*' While 
52' CWA 5 401, 33 U.S.C. 5 1341 (2000). 
522 Miller, supra note I ,  at 463-73, 479-84. 
523 484 U.S. 49  (1987). 
52"nstead, i t  interpreted "in violation" to mean that the citizen suit provision granted 
jurisdiction for citizens to sue only for ongoing violations. Id. at 57. 
525 See supra Part II.A.2. 
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these courts continue to rely on Gwaltney for a general policy direction, 
they rely specifically on North and South Rivers Watershed Assn., Inc. v. 
Town of S c i t u ~ t e , ~ ~ ~  one of the first circuit court decisions interpreting sub- 
section 309(g) and a decision that is even more flawed than G ~ a l t n e y . ~ ~ '  
The division between the courts is not as evident in decisions inter- 
preting the preclusion device in other EPA enforcement provisions, in part 
because there are fewer decisions under them and in part, because defer- 
ence to governmental prosecutorial discretion is blurred when EPA over- 
files, for the enforcement discretion of both EPA and state enforcers are 
involved. 
Considering the judicial divide in the context of EPA as well as citi- 
zen enforcement makes its implications more disturbing. On the one hand, 
most courts faithfully apply the plain wording of the preclusion to allow 
EPA or citizens to enforce when initial state enforcement has not achieved 
compliance or has not assessed a sufficient penalty to provide deterrent 
value. On the other hand, some courts ignore the plain wording of the 
preclusion to prevent EPA or citizens from enforcing under these circum- 
stances. While most of the latter decisions interpret the preclusion device 
only in citizen suit provisions, the similarity of the device in both EPA 
and citizen provisions suggests it has the same meaning in both sets of 
enforcement provisions. The end result of ignoring the preclusion device's 
plain wording is that state enforcement insulates the violator from en- 
forcement by EPA or citizens regardless of the effectiveness of state en- 
forcement. Unfortunately, the factual settings of many of the reported 
decisions suggest that state enforcement is often far from effective.528 To 
allow states to insulate their regulated public from compliance with fed- 
eral environmental requirements can thwart and potentially eviscerate fed- 
eral law. To interpret the preclusion device in either EPA or citizen en- 
forcement provisions to allow this, ignores the text of the provisions, the 
major canons of statutory construction, and the balance Congress struck be- 
tween federal and state enforcement. 
V. INTEGRATED INTERPRETATION F THE STATUTORY BARS TO EPA A N D  
CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT 
Congress enacted broad authority for EPA and citizen enforcement 
actions to promote compliance with environmental laws. It intended the 
citizen suit provisions also to promote citizen participation in environ- 
mental enforcement. It enacted these enforcement authorities against a 
backdrop of cooperative federalism in the implementation of environmental 
programs. For many of the most important programs, Congress envisioned 
526 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1992). 
527 See supra Parts II.A.3.b.(ii).-(iii)., II.A.3.e. 
52s See supra notes 349-360 and accompanying text. 
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that states would assume the primary implementation role, including 
primary enforcement, subject to EPA oversight, and with EPA as the de- 
fault implementer and enforcer if states did not assume the primary role. 
Congress foresaw that unfettered citizen enforcement could result in suc- 
cessive citizen enforcement actions against the same violations, potentially 
conflicting with government enforcement. It also foresaw that, in pro- 
grams with federalized implementation, unfettered EPA and citizen en- 
forcement could result in successive federal enforcement actions against 
the same violations, potentially conflicting with state enforcement. It there- 
fore included in the broad EPA and citizen enforcement authorities vari- 
ants of the three-element notice, delay and bar preclusion device to limit 
conflicts from successive enforcement. 
The preclusion device is not absolute; it is limited. Moreover, Con- 
gress used somewhat different versions of the device in different EPA and 
citizen enforcement provisions. Each preclusion device incorporates its 
own set of qualifications, allowing and preventing varying sets of succes- 
sive enforcement actions. The purposes of the broad enforcement au- 
thorities and of the limited preclusions are not entirely complementary, 
but are the result of legislative compromise. For this reason, EPA and citizen 
enforcement provisions and their preclusion devices cannot be interpreted 
through the lens of a single legislative purpose. Congressional intent is 
better understood by recognizing that Congress, in different ways in different 
provisions, made compromises among opposing desires for (1) achieving 
full compliance through enforcement; (2) avoiding interference with gov- 
ernment enforcement by limiting successive citizen enforcement; and 
(3) avoiding federalism conflicts by limiting successive federal enforce- 
ment. While the best indicia of congressional intent is normally the plain 
meaning of the words it uses, this is particularly true when the provision 
interpreted is the result of compromising divergent goals. The preclusion 
devices in EPA and citizen suit provisions, then, are best interpreted by 
reference to their plain English meaning, unless that interpretation causes 
internal inconsistencies, renders clauses redundant or meaningless, or 
reaches absurd results. 
Most courts have used a plain-English meaning interpretation of 
most issues arising under the provisions with straightforward results com- 
patible with the statute's goals of full compliance. Some courts have reached 
tortured and aberrant results by disregarding the plain meaning of the 
provisions and instead interpreting them to defer as much as possible to 
the government's-particularly the state's-enforcement discretion. They 
elevate a provision's exception over its purpose, contrary to the canon of 
construction that exceptions be interpreted narrowly. Worse, they threaten 
judicial amendment of the underlying statutes by effectively allowing 
violators to shield themselves from compliance with federal law by solic- 
iting ineffective enforcement actions from state enforcers who may not 
be zealous guardians of federal law. These interpretations and their re- 
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sults are not true to-indeed, they do violence.to-the purpose, wording 
and history of the provisions and should be disregarded. 
The preclusion device appears no less than sixteen times in the EPA 
and citizen enforcement provisions of the nine statutes implemented by 
EPA. The author is aware of no other device that Congress used as often 
in these statutes. The preclusion device is sophisticated; while it establishes 
an exception for successive actions to the broad enforcement authorities 
conferred by the statutes, it creates exceptions to that exception. Congress 
crafted sophistication into the device by creating it from three elements, 
each of which it could vary to achieve the exact preclusion it intended in 
each statutory provision. Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that 
when Congress intended to preclude successive enforcement, it did so by 
placing a variant of the preclusion device in the relevant enforcement provi- 
sion, not by obliquely implying preclusion from another provision. It is 
also clear that Congress intended to preclude successive enforcement under 
a particular provision to the extent, and only to the extent, of the words it 
included in the provision's preclusion device. Courts thus need look no 
further than the wording of a particular preclusion to determine the ex- 
tent to which it allows or forbids successive enforcement. 
Heinonline - -  29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 115 2005 
